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Abstract 
Divided into five core chapters, this thesis examines the success and failures of both the 
insurgent that was the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and the counterinsurgent 
(Malaysia and to a lesser extent Singapore) during the Second Emergency (1968 to 1981). 
The conflict is set within a paradigm built upon the four key touchstones of utility of 
military force, civil-military relations, population security, and propaganda. Anglo-
American Counterinsurgency practice in Malaya and Vietnam as well as the doctrine of 
People‘s War and Maoist mass persuasion will be comparatively examined within the 
framework of the abovementioned four touchstones to set the backdrop for the debate on 
the Second Emergency. The CPM‘s strategy of anti-colonial armed struggle from 1948 to 
1960 will be compared with that of its post-colonial armed revolution between 1968 and 
1981. Key themes exploited by the CPM in its propaganda to revolutionise the thoughts and 
actions of its target audience and its impact will be analysed. Likewise, the counter-
measures adopted by both the Malaysian and Singapore governments in response to 
communist insurrection and subversion will be elucidated. A significant part of this thesis 
is dedicated to an assessment of the Malaysian COIN doctrine of KESBAN. In a 
comparative study of the continuities and departures between colonial and post-colonial 
COIN approaches and practices, the strategies adopted in the First Emergency will be 
juxtaposed with that of the Second - particularly the evolution of KESBAN and the concept 
of ‗Comprehensive Security‘. Most importantly, the fundamental ‗Why‘ question, namely - 
Why did the emergent post-colonial states of Malaysia and Singapore triumph; and why did 
the CPM‘s armed revolution failed yet again will be addressed. In providing an answer, this 
study revisits both the interior and exterior terrain of manoeuvre available to both sides of 
the conflict and explains why and how the CPM‘s strategy was inadequate for the 
geopolitical and geostrategic terrain of its day. 
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1. 
 
Introduction: Revolution and Counterrevolution in Southeast Asia 
 
Why the Second Emergency Matters 
 
In the words of Julian Paget, the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) is a: ‗classic example of 
a communist takeover bid, based on insurgency and guerrilla warfare‘.1 The Emergency is 
also a rare model of an insurgency defeated by the state and, as such, ‗the‘ paradigm for 
successive insurgency/counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. Reflecting this singular 
status, there is now an extensive literature on the subject; particularly COIN concepts and 
doctrines derived from the methods and approaches of the forces deployed throughout the 
Emergency‘s lengthy course. The significance of propaganda to the containment of the 
Communists‘ appeal among the civilian population, Malaya‘s ethnic Chinese community 
in particular, has been extensively documented by both Susan Carruthers and Kumar 
Ramakrishna in their seminal works on the issue.
2
 Their work, although revisionist in 
other respects, is orthodox in its central focus on the decisive middle years of the Malayan 
Emergency, between the formulation of the Briggs Plan from 1950 to Sir Gerald Templer‘s 
implementation of Britain‘s ‗Hearts and Minds‘ approach thereafter. This highpoint of the 
Emergency is discussed in more detail below. What becomes clear is that there is no 
comparable body of work – either in quantity or quality – relating to the Second Malayan 
Emergency, the focus of this thesis. 
 
The Malayan Communist Party‘s (MCP) decisive defeat in 1960 led many 
academics and COIN experts to overlook the resurrection of its armed struggle in 1968 
(known after 1964 as the Communist Party of Malaya or CPM for short). If only by 
implication, then, most scholars continue to regard the so-called ‗Second Emergency‘ 
(1968-1989) as a non-event. Most, if not all, recent published work on the MCP tends to 
focus on the earlier Malayan Emergency. In 2004, the proceedings of a two-day workshop 
that placed Chin Peng, Secretary General of MCP alongside a panel of invited scholars at 
the Australian National University (ANU) in 1999, were published as Dialogues With Chin 
                                                 
1
 Julian Paget, ‗Emergency in Malaya‘ in Gerard Chaliand (ed.), Guerrilla Strategies: A Historical Anthology 
from the Long March to Afghanistan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982, 270.  
2
 Susan Carruthers, Winning Hearts and Minds:British Governments, the Media and Colonial Counter-
insurgency 1944-1960 and Kumar Ramakrishna, Emergency Propaganda: the Winning of Malayan Hearts 
and Minds 1948-1958. 
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Peng. These proceedings provided valuable insight into the strategic direction of the MCP‘s 
armed struggle, but the questions posed by the panel of scholars were overwhelmingly 
concentrated within the timeframe of the Malayan Emergency. The focus on the late 
colonial period continues. Typical in this regard is Anthony Stockwell‘s most recent article 
on Chin Peng, which begins with the quote: ‗Fifty years ago, the name Chin Peng was 
feared almost as much as Osama bin Laden is today. So wrote the Hong Kong-based 
journalist, Philip Bowring…it was a time when Chin Peng was Britain‘s enemy number 
one in Southeast Asia‘.3 Unsurprisingly, Stockwell‘s article is overwhelmingly concerned 
with Chin Peng‘s role in events rooted in the Emergency period. What transpired after 1960 
- namely, the reorganisation of the CPM and the subsequent revival of its armed struggle - 
has yet to receive anything like the attention heaped upon the Emergency. We still await 
rigorous scholarship that deals specifically with the Second Malayan Emergency period, 
whether its antecedents from the early sixties or its aftermath and final conclusion in 1989. 
If the historiography of this period remains underdeveloped, the obvious question to ask is: 
why? A partial answer lies in the central part played in official discourse by nation-building 
narratives in Southeast Asia during the post-1945 decolonisation interregnum. And the 
Malaysian authorities, in particular, needed a unifying story to tell. 
 
Malaysia, according to Stockwell ‗was constructed from previously disconnected 
parts which lacked an integrating, pre-colonial core and whose commonality…rested 
merely on experience of various forms of British rule‘.4 With the exception of Cambodia, 
Vietnam and Thailand, much the same can be said of Singapore or any of the Southeast 
Asian states that were cobbled together in the wake of post-war imperial retreat. Post-war 
independence presented an opportunity for the newly emergent states of Southeast Asia to 
write their own national narrative unfettered by the shackles (if not the historical baggage) 
of the colonial state. Indeed, for many Southeast Asian countries, forging nationhood 
remains unfinished business. Wang Gung Wu, arguably Singapore‘s most established 
historian, makes no bones of the fact that in most contemporary Southeast Asian countries, 
                                                 
3
 A.J.Stockwell, ‗Chin Peng and the Struggle for Malaya‘, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 16 (3), 2006, 
279-297, 279. 
4
 A.J.Stockwell, ‗Forging Malaysia and Singapore: Colonialism, Decolonisation and Nation-building‘ in 
Wang Gung Wu (ed), Nation-Building: Five Southeast Asian Histories, Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2005, 
192-3. 
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historians are obliged to ‗contribute to nation-building efforts by writing national history‘.5  
Therefore, any readily available published work that touches on communism in Malaysia 
and Singapore from the late sixties through to the early eighties tends to be two-
dimensional at best and is usually subsumed within a nation-building nationalist narrative.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, scholars outside the system have challenged the 
national narrative, constructing alternative histories. There are problems here too. Their 
quest for alternatives sometimes becomes an acrimonious politicised exercise that sets ‗us‘, 
the marginalised, against ‗them‘, the monolithic state dominated by the ruling party. The 
‗us‘ reject the dominant national narrative, casting themselves as actors speaking out from 
the shadows on behalf of political opponents who have been denied their right to be heard 
as agents of history. One such work, Paths not Taken: Political Pluralism in Post-War 
Singapore, depicted Singapore as a culturally, intellectually and politically dynamic space 
from 1945 until the mid-1970s at which point the People‘s Action Party (PAP)-dominated 
state began its monopolisation of contemporary historical discourse. In this line of 
argument, the thirty years from 1945 was a golden period in which fiery political 
contenders - students, labour unions and representatives from ethnic and religious 
communities - articulated alternative visions of Singapore‘s future and ‗between them 
generated a ferment of ideologies, priorities, perspectives and social visions such as 
mainstream official Singapore politics had never known before, and has not seen since‘.6 
Academically, this approach represents a rigorous alternative to the state-centric narrative. 
However, when read against the grain, it reads, not as a dispassionate assessment, but as a 
lament for a vision of Singapore that could have been: a pluralistic, kinder and gentler 
Singapore far from the path of state-directed global capitalism, elitist-meritocracy, ethnic 
essentialism and micro social-engineering.  
 
With nation-building as the epicentre, historical debate tends to displace broader 
issues that cross national boundaries and the great diversity of ethnic (indigenous and 
immigrant) groups, languages, cultures that are to be found in Southeast Asia. Indeed, this 
                                                 
5
 Wang Gung Wu, ‗Contemporary and National History: A Double Challenge‘ in Wang Gung Wu (ed), 
Nation-Building: Five Southeast Asian Histories, 5. 
6
 Michael D. Barr & Carl A. Trocki (eds), Paths not Taken: Political Pluralism in Post-War Singapore, 
Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008, 6. 
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begs a deeper conceptual question: can the diverse stories of such a multitude of peoples 
and social groups be brought under the rubric of a single narrative? Thongchai Winichakul 
challenged Southeast Asian historians to explore new terrains in the past by ‗shifting their 
angles of visions, to new sites…beyond the clichéd themes and jaded narratives of national 
history‘.7 Winichakul suggested that the concepts of interstices (the history of the locations 
and moments between being and not being a nation, becoming and not becoming a nation) 
and margins (where the inclusion and exclusion, integration and suppression of certain 
meanings take place) present open epistemological spaces where hitherto displaced or 
suppressed histories might be hidden.
8
 However, like episodes in history, historians are 
very much the children of their particular milieu, bound and shaped by forces unique to a 
specific historical moment. In contemporary Southeast Asia, politics is deeply embedded in 
historiography and history-writing. This is particularly true for indigenous scholars who, 
unlike their foreign counterparts, do not have the luxury of distancing themselves from 
supporting or challenging the nation-building project. In short, it is difficult for Southeast 
Asian historians to remain apolitical or detached from their own national histories.  
 
That said, indigenous scholars are increasingly taking up Winichakul‘s call to 
explore the interstices and margins of Southeast Asian history, but political constraints, 
whether real or imagined, remain. These constraints can be practical, such as access to 
documents and interview subjects. Or they may reflect the personal and professional 
challenges intrinsic to the crossing of the unseen Rubicons represented by what is 
politically permissible, transgression of which may result in ‗intellectual martyrdom‘. On 
the other hand, examining Southeast Asian history from a strategic perspective that presents 
the rationale of both the state and non-state actors allows for a less contentious non-partisan 
narrative that transcends interest groups. The American historian Paul Kratoska, for one, 
premised the understanding of modern Southeast Asia on two pillars.  One was the 
examination of the processes through which emergent Southeast Asian states took over 
existing borders and administrative mechanisms during the transition to independence. The 
other was the ensuing internal transformation from loosely joined collectivities into unitary 
                                                 
7
 Abu Talib Ahmad & Tan Liok Ee (eds), New Terrains in Southeast Asian History, Singapore: National 
University of Singapore Press, 2003, ix-xvii. 
8
 Thongchai Winichakul, ‗Writing at the Interstices: Southeast Asian Historians and Postnational Histories in 
Southeast Asia‘ in Abu Talib Ahmad & Tan Liok Ee (eds), New Terrains in Southeast Asian History, 
Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2003, 11-2. 
10 
 
states under the dual impetus of nationalist ideology and administrative convenience.
9
 In 
the case of Malaysia, the insurgency waged by the CPM was the formative experience 
during Malaysia‘s first three decades of independence. Indeed, the strong centralised state 
that has guided Malaysia in its economic success over the last thirty years or so has its 
origins in the Emergency period (1948-1960) and was further, and more fundamentally, 
rationalised in the Second Emergency period (1968-1989). Thus, both emergencies have 
much to offer in explaining the formation of the Malaysian state and, albeit to a lesser 
extent, the Singaporean state as well. In short, the experience of state-formation and the 
state-centric narrative is for better or worse, the dominant story of post-colonial Southeast 
Asia. Presenting a strategic picture of both emergencies – but placing the second 
emergency to the fore of an analysis situated within the framework of state formation - 
remains an ‗untold story‘.  
 
In many ways, the Second Emergency has always lived in the shadow of the First. 
The strategic approaches adopted by both the state and the Malayan Communists in the 
Second Emergency were substantially influenced by the Emergency experience even 
though the international, political and socio-economic context of the 1970s was 
significantly different from that of the 1950s. The same can be said for the literature on the 
subject. From the current U.S. COIN manual FM 3-24 to the Royal United Services 
Institute (RUSI) Journal, much has been said about the utility of the Malayan Emergency 
COIN paradigm for contemporary practice. Indeed, for many COIN practitioners, what is 
of relevance is the inaugural Malayan Emergency while the resurrection of the CPM‘s 
armed struggle remains under-researched. The fact is that, whereas the British successfully 
contained the Malayan Emergency within a decade with all effective MCP armed resistance 
at an end by 1958, it took the Malaysian government a further two decades to contain the 
Second Emergency. On this basis alone, the Second Emergency is a case study that 
deserves analysis in its own right. The asymmetry in sources is the main reason why 
Southeast Asian historians have been reticent about tackling the Second Emergency. To 
date, most of the open-access primary sources are available in British and Australian rather 
                                                 
9
 Paul H. Kratoska, ‗Country Histories and the Writing of Southeast Asian History‘ in Abu Talib Ahmad & 
Tan Liok Ee (eds), New Terrains in Southeast Asian History, Singapore: National University of Singapore 
Press, 2003, 112. 
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than Malaysian and Singaporean archives. Even then, a significant portion of the Anglo-
Australian material remains closed under the thirty-year rule and other statutory provisions 
that retain this secrecy in the interests of international relations. Some documents are there 
to be had, however. This PhD thesis draws upon archival material from the National 
Archives, London, UK (primarily the FCO and DEFE series); the National Australian 
Archives, Canberra, Australia; the Australian War Memorial, Canberra, Australia; and 
restricted access documents from Malaysian and Singaporean sources (primarily transcripts 
of the CPM‘s clandestine radio broadcasts). Research interviews with military and 
diplomatic officers from the UK and Thailand are also incorporated into the chapters which 
follow. 
 
From the little contemporaneous published material available, it is obvious that the 
CPM‘s revived armed struggle was a serious issue that required the combined efforts and 
resources of both the Malaysian and Thai governments to resolve. However, there remains 
a huge gap in the literature on the strategic and operational aspects of this conflict; 
particularly that of the CPM‘s strategic mass persuasion campaign and the counter-
subversion efforts of the Malaysian and Singapore governments. To shed light on this much 
neglected subject, this thesis examines the ‗Voice of the Malayan Revolution‘ (VMR); a 
clandestine radio broadcast of the CPM which ran from 1969 to 1981. The VMR 
constitutes the first concerted strategic propaganda campaign of the CPM that sought to win 
the hearts and minds of Malaysians and Singaporeans. Its goal was to subvert their 
respective societies and states, and so bring about the establishment of a People‘s Republic 
of Malaya (PRM). Through the VMR, major policy statements of the CPM, as well as those 
of its various front organisations, were disseminated, and the party‘s analysis of major 
political and socio-economic issues made known. National liberation struggles in other 
countries were also closely monitored and reported via the VMR, particularly those in 
Southeast Asia. Last but not least, the CPM‘s fraternal links with other Communist parties 
and issues concerning the international Communist movement were publicised over the 
VMR airwaves. The VMR transcripts examined in this thesis therefore provide an 
unprecedented insight into the mindset of the CPM plus those of its CCP sponsors in the 
1960s and 1970s. Indeed, considering the inaccessibility of CPM documents from the 
Second Emergency era, the VMR transcripts provide an alternative source from which the 
12 
 
strategy and the armed struggle of the CPM can be followed.  The VMR compensates 
adequately, albeit not completely, for the asymmetry in available documentary sources that 
is still western-centric and written largely from the counter-insurgents‘ perspective. 
 
While making extensive use of the VMR material, the main thrust of this thesis 
follows the response of the Malaysian and Singapore governments to the CPM‘s threat of 
communist insurrection and subversion. In doing so, the thesis will make plain that 
psychological warfare, or ‗psywar‘, was an integral component of revolutionary war, and 
that the strategy and methodology of the ‗revolutionary psywarrior‘ stood in marked 
contrast to that of his western counterpart or the post-colonial Southeast Asian militaries 
that increasingly came to look, think and act like western militaries. Any attempt at 
interpreting the psychological battles between the Malayan Communists and the state has 
largely been filtered through the western mind rather than that of the indigenous 
revolutionary. Drawing from empirical evidence of the CPM‘s strategic propaganda, it will 
be shown that the CPM‘s campaign on the psychological battlefields of the Second 
Emergency was fought according to the Maoist dictum that: ‗thought determines 
action‘ rather than the western ‗words and deeds‘ approach. 10  Advocates of 
propaganda in the Western school generally believe that effective propaganda, or 
persuasive communication represents the correlation and sycronisation of both words 
(psychological) and deeds (physical action). The Maoist propagandist, on the other hand, 
operated on the principle that the thoughts of the masses must first be revolutionised. 
Hence, rather than influence a target audience through a consistent ‗words with deeds‘ 
approach, the Maoist mass persuasion approach sought to socialise the minds of the 
masses, thereby mobilising them into action. 
 
The ideologically charged atmosphere of China‘s Cultural Revolution provided the 
perfect opportunity for the CPM to resurrect its revolutionary activities in Malaya and set 
the stage for the emergence of the VMR. In his autobiography, Chin Peng wrote that: 
 
Shortly before the Tonkin Gulf incident…I told the Chinese that the CPM had 
received Hanoi‘s agreement for the establishment of a clandestine broadcasting station 
                                                 
10
 Frederick Yu, Mass persuasion in Communist China, London: Pall Mall Press, 1964, 4. 
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in North Vietnam…Could they possibly supply the transmitting equipment? The 
answer was a rejection…Thus my idea for starting up our own revolutionary radio 
network had run into a substantial brick wall…but the situation would turn positive for 
us in the long run…By late January 1967, we had seen Mao. We were to be given the 
radio station facilities we had been seeking for three years. 
11
 
 
The CPM‘s clandestine radio network made its first official broadcast on 15 November  1969 
from a restricted Chinese military base in Hunan, China, under the codename Project 691, 
transmitting as ‗Suara Revolusi Malaya‘ or VMR. Chin Peng was the de facto force behind 
these broadcasts. He vetted all transcripts, and personally ran the station. The VMR 
broadcasts were made in all four common languages of the Malayan Peninsula: 
Malay, Chinese, English and Tamil, as well as five other Chinese dialects 
(Hokkien, Cantonese, Hakka, Hainanese and Teochew). The station‘s total 
workforce, including Chinese nationals, exceeded eighty.
12
 The CPM‘s VMR campaign 
was, in retrospect, far more sophisticated than any of the propaganda methods employed by 
the Malayan Communists in the ‗First Malayan Emergency‘. This piece of evidence reveals 
two compelling insights. Firstly, the aim of the CPM‘s revolutionary war in Malaya was 
more than just the establishment of a ‗People‘s Republic‘ in Malaya: it signified an effort to 
catalyse a greater Southeast-Asian revolution under the ‗Red Banner‘ of Mao Tse-Tung. 
Secondly, subversive propaganda was an important weapon in a pan-global People‘s War 
waged according to the precepts of Mao‘s thought.  
 
With the spread of revolutionary fervour from the Chinese Communists to their 
Cambodian, Burmese, Thai, Laotian, Indonesian and Malayan comrades, the 1960s and 
early 1970s was truly an era of revolutionary war in Southeast-Asia. The application of 
Maoist mass persuasion techniques in a revolutionary war not only of local, but regional, 
proportions makes the Second Malayan Emergency a compelling case study in the art of 
war. The ‗Second Malayan Emergency‘ should thus be seen as integral to this effort to 
trigger greater Revolutionary war in Southeast Asia. More broadly, the 1960s and 1970s 
were also momentous years for Southeast Asia, which witnessed two historically 
                                                 
11
Chin Peng, Alias Chin Peng: My Side of History, Singapore: Media Masters, 2003,  442-9. 
12
 C.C Chin & Karl Hack (ed), Dialogues with Chin Peng: New Light on the Malayan Communist Party, 
Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004, 368. 
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significant events in the development of the Cold War and changing patterns of relations 
with the region‘s massive Chinese neighbour. One was the establishment by 1975 of 
Communist regimes throughout Indochina (Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam), which was in 
no small part due to the varying degrees of military, financial, diplomatic and fraternal 
support from Beijing. Conversely, the death of Mao in 1976 precipitated a ‗pragmatic‘ shift 
in Chinese foreign policy. By the mid-1970s, China‘s main strategic objective in Southeast 
Asia was to contain the regional expansion of Soviet political, military and economic 
influence. Achievement of this aim demanded Beijing‘s ‗peaceful coexistence‘ with the 
non-communist governments of Asia including Singapore and Malaysia. As early as 1971, 
Zhou Enlai‘s strategy ‗called for China to drop its open identification with and 
encouragement of illegal communist parties in those countries…and to return its support 
for fraternal friends back to the clandestine level‘.13 Beijing‘s tacit recognition of the 
Malaysian Federation and Singapore‘s independence meant that even clandestine support 
for the CPM (such as funding for VMR) soon proved impracticable for the Chinese. Deng 
was eventually persuaded by Lee Kuan Yew, then Prime Minister of Singapore to shut 
down the CPM‘s clandestine radio station in Hunan. The VMR‘s final broadcast was 
aired on 15 July 1981. 
 
Taking these developments into account, this study seeks to elucidate the following 
three areas of historical significance: 
 
1. The CPM‘s strategy for armed struggle in the Second Emergency; 
 
2. The integral role of propaganda in Revolutionary People‘s War as well as the 
intended effect and the actual effectiveness of the CPM‘s subversive propaganda on 
its target population and most importantly; 
 
3. The counterinsurgency (COIN) response and strategy of the Malaysian state and to 
a lesser extent the counter-subversion strategy of Singapore in the post-colonial era. 
 
                                                 
13
 Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking’s Relations with Revolutionary Movements, New York: 
Praeger, 1976, 337. 
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The five core chapters to follow will explain the success and failures of both sides of the 
conflict within a paradigm built upon four key touchstones. These are the utility of 
military force, civil-military relations, population security, and propaganda. Only by 
coming to grips with these four touchstones of COIN/insurgency may the ultimate question 
of why the CPM‘s armed revolution failed be answered.  
 
The CPM’s Armed Struggle in Context 
 
Before beginning this task in earnest, we need to examine the context of the CPM‘s armed 
struggle in Malaya. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was founded in 1930, and 
during its first decade in existence its primary aim was to foment unrest against the colonial 
government of Malaya. After 1937, the Japanese threat caused a shift  in MCP 
policies toward ‗national as opposed to strictly labour issues‘, and the Malayan 
Peoples‘ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was formed to resist the Japanese occupation.14 
The MCP‘s active resistance to Japanese occupation during the Second World War 
had two consequences of lasting significance: Party cadres had amassed sizable 
weapons caches for future guerrilla actions, and, more significantly, the MCP had 
become the mouthpiece for Chinese nationalism in Malaya. The MPAJA was 
eventually disbanded, but it was replaced with a number of communist front 
organisations. One of the MCP‘s key post-war strategies was to gain political ascendancy 
through the control of labour. The MCP founded a multitude of worker groups, infiltrated 
older trade unions, and formed federations of unions in each of the nine Malay States as 
well as General Labour Union embracing the whole of Malaya.
15
 Decisive influence over 
trade union organisation thus became the MCP‘s foremost weapon in its effort to control 
the masses. However, no mass urban uprising occurred and from 1948, the MCP switched 
its attention and strategy to mobilising the rural populace.  
 
The Fourth Plenary meeting of the MCP in Singapore from 17 to 21 March 1948 
marked a turning point in the party‘s strategy. Three resolutions were passed: the ‗struggle 
                                                 
14
 James Robert Mallette Jr, Operational Art in the Success of the Malayan Counterinsurgency Campaign, 
Newport: Naval War College, 1997, 3. 
15
 Ian Morrison, ‗The Communist Uprising in Malaya‘, Far Eastern Survey, 17 (24), (December 1948), 281-
286, 282. 
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for independence [taking] the form of a people‘s revolutionary war‘; exhortation for the 
party to abandon its former ‗ostrich policy of surrenderism‘ and preparation of the masses 
for an ‗uncompromising struggle for independence without regard to considerations of 
legality‘.16 The MCP‘s open armed struggle against the British government, which began in 
June 1948, led to the declaration of a state of Emergency in Malaya on the 18
th
 of that 
month.  The MCP‘s application of ‗enforcement terror‘ and violence ‗without regard to 
considerations of legality‘ increasingly estranged the rural Chinese, the very masses that the 
party claimed to represent. Despite the surge in sporadic armed attacks from 1950 to 51, 
there was no real increase in the scale of the attacks; nor could the communists concentrate 
their forces in combined operations. The MRLA‘s armed operations were, on the whole, 
sporadic, lacking in concentrated firepower or strategic coordination, and attempts at 
establishing ‗liberated areas‘ were beyond the MRLA‘s limited military capabilities. 
Unable to secure bases in populated areas the MCP had little hope of securing access to the 
rural population and winning them over through direct contact.  
 
Realising the failure of its 1948 campaign, the MCP sought to salvage the situation 
by issuing the October Directives in 1951. These called on its cadres ‗to cease unrestricted 
terrorism and to henceforth devote more resources to rebuilding relations with the public‘.17 
These directives were issued from a position of weakness rather than strength, and were 
‗symptoms that showed that the MCP was in ideological trouble.‘18 In an analysis of the 
October Directives, John Coates concluded that the MCP‘s strategy ‗missed its aim of 
extending the mass base and obtaining greater room for political manoeuvre….Its high 
point had been passed in 1951; from then on the party…had lost the initiative‘.19 According 
to Kumar Ramakrishna, by the end of 1951, the MCP had ‗inadvertently provoked general 
aversion towards itself amongst the mass of the rural Chinese, a situation that proved 
impossible to redress, and all but destroyed any prospect of success in the shooting war‘.20 
The October Directives was a proverbial case of ‗too little too late‘, and 1951 proved the 
                                                 
16
 John Coates, Suppressing insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954, Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1992, 7. 
17
 Kumar Ramakrishna, ‗Transmogrifying Malaya: the Impact of Sir Gerald Templer (1952-54)‘, Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 32(1), 2001, 79-92, 81.   
18
 Anthony Short, In Pursuit of Mountain Rats: The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, Singapore: Cultured 
Lotus, 2000, 309. 
19
 John Coates, Suppressing insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954, 69. 
20
 Kumar Ramakrishna, Transmogrifying Malaya: the Impact of Sir Gerald Templer, 81. 
17 
 
crucial turning point of the Emergency. By then, the MCP had largely alienated its core of 
potential supporters - the rural population of Chinese labourers. It was also clear that, 
having failed to rally international opinion to its cause, the MCP would have to fight on 
alone without any prospect of external aid. By July 1960 the MCP was decisively defeated 
both militarily and politically and the Emergency was declared over.  
 
In 1961, however, the MCP was persuaded by Deng Xiaoping to resurrect its 
revolutionary war in Malaya. According to Chin Peng: ‗strategically, the whole region, 
Deng insisted, would become ripe for the sort of struggle we had been pursuing in 
Malaya for so long [and] there could be no question Deng had been persuasive‘.21  
Aloysius Chin, Deputy Director of Malaysian Special Branch (MSB) Operations noted that 
since early 1964, the Malayan Communists were paying less and less attention to the 
‗constitutional struggle‘ and had developed a ‗South Vietnam atmosphere of illegal 
militancy‘.22 By 1967 the Malayan Communists felt that the moment had come for the 
initiation of preparatory moves towards the eventual revival of the armed revolution in 
Malaya. Put simply, the resurgent tide of revolutionary armed struggle sweeping 
throughout the whole of Southeast Asia was decisive in spurring the Malayan 
Communists into action. On 1 June 1968, in commemoration of the 20
th
 anniversary of 
their armed struggle, the Malayan Communists (as we saw earlier, now known as the 
CPM), officially announced their intention to revive the armed struggle in Malaya.   
 
Results were slow in coming. Between 1970 and 1974, the CPM was plagued by a 
series of internal splits. In January 1970, believing that the party was being penetrated by 
enemy agents, the leaders of the North Malayan Bureau (NMB) ordered a ‗rectification 
campaign‘ that led to the execution of 200 recent recruits as well as a number of veterans. 
The 2
nd
 District of the 12
th
 Regiment refused to carry out the purge order of the NMB, and 
broke away from the CPM in March 1970. In the hope that Chin Peng would resolve the 
internal schism wrought by the ‗rectification campaign, the 2nd District of the 12th Regiment 
continued to maintain wireless contact with the CPM. Chin Peng, however, ruled in favour 
of the NMB‘s liquidation campaign, and announced that: ‗The Central Committee‘s policy 
of suppressing the counter-revolutionaries was correct and as the situation in the various 
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units is different, conclusion is reserved until a verdict by history‘.23  This decision 
compelled the 2
nd
 District of the 12
th
 Regiment to formally break with the CPM, and form 
its own party, the Communist Party of Malaya Marxist Leninist Faction in August 1974. 
The 8
th
 Regiment similarly repudiated the NMB‘s purge order of January 1970 and, 
dismayed by Chin Peng‘s decision, officially announced its break from the CPM in 1973. 
Henceforth, orders from the 8
th
 Regiment were no longer issued in the name of the 8
th
 
Regiment Revolutionary Committee of the Communist Party of Malaya, but that of the 
Revolutionary Faction (CPMRF).   
 
The factionalism within the CPM did not result in an overall reduction of violence, 
but, rather, prompted the three CPM factions to compete more vociferously with one other. 
In consequence, according to Richard Clutterbuck, ‗the terrorist incident rate in 1974-75 
rose to its highest peak since 1958‘.24  Moreover, despite the three-way split, the CPM 
was able to bolster its ranks by actively recruiting amongst the Thai Malay 
population alienated by the policies of the Bangkok government, and, by 1979, the Party 
had managed to rebuild its combat strength to about 3,000 guerrillas.
25
 The CPM‘s revived 
armed revolution during the Second Malayan Emergency lasted for twenty-one years from 
1968 to 1989, nine years longer than its initial campaign beginning in 1948. It was only in 
1989, after forty-one long years of armed struggle that the CPM finally laid down its arms 
and disbanded its guerrilla forces for good. 
 
Comparing Psychological Warfare and Mass Persuasion 
 
In order to assess the import of the CPM‘s struggle, as well as the form it took, we need to 
dwell a little on the meaning of psychological warfare. According to William Daugherty, 
the term psywar first appeared in English in a 1941 text on the use of propaganda, fifth 
column activities, and terror by the Third Reich.
26
 Psywar itself, however, is a modern 
name for an ancient strategy. The ‗importance of destroying the enemy‘s will to fight‘ is 
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stressed in Sun Tze‘s The Art of War.27 Paul Linebarger viewed psywar in its broadest 
sense as ‗the application of parts of the science called psychology to the conduct of war‘.28 
At the strategic level, Daniel Learner conceived Psywar as ‗a struggle for the attention, 
beliefs, and loyalties of whole populations‘.29 Christopher Simpson further elaborated on 
the concept of psywar as ‗a group of strategies and tactics designed to achieve the ide-
ological, political, or military objectives of the sponsoring organisation…through 
exploitation of a target audience‘s cultural-psychological attributes and its communication 
system‘.30 In sum, psywar can be defined as an instrument of war or struggle that influences 
the mind of an opponent for a strategic, operational or tactical purpose.  
 
In Lasswellian terms, the ‗most distinctive act‘ of Psywar is the use of ‗means of 
mass communication in order to destroy the enemy‘s will to fight‘.31 Much along the 
same lines, Linebarger put forth the notion that Psywar ‗is simple enough to understand 
if it is simply regarded as application of propaganda to the purposes of war‘.32 To that end, 
Linebarger groups propaganda at all levels - strategic, operational and tactical - into the 
following four categories: 
 
4. Conversionary Propaganda that is designed to change the allegiance of individuals 
from one group to another; 
5. Divisive Propaganda that attempts to split the enemy; 
6. Consolidation  Propaganda that is intended to insure compliance; 
7.  Counter-propaganda that seeks to refute enemy propaganda.33 
 
Propaganda can be further classified according to its source as white (overt) propaganda, 
whereby the true source is clearly acknowledged; black (covert) propaganda which 
originates from a source ‗other than the true one‘; and  grey propaganda which avoids 
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identification.
34
 If the objective of psywar is to influence the mind, propaganda can be 
defined as an overt, covert or unidentified ‗deliberate attempt to persuade people to think 
and behave in a desired way‘ through the forms of conversionary, divisive, consolidation 
and counter-propaganda.
35
 Philip Taylor argues that ‗if war is essentially an organised 
communication of violence, propaganda and psychological warfare are essentially 
organised processes of persuasion‘.36 Indeed, propaganda is often taken for granted as the 
very embodiment of persuasion and of psywar itself.  
 
Since the end of the Second World War, Western military thinkers have tended to 
view psywar or psyops (psychological warfare operations), largely as tactics to be 
employed in a theatre of operations, whereas Maoist theoreticians regarded mass persuasion 
and political agitation as a key component of class struggle and people‘s war. The objective 
of a western psywarrior is primarily to seek limited military or political gains without the 
use of military force. The aim of the Maoist revolutionary psywarrior, however, is  to 
revolutionise the masses towards the complete destruction of an existing socio-economic-
political-cultural system, and, in its place, establish a whole new world order. The COIN 
experience of the British in Malayan Emergency and that of the Americans in the Vietnam 
War provide an ideal testing ground from which to compare and contrast the West‘s 
attempt at countering revolutionary war in Southeast Asia with the concept of people‘s war 
and Maoist mass persuasion. The next section of the chapter shall thus examine the 
response of the West to a way of warfighting which differs fundamentally from western 
traditions. In doing so, it will elucidate the contrasting approaches that each took to winning 
the war.  
 
The Culture of Revolution and Counterrevolution 
 
In Carnage and Culture, Victor Davis Hanson suggested that western culture has evolved a 
way of war ‗shackled rarely by concerns of ritual, tradition, religion, or ethics‘ which is so 
lethally precise that it now ‗exercises global political, economic, cultural, and military 
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power far greater than the size its territory or population might otherwise suggest‘.37 
Hanson‘s denomination of a universal western way of war as one based on amoral military 
annihilation is perhaps far too sweeping, but there is a kernel of truth in his suggestion that 
culture is a prime determinant of how civilisations, nation states and non-state actors wage 
war. If the writings of Antoine Jomini and Carl Von Clausewitz have come to shape the 
western perspective on war, the same can be said of Sun Tze‘s impact in the Orient and 
ultimately on Maoist revolutionary war. Military commanders in the West, schooled in the 
Jominian and Clausewitzian tradition are trained to seek decisive military victories while 
their counterparts in the East eschew combat when possible. John Keegan views Oriental 
warfare as characterised by its peculiar traits of evasion, delay and indirectness, as distinct 
from the European way of war.
38
 The key difference between the Oriental and Western way 
of war is, however, the ability of the former to ‗do a better job of harnessing the perceptions 
and common sense of the people in contact with the enemy‘.39 This emphasis on working 
among the population to harness the perceptions of the masses, loosely defined as the ‗Tao‘ 
in the very first page of Sun Tze‘s The Art of War, would reach its apogee with Mao‘s 
development of the people‘s war concept. 
 
Although the French Revolution gave rise to the theory of ‗the people in arms‘, 
‗the first great step toward mass citizen armies‘, the French Revolution ‗unfolded in a 
way that never led to revolutionary war in the full modern sense‘. 40  The French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were fought by patriotic citizen sons of France 
defending the French state against an external military threat of a conventional nature. 
The People‘s Revolutionary War that we know of today draws its inspiration not from 
revolutionary France, but from the experiences of Mao‘s supporters as he led the Chinese 
Red Army in its protracted war against both the Japanese in the Second Sino-Japanese 
War (1937-1945) and the Nationalist Army of Chiang Kai Shek in the Chinese Civil War 
(1927-1950). Revolutionary People‘s War as Mao knew it, unfolds in three distinct stages. 
The first stage is defensive, characterised by guerrilla operations and the building up of 
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an underground organization within the population. Preparation for the counter-
offensive takes place in the second stage whereby the tempo of guerrilla operations is 
increased in tandem with the expansion of the underground infrastructure and 
population control. Upon reaching the point of equilibrium, the third and final stage, the 
strategic counter-offensive is launched culminating in open warfare until the achievement 
of complete revolutionary victory.
41
 Waged amongst the masses, by the masses, and for 
the masses, People‘s War ultimately becomes war personified. People‘s War in its 
apotheosis obfuscates the lines between the people, army and the state, and in so doing 
forges a rocher de bronze link between the people, the revolutionary forces, and 
revolutionary ideology.  
 
From Algeria to Vietnam, Mao‘s vision of people‘s war became the preferred 
weapon of anti-colonial revolutionary movements, communist or otherwise. Since the end 
of the Second World War, Maoist-inspired revolutions based on the people‘s war model 
have swept through Southeast Asia like a ‗raging prairie fire‘. The two most carefully 
studied of all the Southeast Asian revolutionary struggles are those of the Malayan 
Communist Party (MCP) against the British in Malaya, and that of the Vietminh, Vietcong 
and Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DVRN) in Vietnam. With good reason, these two 
case studies have become ‗meta-models‘ in the art of revolutionary war and COIN. The 
successful containment of the Malayan Emergency spelt the only victory won by a Western 
democracy against practitioners of revolutionary warfare in Southeast Asia, while Vietnam 
stood out as the first case of people‘s war to have succeeded in defeating two major western 
powers in succession. As we shall see, even in the contemporaneous observations of British 
officialdom, parallels were drawn between American COIN practice in Vietnam and 
Malaysian COIN practice in Peninsula Malaysia as well as the similarities in Vietcong and 
CPM excellence in booby-trap and jungle fighting skills. Indeed, part of the following 
chapter of this study shall rely on the above two Southeast Asian COIN paradigms to 
explain the COIN approaches of the Americans (dominated by military annihilation), and 
the British (shaped by an imperial policing experience that led to the development of an 
integrated civil-military response that demanded the use of minimum force), as well as the 
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theory and application of Maoist revolutionary warfare in Southeast Asia – particularly the 
model adopted by the CPM.  
 
The narrative is organised into five core chapters. The second chapter discusses the 
development of the First Emergency and the legacy that it left for the Second Emergency. 
The First Emergency and relevant reference points in the Vietnam War as well as the 
doctrine of People‘s War and Maoist mass persuasion will be comparatively examined 
within the four touchstones of COIN framework (utility of military force, civil-military 
relations, population security, and propaganda). In short, the second chapter sets the 
backdrop from which the revival of the CPM‘s armed struggle and the Malaysian 
government‘s response can be explained and analysed. The third chapter charts the CPM‘s 
strategy of anti-colonial struggle in the years 1948 to 1960 and then compares the methods 
adopted with those of its post-colonial struggle between 1968 and 1981. The fourth chapter 
follows a parallel approach, examining the CPM‘s application of revolutionary 
psychological warfare within the same period.  Key themes exploited by the CPM in its 
propaganda to revolutionise the thoughts and actions of its target audience and its impact 
will be analysed. Chapter five will explore the counter-measures adopted by both the 
Malaysian and Singapore governments in their responses to the CPM‘s subversive 
propaganda. It also includes an assessment of the Malaysian COIN doctrine of KESBAN. 
Finally, this chapter links the strategies adopted in the First Emergency with that of the 
Second, particularly the evolution of KESBAN and the concept of ‗Comprehensive 
Security‘. In a comparative study of the continuities and departures between colonial and 
post-colonial COIN approaches and practices, the strategies adopted in the First Emergency 
will be juxtaposed with that of the Second. The sixth and final chapter addresses the 
fundamental ‗Why‘ question, namely - Why did the emergent post-colonial states of 
Malaysia and Singapore triumph and why did the CPM‘s armed revolution failed yet again? 
In providing an answer, the chapter revisits both the interior and exterior terrain of 
manoeuvre available to the CPM in order to explain why and how its strategy was 
inadequate for the geopolitical and geostrategic terrain of its day. 
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2. 
 
Fighting Big Wars and Small Wars: Approaches to COIN and Maoist Revolutionary 
Warfare in Perspective 
 
By examining the British experience in the Malayan Emergency, we are able to identify a 
distinctive experience that shaped British military culture and determined the colonial 
authorities‘ response to revolutionary violence in Southeast Asia. There is no doubt that 
the Malayan Emergency had a profound impact in the decolonisation process and the 
shaping of the Malaysian state, its institutions, strategic culture and COIN approach to the 
Second Emergency. At the same time, the Americans were waging their own COIN 
campaign in Vietnam. That event, too, had an influence on the tactics of the CPM 
insurgents during the Second Emergency which subsequently shaped the operational and 
tactical responses of the post-colonial Malaysian security forces. Thus the insurgency in 
Vietnam will be addressed to the extent of defining American and Vietcong operational 
and tactical approaches of relevance to the Second Emergency. Each of the three 
campaigns (the First Emergency, the Second Emergency and the Vietnam War) should be 
treated as distinct events in their own right, but it is a worthwhile intellectual exercise to 
provide an overarching sense of how these conflicts relate to each other as part of a COIN 
narrative – particularly the continuities and departures between the First and the Second 
Emergency. In short, the main aim of this chapter is to briefly lay out the course of the First 
Emergency and the legacy that it left for the Second Emergency. This chapter provides the 
necessary conceptualisation and backdrop from which the development of the Malaysian 
government‘s response can be explained and rationalised. This chapter will also examine 
the concept of revolutionary people‘s war and contrast it against western perceptions of 
war-fighting which again sets the scene for discussing the CPM approach to revolutionary 
warfare in the subsequent chapters.  
 
The conceptual focus of this chapter will be on the British and Maoist-
revolutionary approaches in the four key components of strategy we identified earlier: 
the utility of military force, civil-military relations, population security, and 
propaganda. It is the state‘s performance within this interconnected quadrant ultimately 
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dictates the success or failure in countering revolutionary war - simply because it is 
through them that the power of the word and deed is most keenly felt by the population 
and the revolutionary. Many students of COIN have acknowledged the importance of 
the ‗credibility‘ factor but few have addressed its pertinence within an integrated 
approach to COIN and counter-revolution. In a people‘s war, these four integral facets 
are of as much relevance to the revolutionary as it is to the counter-revolutionary. Since the 
revolutionary invariably starts out as the weaker military force, adopting an integrated 
population-centric approach tied to a credible cause is of paramount importance. Indeed it 
is in these four crucial areas of the Insurgency/COIN paradigm that the battle for hearts 
and minds takes place. With the First Emergency and the Maoist People‘s War model 
as the main reference points, this chapter will thus demonstrate that revolutionary wars 
are by their ontological nature, ‗credibility wars‘ waged within the population. Hence , 
at both the strategic and operational levels, winning credibility amongst the target 
population is the cornerstone - the sine qua non in any COIN campaign or attempt to 
subvert and overthrow an existing government. 
 
The development of a population-centric mindset during the course of a campaign 
or within an institution such as the army cannot be taken for granted. The mindset of the 
military organisation is to a large extent shaped by its collective operational experience. 
The predilection towards certain strategic and operational methods would give rise, in due 
course, to a particular military culture—the ‗beliefs and attitudes within a military 
organisation that shape its collective preferences toward the use of force‘.42 Military culture 
shapes a nation‘s preference for limited wars or total wars, protracted wars or lightning 
wars, small wars or big wars. In the case of the British Army, Hew Strachan observed that 
Empire, and not Europe, has been the more continuous element in British military 
experience over the past 200 years. Since 1792, Britain has fought continental forces only 
in the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), the Crimean War (1853–1856), and the two 
World Wars (1914–1918 and 1939–1945). Thus, although the theory of war has been 
                                                 
42
 Robert M. Cassidy, ‗The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture‘, Military 
Review (May–June 2005), 53–59, 53. 
26 
 
Eurocentric, the practice of the British Army was shaped by colonial and imperial ‗historic 
practices‘.43 
 
By the early twentieth century, the British Empire had reached its zenith, spanning 
every continent on the globe, while covering a quarter of the world‘s land mass. Since this 
age of ‗high imperialism‘, the British Army‘s focus was on imperial policing that made 
small wars the norm, and large-scale annihilatory conventional war the exception. It was 
partly due to a history of limited resources that the British Army has not viewed technology 
as a ―be-all and end-all solution‖.44 Confronted with a hostile situation, the British have 
been more likely to opt for a low-profile integrated civil-military response that would 
eschew large commitments of military resources, with particular emphasis placed on 
the civil rather than military aspects. The failings and sometimes appalling excesses 
of the second South African War (1899–1902), the Anglo-Irish War (1919–1921), 
and the Amritsar Massacre (1919) drove home the crucial lesson of minimal force, 
and the principle that the government cannot act with the same abandon as its 
political opponents without undermining the very legitimacy of its own rule .
45
 
Shaped by its historical role as the primary agent of imperial policing, the British 
Army has largely been an instrument of limited war, built to achieve limited goals 
at minimal cost. Such is modern British military culture and the British way of war—a 
decentralised approach that avoids excessive use of military force, a preference for small 
rather than big, and one that draws strength from its past experiences and its inherent 
flexibility. In short, the bedrock of British COIN success lies, at least in theory, in a highly 
integrated minimal force COIN practice that neither alienates a target population nor 
undermines its legitimacy and credibility. 
 
The American way of war, on the other hand, is the very antithesis of the British 
small war tradition. After the success of the American War of Independence (1775–
1783), in which irregular action played a crucial role, the U.S. Army turned its back 
on small wars, and fought its wars under the precept that they were crusades to be 
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won completely. The American Civil War (1861–1865), the Spanish-American War 
(1898), and both World Wars are all united by this idea. Since then, the focus of 
the U.S. military has been on waging large wars and using its untrammelled might to 
crush or bleed dry opponents.  Russell Weigley‘s eponymous classic on the American 
way of war is as relevant today as it was published just at the end of the Vietnam War. 
Weigley puts that: 
 
In the history of American strategy, the direction taken by the American 
conception of war made most American strategists, through most of the 
span of American history, strategists of annihilation … the wealth of the 
country and its adoption of unlimited aims in war cut development short, 
until the strategy of annihilation became characteristically the American 
way in war.
46
 
 
With American supremacy in material wealth, technology, and weaponry (both 
conventional and nuclear), the annihilative/attritional approach of destroying one‘s 
opponent via the overwhelming firepower and resources of its military juggernaut 
often seemed like the surest way to win a war. Indeed, Eliot Cohen defines the two 
dominant characteristics of American strategic culture as ‗the preference for massing a 
large number of men and machines, and the predilection for direct and violent assault‘.47  
Jeffery Record admits that; rooted in American political and military culture, 
Americans are frustrated with limited wars, particularly counterinsurgent wars … And 
Americans are averse to risking American lives … Expecting that America‘s conventional 
military superiority can deliver quick, cheap, and decisive success.
48
 Thus, for most of the 
twentieth century, U.S. military culture, with the exception of the Marine Corps, 
generally embraced the conventional big war paradigm at the expense of developing a 
coherent strategic/tactical approach to small wars and insurgencies. The institutionalised 
preference for big wars proved to be a serious impediment in developing a successful 
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American COIN approach at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical. The 
consequence of such a failure was to rear its ugly head in Korea and, later, Vietnam. 
 
Utility of Military Force: The British in Malaya   
 
 The performance of the U.S. military as a whole in both the First and the Second 
Indochina War from 1950 to 1972 depicts the triumph of the big guns tradition. One 
anonymous U.S. Army general remarked: ‗I‘ll be damned if I will permit the U.S. 
Army, its institutions, its doctrine, and its traditions to be destroyed just to win this 
lousy war‘.49 Just as the U.S. Army could never bring itself to forsake its Jominian 
tradition, likewise, neither the Navy nor the Air Force could repudiate the Mahanian 
concept of seeking the decisive naval battle, and the Mitchellian notion of the 
decisiveness of air power.
50
 To most of the top brass, going against this ‗trinity of 
decisiveness‘ was tantamount to destroying the very fabric of the American military 
institution. Upon entry into military hostilities proper after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the 
USAF sought to obliterate its opponents from the air, while the U.S. Army‘s strategy 
represented by that of General Westmoreland was focused on the destruction of the enemy‘s 
military forces. Last but not least, guided by its past COIN experience, the USMC pursued 
the diametric approach of political-military pacification rather than military annihilation. In 
truth, four distinct wars were waged by the U.S. military in Indochina: a 
conventional ground war waged by its army, a coercive strategic air campaign against 
North Vietnam, an aerial interdiction campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trial, and an 
attempt by the USMC at political-military pacification. As different wars were run by 
separate command entities divided by service affiliation and irreconcilable differences on 
how to win the war, the American mission in Vietnam inevitably became ‗Balkanised‘.51 
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Unlike their American cousins, the British successfully avoided the ‗Balkanisation‘ 
of the Malayan Emergency through its traditional integrated civil-military approach, in 
which all armed services and security forces operated under civilian control and the 
maxim of minimum force. In an attempt to forge closer civil-military cooperation, improve 
efficiency and prompt coordinated action, Lieutenant General Harold Briggs, Director of 
Operations, reformed the Malayan administration by introducing the War Executive 
Committee (WEC) system at federal (FWC), state (SWEC) and district (DWEC) levels. 
The WEC was, in effect, a network-centric system that eliminated duplicate efforts, 
and provided a conduit for the rapid and effective exchange of intelligence that 
ultimately translated into better operational and tactical results on the ground. Briggs‘s 
tenure also saw the gradual move away from large-scale army sweeps towards a more 
effective system of small-unit patrols. He realised that the conduct of massive sweeps 
by large units were counterproductive. Instead, small patrols that utilized the skills 
of native trackers, intelligence provided by surrendered enemy personnel (SEP) and 
Special Branch infiltrators to target selected terrorists with the minimum force 
required were increasingly used.  
 
The British regimental system facilitated the practice of decentralisation as British 
Army units were accustomed to deploying smaller units for extended periods 
throughout the empire.
52
 A British general in Malaya quipped: ‗As far as I can see, the 
only thing a divisional commander has to do in this sort of war is to go round seeing that 
the troops have got their beer‘.53 In the dense jungles and sprawling plantations of Malaya, 
battalion commanders perforce yielded tactical control of their companies, company 
commanders yielded control of an action to the platoon leader, who in turn utilised self-
sufficient two-to-three day small patrols commanded by sergeants and corporals.
54
 Not 
only did the flow of intelligence increase from the closer contact between soldiers, 
police, civil servants and the locals, given the initiative, young officers learned to react 
quickly and effectively. In short, the British Army realised and acknowledged that the 
key to operational success in small wars was not the preponderant use of force 
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exemplified by heavy artillery and air bombardment, but rather the willingness to fight 
like their indigenous opponents on their own terms. 
 
Offensive air support, problematical in the dense jungle conditions of Malaya was 
generally used with great economy of force. The most important contribution of the RAF in 
the Emergency, however, was the provision of transport support in the troop-lifting, supply-
dropping, casualty-evacuation and liaison-missions roles which considerably increased the 
mobility and flexibility of the ground forces as well as their ability to sustain extended 
periods of jungle operations. In addition, crop spraying, leaflet dropping and loud-hailing 
carried out by the air transport forces contributed largely to the success of the food denial 
and psychological warfare campaigns.
55
 By 1954, the lack of evidence about the 
effectiveness of air-strikes ensured that offensive air support was limited solely to a 
harassing role - except when first rate target intelligence on pinpoint or small area targets 
was available.
56
 In the words of a serving British officer in Malaya, Lieutenant 
Colonel Robert Ian Hywel Jones: 
 
We concluded that given accurate information as to a target then there 
would be merit in considering bombing as a means for attacking it. But 
to use bombing on a random basis would really be far too costly. And 
could well perhaps do more harm than good.
57
 
 
In fact, the RAF presence in Malaya never went beyond its peak strength of seven 
squadrons in 1950, and less than 70 aircraft were available for offensive air support. 
Aircraft were, however, used extensively for psychological warfare in leaflet and 
loudspeaker operations. During the peak year of 1955, 141 million leaflets were dropped. 
Indeed, by the end of the Malayan Emergency, ‗there were few insurgents who had not 
been showered by leaflets or heard a message to surrender broadcast from aircraft‘, and 
interrogations revealed that the MCP guerrillas considered loudspeaker aircraft highly 
effective in inducing surrenders.
 58
 As the MCP withdrew deep into the jungle areas, the 
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dropping of leaflets and the broadcast of messages from the air was often the only means of 
making contact. Indeed, without aerial means of propaganda dissemination, much of the 
effect of the psychological warfare campaign would have been nullified.
59
 Unlike offensive 
bombing, which had mixed success, the use of air power in psychological operations was 
highly effective in eroding the morale of its fighters and crippling the MCP‘s physical 
strength. 
 
This minimal force approach was based on the long-held British assumption that 
insurgency is not a military problem but a policing task and therefore a civil problem. 
In a contemporary analysis of the small wars that flared throughout the British Empire in 
the 1920s and 1930s, Sir Charles Gwynn argues that ‗the principal police task of the 
Army is … to restore [civil control] when it collapses or shows signs of collapse‘.60 Thirty 
years later, in 1951, the Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton would put before 
Parliament: ‗The Emergency is in essence a police rather than a military task. More 
troops would add little to the impact … In short, I do not recom mend any increase 
in troops‘. Rather than commit more troops to the fight, Lyttelton pushed for the 
creation of the Home Guards to boost the numbers and effectiveness of the police 
force in Malaya. In his opinion, ‗once the training and re-training of the police and 
paramilitary forces have been completed, police action, including the better provision 
of information, will render military action gradually more effective and, I hope, 
ultimately unnecessary‘.61  
 
The British Army at the dawn of the Cold War was well familiar with the 
techniques involved in countering a politico-military insurgency. John Nagl draws 
attention to the fact that, of the 1,219 hours spent by mid-grade officers at the U.S. 
Army‘s Command and General Staff College, none was devoted to the study of 
revolutionary warfare or the impact of Mao while 190 hours were spent on 
conventional infantry operations. On the other hand, officers at the British Army 
Staff College had to go through 45 of 1,042 hours of instruction on Small Wars and 
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Policing Duties and another six on the study of Warfare in Developing Countries.
62
 
In the British Army, it was readily accepted that internal security operations were the 
norm rather than the exception. The accumulated experience from more than a century 
of imperial policing led to the development of a limited war perspective in the British 
Army—one that has been highly adaptable to operating in a COIN environment. As 
will be demonstrated later, the emphasis on a population-centric approach that focused on 
policing the population and population control, rather than going for the total military 
solution, became a vital key in suppressing the Communist insurgency in Malaya. 
 
 Britain‘s response to the Communist threat in Vietnam came in the form of the 
dispatch of the British Advisory Mission (BRIAM) to Saigon in September 1961, with the 
aim of imparting lessons learned from the Malayan Emergency. Sir Robert Thompson, 
the former Minister of Defence of Malaya and leader of the mission, was unable to 
convince the Americans that the focus on military solutions to political problems was 
counterproductive. The explicit endorsement of the strategy of military annihilation and 
attrition by the American top brass was to govern the entire conduct of the war. In 1966–
1968 alone, American air munitions expenditure in Indochina (2,865,808 tons) exceeded 
the total tonnage of bombs dropped during the whole of the Second World War in both the 
European and Pacific theatres (2,057,244 tons).
63
 The prevalent belief among American 
commanders was that air power could be depended upon to cripple the DVRN‘s capacity 
to wage war. The largely agrarian economy of North Vietnam however had few targets of 
economic or military significance. The application of air power as a decisive ‗quick-fix‘ 
was also a common practice during the Second Emergency – particularly in the early 
years of the conflict. 
 
Another prevalent feature of the Vietnam that also became widespread during the 
Second Emergency was the insurgent tactic of the concealed ambush. Often at the time and 
place of their choosing, Vietcong guerrillas would fire at American troops from concealed 
positions within villages. Eager to engage the elusive enemy, American soldiers would fall 
for the bait, and assault the hamlets with heavy artillery, naval gunfire, tactical air support 
and helicopter gunships. As we shall see in the subsequent chapters, the CPM adaptation of 
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Vietcong concealed ambush tactics and the tactical response of the Malaysian security 
forces were remarkably similar to what transpired in the Vietnamese countryside. The 
significant difference was at the strategic level. The Malaysian Federal government realised 
the importance of a comprehensive approach and in time incorporated the security forces 
rather than allow them to dominate the overall COIN effort. This acceptance of the use of 
minimal force (even in theory) was a distinct influence of the First Emergency. In order for 
the successful practice of minimal force to take place, there must be a unity of effort 
between both the civil and military authorities in an environment where the military forces 
cooperate rather than dominate. Again, the historical antecedents for such an approach 
during the Second Emergency years were derived from the experience of British colonial 
COIN in the First Emergency. 
 
Shaping the Civil-Military Relations Model of the First Emergency 
 
Since the nineteenth century, the British Army developed a history of close 
cooperation with civil administrators in the maintenance of the Pax Britannica. In a 
COIN environment, the British Army‘s role was that of providing the security 
umbrella under which the crucial tasks of effective civil administration and the 
winning of hearts and minds could be carried out. As such, the army essentially 
operated as a police force under civilian control. In Malaya, this principle was readily 
accepted and practised by all—soldiers and civil servants alike. Although a soldier by 
profession, Sir Gerald Templer, High Commissioner, Malaya insisted that ‗the fighting of 
the war and the civil running of the country were completely utterly interrelated‘ and 
refused to allow a ‗military takeover of what essentially remained a civil problem‘.64 
Another Malayan veteran, Major General Richard Clutterbuck maintained that 
‗military assistance has often been of less importance than their aid in supporting effective 
civil administration and helping the government to improve the lot of its people rather than 
to allow it to decline or relapse into chaos‘.65 During his tenure as Director of Operations, 
Harold Briggs brought in a civilian, Hugh Carleton Greene, to set up the Emergency 
Information Services (EIS) to coordinate all psyops efforts in Malaya. In the minds of 
Briggs, Templer, and Clutterbuck, there was no question that the Malayan Emergency 
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demanded an integrated civil-military solution with an emphasis on the ‗civil‘ rather 
than the application of extensive military force. With the military operating in support 
of civil power rather than in place of it, the Malayan Emergency was never militarised 
and most importantly never ‗brutalised‘. 
 
 Despite the tradition of subordinating military forces to civilian authority in 
times of civil emergency, early attempts at a coordinated civil-military effort lacked 
unity of effort. Synergy was injected into the administration with the introduction of 
the Committee system by Briggs. Civilian members at all levels of the Committee 
system far outnumbered those of the military except at the federal level. Rather than 
rely on military intelligence units, the system came to depend on localised insights 
provided by the indigenous Special Branch. Military liaison officers in the 
organisation would in turn translate such information into operational intelligence. 
Over time, the Committee system forged a highly integrated civil-military structure 
that functioned in a synergised manner. In fact, most units had their headquarters set 
up in Joint Operations Rooms run by the police. A veteran commented that ‗this close 
cooperation between the military and the police was the secret of all successful 
operations‘.66 As we shall see later, the integrated civil-military structure developed in 
the First Emergency was to be replicated by the post-colonial authorities - albeit to 
suit the context and requirements of the Second Emergency. 
 
Cooperation was further extended beyond the police-military relationship into the 
local Malayan community. Karl Hack argued that because of the local ethnic, social and 
political divisions, the British were able to ‗screw down‘ the Communist supporters.67 He 
further maintained that the integrated civic, military and political measures adopted by the 
British blunted the resentment caused by coercion.
68
 Indeed, the complex demographic and 
social intricacies of Malaya were the biggest advantage the British had in the Emergency. 
With the promise of Malayan independence, the British were able to win the support of the 
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Malay majority and isolate the Malayan Communists who were overwhelmingly Chinese. 
With regards to the Malayan Chinese community, the British-engineered alliance between 
the Nationalist Malay United Malay National Organization (UMNO) and the Chinese 
business-orientated Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) provided the political foundation 
for the successful containment of the Emergency. This, according to John Cross, a British 
jungle warfare specialist ‗was crucial to British success because it provided a stronger base 
of support than that possessed by the embattled MCP‘.69 Relations with the European 
planters and miners were close from the start. However, it was the inclusion of Malay 
and Chinese officials in policy discussion and formulation that developed the much 
coveted grassroots confidence between the population and the Security Forces. The British 
experience demonstrated that the high level of civil-military cooperation achieved in 
Malaya was a decisive factor not only in defeating the MCP militarily, but also in 
establishing a political solution.
70
 Again the co-opting of local political support as part 
of a comprehensive population-centric approach was a hallmark of the First 
Emergency that was subsequently revised to suit the political and socio-economic 
landscape of the Second Emergency. 
 
Population Security 
 
The civil-military administration in Malaya regarded its primary mission during the 
Emergency to be that of providing security to the people, with the subsequent aim of 
separating the guerrilla from the people. In Clutterbuck‘s opinion, the most important 
lesson of the Malayan Emergency was ‗that the villager is more subject to terror by the 
man with a knife living inside the village at night than by the guerrilla with a gun coming in 
from the jungle outside‘.71 In order to separate the ‗man with a knife‘ from the population, 
Briggs implemented ‗the largest social revolution ever known in Asia; the resettlement 
of 600,000 squatters into New Villages; a revolution which … was to prove a brilliant, 
unorthodox tactic in the war against guerrilla Communism; one which military leaders 
would study in every future Asian war‘.72 Anthony Short lauded Briggs‘ plan as the ‗basic 
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analysis and prescription had set the pattern that was to be followed through to a successful 
conclusion … and a proper appreciation of what was required in the new villages may be 
seen as the blueprint for success‘. 73  By March 1953, the attributes necessary for a 
successful New Village had been defined as: 
 
A modicum of agricultural land and the granting of long-term land titles, an 
adequate water supply, a reasonably well-functioning village committee, a 
school which could accommodate at least a majority of the children, a village 
community centre, roads of passable standards and with side drains, 
reasonable conditions of sanitation and public health, a place of worship, trees 
along the main street and padang, an effective perimeter fence, a flourishing 
Home Guard, a reasonably friendly feeling towards the Government and the 
police.
74
 
 
The fundamental objective of the New Villages was to isolate the insurgent from the 
population and protect the population from subversion that, according to Thompson, is 
the prerequisite for uniting the people in community spirit in positive action on the  
side of the government.
75
 Briggs‘ strategy of resettling the Chinese squatters in ‗New 
Villages‘ (continued by Templer) proved to be a highly successful ‗carrot and stick 
strategy‘ that solicited cooperation from the rural Chinese in exchange for a more secured 
and prosperous way of life. 
 
Briggs and Templer recognised that the decisive tactical element in Malaya was the 
village police post rather than the army battalion. Both insisted that no New Village should 
be occupied until the provision of adequate police protection. Briggs oversaw the initial 
phase of the expansion of the police force that grew from nine thousand to 45,000 within 
a short span of six months.
76
 Above all, Briggs knew that a happy ending to the 
Emergency depended on the active cooperation of the rural Chinese. Briggs sought to 
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convince the Chinese population that their future was in  an independent Malaya rather 
than a Malaya dominated by the Chinese Communists. As part of his efforts to achieve 
this political end, Briggs gave the Chinese a stake in their own security. In his 
Directive No. 3 of 25 May 1950, Briggs stated: ‗The time has come when selected 
Chinese should be recruited as Auxiliary Police and where necessary armed with 
shotguns to take their share in anti-bandit operations‘.77 Realising the significant 
role that the local Chinese auxiliary policemen could play in isolating the 
Communists both physically and mentally from the rural Chinese, Templer 
continued the policy of arming the Home Guard, and even equipped it with some 
armoured cars. Not only were few weapons lost, the Home Guard proved to be a 
valuable link between the security forces and the populace, thus considerably improving 
the security of the villages.
78
 In short, the establishment of a permanent police 
presence in the New Villages and the empowerment of the rural Chinese sent two 
crucial messages to the Chinese population. First, the government was doing its best to 
protect them, and second, the government trusted them and was sincere in its efforts to 
include them in the building of a new independent Malaya.
 
 
Initially, the resettled villagers might have felt compelled to cooperate with the 
authorities out of fear. In time, however, the rural Chinese began to see the government as 
the provider of physical and socio-economic security. The subsequent transformation of the 
New Villages into thriving small towns with modern amenities encouraged families to stay 
put. Kumar Ramakrishna maintained that the British were gradually able to secure the 
confidence of not only the rural Chinese but also that of the MCP rank and file 
through the propaganda of its deeds that promoted the physical and socio-economic 
security of both the rural Chinese and MCP cadres.
79
 To put it bluntly: ‗with security 
came loyalty‘.80 The government‘s ability to provide for the security of the people and 
ensure a stable secure progressive socio-economic environment demonstrated its credibility, 
and was a key factor in winning the hearts and minds of the rural Chinese. In short, the 
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New Villages played a pivotal role in securing the entire rural Chinese population from the 
MCP – thereby turning the strategic tide decisively in favour of the counterinsurgent. 
 
 The development and importance of the New Villages cannot be understated. The 
New Villages of the First Emergency era fundamentally shaped and changed the physical 
and socio-political landscape of post-colonial Malaysia to such an extent that the presence 
of the state was now felt in hitherto ‗black areas‘. More importantly, the resettlement of the 
First Emergency period created purpose-built townships whereby the surveillance, policing 
and control of the Chinese population became a much easier task for the post-colonial 
authorities. Indeed, the population security apparatus developed in the First Emergency was 
the bedrock upon which the post-colonial Malaysian state could further build on. As we 
shall see in the subsequent chapters, there were remarkable similarities in the development 
and implementation of population-centric approaches between the First and Second 
Emergencies that enabled both the British and later Malaysian governments to secure the 
population. The cognisance of population-centricity as the sine qua non was deeply 
reflected in the British practice of pouring in immense resources to win over the hearts and 
minds of the population. 
 
Propaganda in the Population-centric Approach 
 
Thompson postulated that in the battle for the hearts and minds of the people, it is the mind 
that counts: ‗What the peasant wants to know is does the government mean to win the war? 
Because, if not, he will have to support the insurgent. The government must … instil the 
confidence that it is going to win‘.81  Briggs appreciated the fact that one of the best 
methods to instil confidence into the population is effective government propaganda. As 
noted earlier, Hugh Carleton Greene was brought in by Briggs to set up the EIS, which was 
to be a civilian institution that handled all of the government‘s conduct of public relations 
and dissemination of public information. The British clearly believed that since the 
Emergency was essentially a civil problem, a supra-civilian Information Services would be 
the best organisation to coordinate and conduct the entire psywar effort. The British 
further avoided any militarisation that would undermine its credibility. If military assets 
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were utilised, it was in the dissemination and distribution role, in the form of leaflet drops 
and voice aircraft sorties by the RAF in the skies, and on the ground by troops on patrol. 
 
The following fundamentals of the government‘s psywar efforts were laid out by 
Greene: 
 
To raise the morale of the civil population and to encourage confidence in 
government and resistance to the communists with a view to increasing the 
flow of information reaching the police; to attack morale of members of the 
MRLA, the Min Yuen and their supporters and to drive a wedge between the 
leaders and the rank and file with a view to encouraging defection and 
undermining the determination of the communists to continue the struggle.
82
 
 
Greene also formulated what was to be the government‘s long-term surrender policy of 
‗fair treatment‘ of all Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEPs). Having realised the ‗critical 
psychological vulnerability posed by the powerful materialistic impulse of the average rural 
Chinese peasant and terrorist‘, Greene deduced that the ‗offer of attractive rewards to 
induce these peasants to betray the terrorists would intensify the anxieties of waverers in 
the MRLA‘. Hence, Greene set about rationalising the existing rewards programme.83 
Briggs, Thompson and Templer were all convinced that persuading the guerrillas to 
surrender would be a much more effective method of destroying the MCP than 
killing them, and staunchly backed efforts of the IES at inducing surrenders. 
 
The revitalised psywar deeply vexed the Communists. As contact between guerrillas 
and government propaganda increased, the MCP was forced to divert its resources into 
countering government propaganda. The sheer volume of communist counter-propaganda 
suggested that from 1951 onwards, the government‘s psywar was starting to make its 
effects felt.
84
 The main reason for the success of the government‘s strategic 
propaganda campaign, and vanguard of its efforts, was the psywar section of the IES. 
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The psywar section led by C. C. Too, a local Chinese, consisted mostly of ex-MCP 
guerrillas, which never exceeded 30 in number. Too‘s fundamental rules in psywar 
were: ‗don‘t preach‘, ‗don‘t theorise‘, ―never say I told you so‘ and ‗no propaganda 
based on hatred‘. Too further believed that ‗every item of propaganda must be factual 
and true‘, to the extent of admitting in a leaflet that a Communist guerrilla whose death 
he had publicised was alive due to an error in identification.
85
 This emphasis on the truth 
had the intended effect of boosting the credibility of government propaganda not only in 
the eyes of the population, but those of its opponents.  
 
In appreciation of Too‘s unparalleled knowledge of the MCP and local conditions, 
Thompson gave Too a free hand as much as main policy would allow and was resolutely 
behind Too in his ‗no hate‘ and ‗nothing but the truth‘ approach. The ‗no hate‘  policy not 
only encouraged droves of Communist guerrillas to surrender, but also SEP cooperation 
with the security services. This in turn greatly increased the flow of invaluable 
intelligence, something that cannot be gained by simply killing off the insurgents. The 
British approach to psywar in Malaya can thus be summed up as one that adopted a civil 
rather than militaristic outlook, avoided hate, strictly adhered to the truth, prevented the 
guerrilla from seizing the initiative, and based on local conditions rather than an imposed 
preconceived European perspective. More importantly, the British approach to pyswar 
during the First Emergency was based on a population-centric approach specifically 
designed to win over a particular population group. In short, without population-
centricity, the First Emergency psywar effort would have gone off-target and failed to 
convince its audience of its credibility.  
 
In the subsequent Second Emergency, both the insurgent and the counterinsurgent 
would again battle for the hearts and minds of the population. In the post-colonial 
context, a significant departure would be the Malaysian government‘s complete local 
ownership of its overall COIN effort as an independent state. Interestingly however, in 
the propaganda of the CPM, the Malaysian Federation was constantly portrayed as a 
product of neo-colonialism. The CPM did not view the First and Second Emergencies as 
separate struggles but part of a greater effort to create a people‘s republic that disregarded 
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the formation of the independent nation states of Malaysia and Singapore. In short, the 
distinction between its colonial and post-independence opponents was irrelevant in the 
CPM‘s grand narrative of its armed struggle of ‗using the countryside to surround the 
cities‘. This idiosyncrasy in CPM strategic propaganda was a marked influence of Maoist 
revolutionary mass persuasion. Thus, in order to adequately explain the peculiarities of 
CPM psywar methodology, it would be necessary to visit the conceptualisation of 
People‘s War and revolutionary mass persuasion.   
   
Tempering the Elemental Force of People’s War 
 
In Malaya, the British were able to counter the MCP‘s attempt at waging People‘s 
War not by guns alone, but through an integrated approach that embraced both the 
civil and military spheres.  This was necessary as People‘s War is a mastery blend of 
political violence, psychological warfare, propaganda and mass mobilisation. 
Travelling through a China ravaged by the dogs of war since the collapse of the Qing 
dynasty, the American Journalist Jack Belden observed that: ‗A People‘s War is an 
intensification of the already violent nature of war…more passionate, more savage and 
more personal than any other type war yet known‘.86 Waged amongst the masses, by the 
masses and for the masses (doctrinally-wise), People‘s War ultimately becomes highly 
personalised and war personified. People‘s War in its apotheosis obfuscates the lines 
between the people, army and the state, and in so doing forges an immutable link between 
the people, the revolutionary forces and revolutionary ideology. Ever since Mao‘s Red 
conquest of China, this form of revolutionary violence has become a model for many 
of the world‘s revolutionaries past and present. Despite taking the Western 
democracies by storm, Mao never did claim that his concept of People‘s War was a 
radically new paradigm of warfare. Like Clausewitz, Mao recognised that ‗war is the 
continuation of politics‘ and since ‗war itself is a political action‘, ‗victory is 
inseparable from the political aim of the war‘.87 Indeed neither Mao‘s strategy nor 
tactics in insurgent warfare were revolutionary. The titanic force of peasant rebellions 
that often brought about the collapse of old dynasties and the rise of a new unifying 
power harkens back to the millennia-old peasant rebellions of ancient China. However 
                                                 
86
Jack Belden, China Shakes the World, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970, 221. 
87
 Mao Tse Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung Vol I, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965, 152-3. 
42 
 
by waging insurgency within the framework of a highly ideologised political doctrine 
designed to mobilise the masses, Mao added a whole new dimension to an ancient 
way of war. Walter Laqueur noted that: 
 
The Communists were not just another party or clique of warlords; they 
had an ideology that at one and the same time provided an explanation of 
the world and a guide to action for changing it…they had a method to 
mobilize the masses that was more effective, more in line with Chinese 
realities than that of the Kuomintang or the warlords.
88
 
 
Unlike their Nationalist opponents, the Chinese Communist realised that ‗a latent power for 
good or evil lay coiled within the energy and frustration of the peasant masses‘.89 It was 
Mao‘s ability to agitate, mobilise, temper and weld the elemental force of China; its 
hundreds of millions of rural masses that allowed him to revolutionise China as well 
as much of the Third World.  
 
Rupert Smith argues that Revolutionary war, while based on ‗competing 
triangular relationships‘, possesses a characteristic that is common to both sides, the 
people; with ‗the government, the security forces and the people‘ forming one triangle 
and ‗the revolutionaries, their ideology and their putative administration and the 
people‘ the other. While the government seeks to separate the people from the 
Revolutionary, the objective of the Revolutionary is to break the link between the 
government and the people.
90
 Indeed, although the end goals of the Revolutionary and 
the Counterrevolutionary might differ, the means to victory are fundamentally the 
same; a campaign amongst the people that utilises an integrated approach within the 
four integral pillars of military force, civil-military relations, population security and 
propaganda. In a People‘s War, mastering the elements of military force, civil-military 
relations, population security and propaganda are of as much relevance to the 
Revolutionary as it is to the Counterrevolutionary. Moreover, since the Revolutionary 
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invariably starts out as the weaker military force, adopting an integrated approach tied 
to a credible ideology and political cause is of paramount importance. Indeed, 
Revolutionary People‘s War is never bound to the confines of military action but 
rather a unity of the military, political, social, economic and psychological.
91
 This 
section of the thesis will analyse the integrated approach utilised by the 
Revolutionary to bring the revolution to the masses and the process by which mass 
mobilisation and mass persuasion takes place. 
 
The People’s Army 
 
Unlike the highly specialised professional armed forces and security services of the 
West, a Revolutionary Army is more than just a military force. A soldier in a Western 
army is trained to be highly skilled specialist in a specific vocation, plying his craft as 
an infantryman, a radioman, a combat engineer, a combat medic and etcetera. On the 
other hand, his counterpart in a ‗People‘s Army‘ is more than just a combatant: 
 
The [Red] Army is not only a fighting force, it is mainly a working 
force…In urban work they should learn how to be good at dealing…with 
the bourgeoisie, good at leading the workers and organising trade unions, 
good at mobilising and organising the youth, good at uniting with and 
training cadres in the new Liberated Areas, good at managing industry and 
commerce, good at running schools, newspapers, news agencies and 
broadcasting stations, good at handling foreign affairs, good at handling 
problems relating to the democratic parties and people‘s organisations, 
good at adjusting the relations between the cities and the rural areas and 
solving the problems of food, coal and other daily necessities and good at 
handling monetary and financial problems…The army is a school. Our 
field armies of 2,100,000 are equivalent to several thousand universities 
and secondary schools.
92
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In waging ‗People‘s War‘, a ‗People‘s Army‘ becomes politicised and rejects the high 
level of specialisation common to all Western professional armed forces. On top of 
war-fighting, a soldier of a ‗People‘s Army‘ is also a school-teacher, a foot-doctor 
dispensing medical aid to the rural masses, a worker in industry, a diplomat on the 
international stage and above all, a tool of political mass mobilisation and action. 
Ultimately, it is the revolutionary political objective that shapes the role of the 
‗People‘s Army‘ with ‗People‘s War‘ waged within the ambit of that same political 
context.   
 
A Western professional army exists as a separate sphere in the very society it 
serves to protect; with its own distinct values, laws, customs and way of life often 
incomprehensible and removed from the civilian masses. On the other hand, a 
‗People‘s Army‘ in maintaining the primacy of the political sphere as its key principle 
and rejecting professionalism becomes part of rather than separated from the masses. 
Maria Macciocchi observed that in the Chinese Red Army:   
 
A soldier recognizes him [his commanding officer] just as the worker 
recognizes the leader of the revolutionary committee or the person in charge of 
his shop. He personally knows him from his work, and not because of some 
external rank or stripe… Discipline in the Chinese army is strong because it is 
something conscious, not because it is due to the presence of sergeants in the 
barracks, but because it is born of a political commitment to defend proletarian 
power.
93
 
 
In its conduct towards the civil populace, soldiers of the Chinese Red Army were strictly 
governed by eight simple rules devised at the 1928 Second Maoping Conference.
94
 This 
form of conscious mutual respect earned though deeds and actions rather than an enforced 
professional hierarchy ultimately translates into an immutable relationship that binds the 
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‗People‘s Army‘, the political leadership and the people; hence precipitating the 
revolutionary mobilisation of the people. 
 
Odoric Wou posits that the Communist Revolution in China consisted of a series of 
‗local revolutions‘. Wou uses the Dubalian (Eight-Neighborhood Pact) in Henan to 
illustrate the sociopolitical process of how the Chinese Communists made use of local 
community self-defence in wartime to build up its military capability and undermine 
Nationalist state power locally. He argues that the inability of the Nationalists to protect 
localities seriously discredited them. On the other hand, by leading local residents in 
patriotic resistance, the Communists were able to gain popular support and became an 
effective contender for local power which locals identified themselves with.
95
 Indeed Edgar 
Snow, one of the few Western journalists that were able to slip through the Nationalist 
blockade into Communist held areas noted that amongst the peasants: 
 
Many of them were very free in their criticisms and complaints, but when asked 
whether they preferred it to the old days, the answer was nearly always an 
emphatic yes. I noticed also that most of them talked about the soviets as 
womenti chengfu – ‗our government‘ - and this struck me as something new in 
rural China.
96
  
 
This feeling of belonging and of having a stake in government brought to the Chinese 
masses a sense of self-determination.
97
 Without that crucial personalised element which 
links the interests of the locals and masses to those of the Revolutionary cause, People‘s 
War is bound to fail. Explaining the raison d‘etre of the Chinese Red Army, Mao 
wrote: 
 
They think that the task of the Red Army, like that of the White army, is 
merely to fight. They do not understand that the Chinese Red Army is an 
armed body for carrying out the political tasks of the revolution…The Red 
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Army fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to conduct 
propaganda among the masses, organise them, arm them, and help them to 
establish revolutionary political power. Without these objectives, fighting 
loses its meaning and the Red Army loses the reason for its existence.
98
 
 
A fundamental component of the Chinese Red Army is its political arm consisting of 
propagandists, political officers and political fighters. A parallel system of military 
and political officers extends right down to the company level. While at the platoon 
and squad levels, Zheng Zhi Zhan Shi (political fighters) were selected from the ranks 
as ‗progressive‘ models for fellow soldiers.99 The short-term effect of such a system is 
a fighting force which is highly motivated, politically conscious and aware of the need 
to maintain good civil-military relations. The long-term outcome however extends 
beyond the military sphere. As the People‘s Army begins to interact with the masses, 
the attitudes of the people slowly become revolutionised and there will come a time 
when the distinction between the state‘s army and the People‘s army becomes 
nonexistent in the minds of the people. Once the people have embraced the People‘s 
Army as their own, the unity between the people, the revolutionary forces and 
revolutionary ideology will have been achieved. 
 
People‘s War is fundamentally about winning over the masses in which 
political organisation, instruction, agitation, indoctrination and mobilisation takes 
precedence over all else. People‘s War is thus waged using a Unified approach in 
which military and political action is forged into a single force and brought to the 
masses. In People‘s War, the objective and the utility of force is determined by a 
single unwavering unified political goal; the overthrow of an existing government and 
the establishment of revolutionary political power. In other words, the nexus of 
People‘s War is unity; the unity that exists between the political leadership, the 
Revolutionary Army and the masses in advancement of the revolutionary cause. If 
such is achieved, it will be virtually impossible for any intervening power to impose 
its will no matter great its military strength.  
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Revolutionary Mass Persuasion 
 
Crucial to the success of People‘s War is the use of psychological warfare in the form 
of mass persuasion; a process that utilises ‗all feasible vehicles of human expression 
and means of influence‘ in order to bring the largest possible number of people into 
close contact with the Revolutionary Party.
100
 The concept of xin li zhan 
(psychological warfare) is however as old as the Chinese way of war. Sun Tze‘s 
notions of victory by deception and destroying the enemy‘s will to fight have since 
become indispensable tenants of Chinese strategic and military culture. Within the 
context of its role in People‘s War, the inferior firepower of the Chinese Red Army 
before 1949 meant that psychological warfare was a virtue of necessity and a ‗decisive 
substitute for firepower‘. 101  The Chinese Communists have always attached great 
importance in psychological factors and this faith in the power of ideas were 
reinforced by successes in political action.
102
 Indeed, by 1945, the Communists had 
won the propaganda war. They were viewed in liberal circles as incorruptible capable 
reformers whereas the Nationalist government could project no such image.
103
 In the 
struggle to win popular support amongst the Chinese masses, the Chinese Communists 
moved the practice of xin li zhan onto a higher plane. Unlike the imperial forces of old, 
the Communists were able to use xin li zhan as a means to galvanise and mobilise the 
elemental force of China‘s rural masses.  
 
To Mao everything depended on the masses which constituted both the 
audience and the vehicle of mass persuasion. The key to understanding Mao‘s 
revolutionary mass persuasion is the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist dictum that ‗thought 
determines action‘ and that ‗if people can be made to think correctly…they will 
naturally act correctly‘. Fundamental to the Chinese Revolution is the process of class 
struggle and the concept of class consciousness. The main purpose of propaganda is 
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thus to ‗awaken, heighten, and sharpen the class consciousness of the masses‘.104 The 
Marxist-Leninist-Maoist propagandist operated on the principle that the thoughts of 
the masses must first be revolutionised upon which a new social, political, economic 
and cultural order would then emerge. Rather than seeking to influence a target 
audience through a consistent ‗words with deeds‘ approach, the Maoist mass 
persuasion approach attempts to socialise the minds of the masses to create a ‗New 
Socialist Man‘ for the ‗New Socialist State‘. In Revolutionary warfare, ideology 
precedes and in many ways defines the formation of the New State and its society. 
 
In the battle for the ‗truth‘, propaganda is a potent psychological weapon that 
presented the platform for transforming aggrieved feelings into revolutionary thoughts 
and action. It must be noted that to a Revolutionary propagandist, half-truths were as 
good as the whole truth so long as they are persuasive enough to be credible, and most 
importantly persuasive enough to agitate the thoughts of the masses. The ‗truth‘ is 
thus defined by the power to socialise the minds and actions of the masses rather than 
matching words with deeds. Revolutionary Psywar methodology is a blend of White, 
Black, Grey, Conversionary, Divisive, Consolidation and Counter Propaganda adapted 
to meet the requirements of a protracted revolutionary war. Revolutionary Psywar is in 
essence ‗Plug and Play Psywar‘ which each component utilised according to the 
various scenarios and stages of the protracted revolutionary armed struggle.   
 
Frequent shifts in Maoist propaganda practice should not obscure the 
underlying consistency in its strategic objectives and any modifications should be 
rationalised as adaptations to the special conditions of the Chinese Revolution.
105
 Mao 
stresses that the cadre‘s capacity for effective practical struggle differs fundamentally 
from the assumptions of dogmatism and that practice is more important than adhering 
to dogmatic theory.
106
 Theories, doctrines, dogmas and ivory-tower scholarship were 
considered by Mao to be irrelevant if not translated into action. In order for mass 
persuasion to be effective, ‗psychological warfare output must be a part of the 
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everyday living and fighting of the audiences to which it is directed‘.107 To Mao‘s 
mind, communication must be to be ‗from the masses to the masses‘, and that party 
leadership must stem from the same practical ‗from the masses to the masses‘ 
process.
108
 However, Mao‘s doctrine of the ‗mass line‘ like many of his other intellectual 
formulations was double-ended; while it asserted the need to consult the masses, it also 
reiterated central control and leadership.
109
 Fundamentally, Mao understood that for 
mass persuasion and mass mobilisation to succeed, the masses must be brought into 
the closest possible contact with the Revolutionary Party.  
 
In Maoist Revolutionary doctrine, no partition exists between the political and 
military spheres. The same can be same in the relationship between art and propaganda. To 
a Maoist propagandist, the only distinction lies in what was understandable through 
experience and what was not. Drawing from the experience of his Yanan days, Mao 
concluded that:   
 
The spread of political propaganda throughout the rural areas is entirely an 
achievement of the Communist Party and the peasant associations. Simple 
slogans, cartoons and speeches have produced such a widespread and 
speedy effect among the peasants that every one of them seems to have 
been through a political school.
110
 
 
The main tool of Revolutionary Psywar, or ‗oral agitation‘, is face to face 
communication and maximum possible interaction with the masses carried out by 
millions of propagandists at the ground level. With an emphasis on attaining the 
closest possible direct contact between the masses and party cadres, Revolutionary 
‗oral agitation‘ provides a continuous flow of information on the ‗psychological 
climate of the people‘, which in turn gives the Revolutionary an ‗incontestable 
element of superiority‘.111 The effectiveness of Maoist political propaganda can partly 
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be explained by its sheer simplicity; simple face to face forms of communication 
directed at the grassroots with the maximum possible level of direct interaction. Liu 
Shaoqi, the second Chairman of the PRC after Mao, emphasised that in mass 
mobilisation:  
 
Members of the work teams should visit and talk with the peasants, household 
by household…The language and examples used should be easy for the local 
peasants to understand and should have a sense of personal immediacy for 
them. Once they grasp the meaning, their political consciousness will be 
enhanced. Once awakened, the peasants become anxious to do 
something.
112
  
 
In the practice of propaganda art, dramatic troupes of ‗Red thespians‘ moving from village 
to village performing simple acts that the peasants can relate to were one of the most potent 
weapons used to awaken the peasants. These troupes performed ‗Living Newspaper‘ scenes 
that dramatised military, political, economic, and social issues in an understandable and 
entertaining way. Likewise, doubts and questions of the sceptical peasantry were answered 
in a similar fashion.
113
 In predominantly Muslim areas, plays based on local historical and 
social contexts were staged. Posters, leaflets and newspapers, in both Chinese and Arabic 
were also distributed.
114
 In short, the dramatic troupes became an effective face to face 
propaganda tool that were utilised to allay the fears of the people, win their confidence and 
enhance their political consciousness.  
 
The emphasis on direct face to face contact and communicating in ways that 
connect with the masses though time-consuming allows the Revolutionary to penetrate 
into the minds if not hearts of the masses. It brings the masses into direct contact with 
the Revolutionary ideology and persuades though politicisation, social control or a 
combination of both. People‘s War and Maoist mass mobilisation is a continuous 
process that results in the penultimate symbiosis of the masses, the People‘s Army and 
the revolutionary cause, or  explained in Clausewitzian terms; a symbiotic unity of the 
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people, army and the state. It is clear that Maoist mass persuasion plays an integral 
role in mobilising the masses for People‘s War, but how exactly does it persuade?  
 
In Mao‘s own words, it persuades by linking ‗the political mobilisation for the 
war with developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people‘. In 
order for People‘s War and mass persuasion to succeed, it must relate to the everyday 
struggles and lives of the masses which meant fulfilling the existential needs of the 
rural masses and providing a sense of security and stability where there was 
previously none. Hence, socio-economic work amongst the masses is the wellspring of 
security and stability that persuades by establishing a correlation between the 
revolutionary political struggle with the everyday lives of the masses. On the 
paramount necessity of establishing unity between the lives of the masses and 
Revolutionary war, Mao wrote: 
 
If we want to win…We must lead the peasants‘ struggle for land and 
distribute the land to them, heighten their labour enthusiasm and increase 
agricultural production, safeguard the interests of the workers, establish co-
operatives, develop trade with outside areas, and solve the problems facing 
the masses - food, shelter and clothing, fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt, 
sickness and hygiene, and marriage. In short, all the practical problems in 
the masses‘ everyday life should claim our attention. If we attend to these 
problems, solve them and satisfy the needs of the masses, we shall really 
become organisers of the well-being of the masses, and they will truly rally 
round us and give us their warm support.
115
 
 
In People‘s War, economic construction is always carried out in tandem with 
traditional warfighting. Cadres are expected to engage in economic work as well as 
military duties. In practical terms, there was no other alternative for the Chinese 
Communists. The guerrilla war was also a production war. The development of local 
economies in the Communist base areas was of existential importance; crucial in 
                                                 
115
 Mao Tse Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse Tung Vol I, 147-8. 
52 
 
sustaining the isolated Chinese Red Army and winning popular support amongst the 
population that it dwelled. 
 
In a war that is heavily dependent upon mass support, the provision of socio-
economic stability in base areas is crucial in winning the hearts and minds. Liu Shaoqi 
warned that:  
 
If the economic burden in the base areas is so heavy for the people…it 
might damage our bonds with them, cause the people outside the base areas 
to fear and reject leadership by our Party and our army, or create doubts 
among the people about the Communist Party's ability to lead.
116
 
 
By working on the land, a sense of solidarity between the ‗People‘s Army‘ and the masses 
is developed and reinforced; particularly when contrasted with the behaviour of previous 
armies that took from the land. Edwin Hoyt, a correspondent based in China in the 1940s 
observed that: ‗this brought the Red Army and the Red organisation closer to the people 
than the Guomindang had been since the days of National Revolution‘.117 This feeling of 
solidarity was further encouraged by the ‗support the government and love the people‘ and 
the ‗support the army‘ campaigns which were celebrated by the exchange of gifts, feasts 
and ceremonial meetings between army units and the local populace whereby army leaders 
would publicly criticise their behaviour towards the civil population, and offer 
compensation for any damages.
118
 This perceived sense of solidarity between the civil 
population and the ‗People‘s Army‘ is the vital factor that ensured the survival and eventual 
success of the Chinese Red Army.  
 
In the base areas held by the Chinese Communists, the synthesis of tax reform, rent 
reduction, promotion of mutual aid and redistributive programmes, ‗cumulatively ushered 
in a silent revolution‘ that ‗simultaneously empowered the poor and deepened and tightened 
the reach of the party down into the village‘. 119  Indeed, by implementing select 
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socioeconomic reforms in concert with its mobilisation efforts in resisting the Japanese, the 
Communists were ultimately able to build political legitimacy in the countryside.
120
 The 
socio-economic development component of ‗People‘s War‘ is just as important as the 
warfighting element. Both had complementary roles in the process of mobilising the people 
at the populist and elitist levels. Failure in the socio-economic sphere will create a sense of 
apathy or worse alienate the population, while success wins credibility in what is essentially 
a population-centric credibility war.   
 
It is not difficult to understand why the Chinese rural masses were persuaded 
by Mao‘s cadres. In light of the tumultuous warlord years of the 1920s and 30s 
followed by the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the average Chinese peasant was 
constantly at the mercy of the Japanese Army, corrupt KMT provincial officials and 
rapacious warlords. In a land where the rural masses ‗ate bitterness‘ (Chi Ku), Mao‘s 
vision of a Revolutionary New China was more than persuasive. Indeed, the potential 
for Revolutionary war exists in any society where grievances run deep within the 
masses. Revolutionary People‘s War seeks to exploit those grievances not through the 
narrow confines of military action but rather a blend of the military, political, social, 
economic and psychological that ultimately results in mass mobilisation and the 
overthrow of an existing socio-political order. Revolutionary victory is only possible 
through an integrated approach which integrates all military, political, social, 
economic and psychological means with the masses as its focal point. In People‘s 
War, the population as defined by the masses constitutes the centre of gravity, the hub 
of its power, and mass mobilisation is the key to unlock that power.   
 
 Throughout both the First and Second Emergencies, the Maoist People‘s War 
model was the strategic template on which the MCP/CPM adhered to with unwavering 
faith. The CPM leadership tried to adapt the People‘s War model to its own 
revolutionary struggle in the First Emergency with little success.  Another attempt to 
do so in the Second Emergency again met with strategic failure. If the CPM 
propaganda, manifestos, constitutions and other items of information of both 
Emergencies were anything to go by, the cumulative evidence suggested that the 
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senior party leadership was well-versed in the theory and concepts of People‘s War – 
including the paramount importance of winning over the masses. Why then did the 
CPM‘s relentless efforts at mass persuasion fail to seize the hearts and minds of its 
target population? Having set the conceptual backdrop for both the counterinsurgent 
and insurgent within the four key touchstones of the utility of military force, civil-
military relations, population security, and propaganda, a partial explanation for the 
aforesaid question can be proffered in following chapter which details the strategy of 
the CPM in both Emergencies.  
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3. 
 
Strategy of the CPM’s Revived Armed Struggle: Retreat, Reform and Revival 
(1948-1981) 
 
If the Chinese Revolution was the adaptation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine to Chinese 
conditions, the CPM‘s armed struggle and strategic propaganda campaign exemplified 
its efforts to replicate the success of the Chinese Communists in Malaya. This chapter 
will chart the strategic history of the CPM from 1948-1981 and compare the CPM‘s 
strategic approach to its anti-colonial struggle (1948-1960) with that of its post-colonial 
struggle (1968-1981). Since much ink has been spilled on the First Emergency, the focus 
will be on the distinctive facets and organisational aspects of the evolution of CPM strategy 
during the Second Emergency.  This chapter begins with a brief examination of the CPM‘s 
strategy for the anti-colonial phase of its existence, followed by that of its ‗resurrection 
strategy‘. Drawing from CPM manifestos, constitutions and other items of 
information released via the VMR as well as Australian and British records, the 
chapter reconstructs the evolution of CPM strategy in the post-colonial phase of its 
armed struggle. In short, this chapter will cover the antecedents, push-pull factors, 
planning and execution of the CPM‘s revived armed struggle as well as a comparative 
analysis of the CPM‘s anti-colonial and post-colonial strategies. 
 
From 1948 to 1981, the CPM‘s template of revolution was largely based on the 
Maoist doctrine of ‗using the countryside to surround the cities‘.  However, this was 
not always the case. As explained in the introduction, the immediate post-war strategy 
of the MCP was based on the Soviet model of urban struggle rather than the Maoist 
way of rurally-based guerrilla war. For three years, the MCP fought to gain political 
ascendancy through labour agitation and control of the trade union movement. Infiltration 
and control of the trade unions thus became the MCP‘s main instruments in its efforts to 
ferment an urban uprising. The MCP however overestimated its hold on the labour 
movement. In the chaotic transition from war to renewed colonial occupation of 1945 to 
1946, workers might have revolted, but by 1948, many Indian and Chinese labour leaders 
56 
 
were actively discouraging labour-militancy with increasing success.
121
 The Trade Unions 
(Amendment) Ordinance of June 1948 effectively forced the dissolution of all MCP-backed 
trade unions and dashed all hopes of a popular workers‘ uprising. By June 1948, in light of 
its failure to mount mass city protests and work stoppages, the MCP shifted its strategy to 
that of the armed struggle.  
 
The long term military strategy of the Malayan Communists in 1948 was based on 
the Maoist model envisaged in three phases. Phase one entailed the use of guerrilla warfare 
and terrorism to disrupt the Malayan economy and the communications of the colonial 
authorities. Phase two would see the establishment of communist governments on liberated 
rural areas similar to the Soviets established by the Chinese Communists in the Yenan days. 
The final Phase would culminate in the joining up of liberated areas followed by a mass 
uprising that would sweep the British away. Despite the inadequate British response during 
the first five months of the insurgency, the opening phase of the Malayan Emergency was 
fought to a stalemate without the MCP ever gaining the initiative. Since the MRLA could 
not concentrate its forces in combined operations, its ‗surge‘ in armed attacks from 1950 to 
51 was sporadic and did not represent any real increase in scale or impact. The limitations 
to the MCP‘s military strategy was demonstrated by the fact that even at the height of 
MNLA violence, the British continued to govern and the MRLA never succeeded in forcing 
the British administrative withdrawal from key areas.  
 
Realising the failure of its late1948 strategy, the MCP leadership sought to salvage 
the situation by issuing the October Directives which called on its cadres to cease 
unrestricted terrorism. The October Directives proved to be too little too late. According to 
Kumar Ramakrishna: ‗By the end of 1951, the MCP had inadvertently provoked general 
aversion towards itself amongst the mass of the rural Chinese, a situation that proved 
impossible to redress, and all but destroyed any prospect of success in the shooting war‘.122 
As mentioned above, the MNLA‘s armed operations were on the whole sporadic. They 
lacked force-concentration, attacks were ill-coordinated and attempts at establishing 
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liberated areas were beyond the MNLA‘s limited military capabilities. Moreover, the use of 
unrestricted terrorism alienated the majority of the rural Chinese masses; the very people 
that the MCP depended upon to keep its revolution alive. The MCP never quite got beyond 
phase one of its plan and were instead defeated in the guerrilla phase of its armed struggle. 
 
Reminiscent of Mao‘s Long March, the MCP began a phased withdrawal of its 
main combat units to the jungles of Southern Thailand in April 1952. Unlike the Chinese 
Red Army, the MRLA never did establish a secure base in Southern Thailand from which it 
could regain the operational initiative. From its peak strength of 8,000 fighters in 1951, the 
MCP‘s combat strength was whittled down to a rump of less than a thousand hard-core 
cadres by 1958. Indeed, by 1954, prospects of winning the armed struggle in Malaya 
looked rather bleak. In April 1954, the Second Conference of Communist and Workers‘ 
Parties in the British Commonwealth passed six resolutions, the last of which called for the 
armed struggle in Malaya to be ended by ‗the method of peace‘. This shift from armed 
struggle back to ‗peaceful coexistence‘ implied that revolution through violent means no 
longer enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of International Communist movement.
123
 By then, 
any hopes of external aid were dashed. The MCP thus returned to the means of peaceful 
struggle in 1954. Chin Peng was however unwilling to accept the party‘s dissolution and 
surrender; pre-conditions laid down by the Tunku in exchange for involvement in main 
stream Malayan politics. 
 
The formal declaration of Malayan independence on 31 August 1957 further 
undercut any room for political manoeuvre. Thus, the deteriorating military situation was 
further exacerbated by a new political environment that offered bleak prospects of salvation 
either through external intervention or political brinkmanship. The MCP leadership‘s 
response was contained in the issues of a manifesto declaring the party‘s intentions to 
pursue ‗democratic means within constitutional limits‘ in tandem with its guerrilla methods. 
The MCP‘s 1957 manifesto duly illustrates a dual approach that attempted to reconcile the 
Soviet and Chinese models as well as the schisms within party leadership over the 
movement‘s long-term direction. However, by 1958, the ‗operational realities of 
irreversible military failure‘, the ‗unsalvageable political position of the Party‘ coupled with 
                                                 
123
 Kumar Ramakrishna, ‗Anatomy of a Collapse: Explaining the Malayan Communist Mass Surrenders of 
1958‘, War and Society, Vol 21 (2), 2003, 109-133, 128. 
58 
 
the generous Merdeka amnesty produced mass surrenders which effectively ended the 
shooting war.
124
 A similar picture is painted by Karl Hack who views the 1956-1958 period 
as one in which the intensified use of amnesties combined with operations in key areas and 
mass betrayals resulted in ‗a virtual collapse of the MNLA within Malaya‘ and a ‗virtual 
mothballing of the military struggle‘. Hack makes another critical argument, namely, that 
by August 1957, the MCP was ‗on its way to becoming not a Malayan-based party, but a 
mainly Thai-based, Communist organisation in exile‘.125  July 1960 witnessed the final 
mopping-up phase of operations by Malayan security forces, by which point, the 
government in Kuala Lumpur felt it safe enough to declare the Emergency over. 
 
Recognising the failure of its initial armed struggle, The MCP issued its 1958 ‗Put 
away the flags and Silence the Drums‘ Directive. The remaining 500-odd cadres now in 
Southern Thailand were demobilised and encouraged to enter Thai civilian life to act as 
‗sleepers‘ or at least remain in touch with the Party. 126  Most of the MCP‘s Central 
Committee members were exfiltrated to Beijing which became the MCP‘s new 
headquarters for directing the political and later armed struggle in Malaya. As early as 1961, 
most of the MCP‘s Central Committee members were effectively persuaded by Beijing that 
the time was ripe for a second attempt at armed revolution. Bearing witness to the events of 
the Cultural Revolution, the Beijing-based MCP executive could not help but feel inspired. 
From 1962 to 1968, the ground in Southern Thailand was slowly readied for revolution. 
Old networks were reactivated, Kuomintang and criminal gangs targeted and new training 
camps were set up in the border area. MCP strength within this region grew from 300 to 
2,000 cadres in the first year, with a core of about 800 fighting personnel by 1964.
127
 By 
1967 preparatory moves for a renewed armed revolution in Malaya were at an 
advanced stage. On the 20
th
 anniversary of their armed struggle, 1 June 1968, the 
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Malayan Communists, now known as the CPM officially announced their intention 
to revive the armed struggle in Malaya.  
 
For the MCP, victory in Malaya depended on ‗using the countryside to encircle 
the cities‘; yet ‗the Botanic Gardens [in Singapore] were not countryside‘.128 In an 
urban environment unsuited for a rural insurgency, legal ‗united front‘ action 
necessarily took precedence over guerrilla warfare. In other words, the MCP had to 
adopt different strategies for both Malaysia and Singapore. Whereas revolutionary 
success in Malaysia depended upon the dove-tailing of the MCP‘s military and 
political efforts, its actions in Singapore were largely based on subversion and 
political activism. Through MCP-controlled trade unions and a legal political front, 
the MCP sought to dominate the communist/socialist movement in Singapore and 
ultimately the island-city-state. The high point of the MCP‘s political activism in Singapore 
was in 1954 when open united front activities were made possible under the Rendel 
Constitution passed in the same year. Under the Rendel constitution, political parties and 
trade unions could be legally formed to serve as front platforms for the communist 
movement. During the heydays of the communist/socialist movement in Singapore, the 
united front consisted of the People‘s Action Party (PAP), the Barisan Socialists (BSS) and 
numerous trade unions (many of which were front organisations of the MCP). The demise 
of the MCP‘s united front strategy came in the 1960s, when the non-communist faction of 
the PAP, led by Lee Kuan Yew, succeeded in gaining leadership and control of the united 
front effort to end colonial rule.  
 
Between mid-1961 and the end of 1966, the CPM was preoccupied with the twin 
tasks of sending cadres away from Singapore to escape impending capture and the 
prevention of the proposed merger between Singapore and Malaya which would destroy the 
MCP‘s efforts to rebuild its strength.129  Prior to Singapore‘s entry into the Malaysian 
Federation, Lee Kuan Yew won the backing of both Tunku Abdul Rahman and the British 
government (sponsors of the merger plan) to crackdown on pro-communist elements of the 
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united front. The withdrawal of most of the MCP‘s Singapore-based cadres to Indonesia 
and the netting of most the remaining cadres in Operation Cold Store on 2 February 1963 
deprived the Singaporean communist movement of adequate leadership to sustain its 
activism. When Singapore left the Malaysian Federation on 9 August 1965, the pro-
communist faction of the united front movement refused to recognise the independence of 
Singapore which it judged to be false and boycotted parliament. This resulted in an 
irreconcilable split within the socialist movement in Singapore which effectively confirmed 
the PAP‘s virtual dominance in government. By 1966, any hopes of winning over 
Singapore through legal and constitutional means via a united front strategy were at an end.  
 
Many of the CPM‘s Singapore-based cadres that made it to Indonesia were 
redeployed to the Thai-Malaysian border to resume the armed struggle. Right up to the mid-
seventies, the communist front in Singapore continued to feed recruits to the Sixth Assault 
Unit (6
 
AU) operating in Pahang.
130
 The CPM‘s efforts at subverting the Singaporean 
masses however continued unabated. The VMR broadcasts available twice daily in 
Singapore on 9590 k c/s and 7305 kc/s in the 31 and 41 metre bands was an all important 
link between the CPM leadership in the PRC and its urban subversion effort in Singapore. 
Singapore‘s Internal Security Department was quick to recognise that the VMR broadcasts 
were ‗expedite means of giving broad outlines of tactics to the communist underground and 
front organisations and party supporters and sympathisers‘. 131 On 29 July 70, the Singapore 
Telecoms Department began jamming the VMR station but such efforts were not 
completely effective.
132
 The VMR continued to be a source of inspiration and instructions 
for CPM supporters and sympathisers well into 1981 when the VMR station was finally 
shut down by the CPM‘s Chinese sponsors. 
 
           According to the VMR broadcasts made over a four-day period to mark the 50th 
anniversary of the founding of the CPM, the official party line delineated the CPM‘s 
political and armed struggle into four historical periods: 
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1. The first period was that of the pre-war underground struggle which began in April 
1930 and ended in December 1941; 
 
2. The Second period was the period of the Anti-Japanese National Liberation War 
(AJNLW) from December 1941 to August 1945; 
 
3. The third period was the post-war period of peaceful struggle from August 1945 to 
June 1948; 
 
4. The fourth period was that of the Anti-British National Liberation War (ABNLW) 
from June 1948 to ‗today‘.133 
 
The CPM clearly perceived its post-68 armed struggle as part of the same continuum as its 
‗Anti-British-Liberation-War‘. This rhetoric stemmed from the CPM worldview that post-
independence Malaysia and Singapore never were sovereign states but remained as British 
neo-colonies. Rhetoric notwithstanding, the CPM‘s post-68 armed struggle was a distinct 
historical episode that unfolded in three phases: 
 
1. The first phase was characterised by the infiltration and movement of CPM groups into 
Peninsular Malaysia and the re-establishment of an underground mass support and supply 
infrastructure  from 1968 to 1973; 
 
2. The second phase was in 1974:  This was a watershed year that witnessed an increased 
armed violence as all three CPM groups tried to outdo each other; 
 
3. The third and final phase was from 1975 to the end of the CPM‘s armed struggle in 1989 
and the signing of the Haayai Peace Accords. However, in light of the lacuna in archival 
material, only the 1975-1981 period of the third phase will be covered in any detail. 
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The above three-phased rubric of the CPM‘s post-68 armed struggle reflects the CPM‘s 
methodical efforts to replicate the success of Mao‘s three-staged People‘s War in Malaya – 
step by step, stage by stage. For the CPM, Mao‘s People‘s War model remained the proven 
method of achieving revolutionary victory. From the strategic perspective, the ‗using the 
countryside to encircle the cities‘ strategy adopted by the CPM from 1961 onwards was 
very much a carbon-copy replication of its Emergency-era approach to revolution. There 
were however marked distinctions between the colonial (1948-1960) and post-colonial 
(1968-1981) periods of the CPM‘s attempts at revolution - particularly in geopolitics, 
political economy, demographics and tactics.  
 
Compared to the 1948 to 1960 period, the geopolitical space between 1968 and 
1981 was shaped by the rapidly shifting dynamics of the Cold War with serious 
ramifications on the CPM‘s armed struggle. The most fundamental shift of them all was the 
increasing engagement between the PRC and the non-communist states of ASEAN in the 
1970s that eroded the PRC‘s support for the CPM‘s armed revolution. On the local 
battleground, the Northern Malaysia states of Kedah, Perak and Kelatan - renowned ‗black 
areas‘ of the First Emergency-era became once more the main ‗cock-pit‘ of the CPM 
insurgents and government security forces in the Second Emergency. In recognition of the 
vulnerability of its border states to communist subversion, the Malaysian government 
invested heavily in various development schemes to integrate these economically backward 
states with the rest of the country. Indeed, strides made in the development of the post-
colonial Malaysian and Singaporean political-economies severely dampened the CPM‘s 
call to revolutionary violence. One of the major failures of the MCP during the First 
Emergency was its lack of appeal to the Malay masses. In the Second Emergency, the CPM 
tried to rectify this ‗demographic‘ problem by creating various Malay-Muslim front 
organisations such as Parti Persaudara‘an Islam (PAPERI) and Malayan Islamic Fraternal 
Party (MIPF). The CPM was able to recruit large numbers of Thai-Malays, but despite its 
best efforts, support from the Malays south of the Thai border remained lacklustre. As with 
the MCP during the First Emergency, the CPM of the Second Emergency remained a 
largely Chinese dominated movement will limited appeal to the Malay majority. On the 
tactical front, small-unit actions reminiscent of the First Emergency remained the modus 
operandi of the revived armed struggle. In the Second Emergency, however, training 
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assistance provided by its Vietcong counterparts vastly improved the tactical competence of 
the CPM‘s armed units particularly in small-unit tactics, booby-traps tactics and ambushes. 
These various continuities and departures in geopolitical, political-economic, 
demographical and tactical conditions and their influence on CPM strategy will be 
constantly touched upon later in this chapter. 
 
Rekindling the Revolutionary Flame (1968-1973) 
 
The CPM‘s formal announcement of its intention to capture political power through armed 
struggle on 1, June, 1968 also marked the explicit rejection of all constitutional means of 
political engagement.  The systematic transformation of all CPM united front activities into 
underground operations in support of the armed struggle was well underway by 1967. 
Instructions to initiate the switch came in a 1967 secret directive that stated: 
 
What form of struggle should be adopted?...The most important is the armed 
struggle of the masses, i.e. People‘s War. The so-called ‗peaceful road‘, 
‗constitutional road‘ and ‗parliamentary road‘ are all sham revolutions…The 
leftwing progressive parties, trade unions and revolutionary masses 
organisations must…gradually revolutionise the masses until they are ready to 
embark on People‘s War…penetrate deeper into the towns, corporations, mines, 
estates, villages, schools and various centres, pay particular attention to the 
rural areas, perform well the masses propaganda and organisational work in the 
rural areas…intensify the illegal struggle and consolidate the underground 
fortress in order to ensure…that we will not be without resources in the face of 
the white terror.
134
 
 
Since 1968, CPM cadres and armed units have infiltrated into Malaysia from Southern 
Thailand with the aim of re-penetrating the ‗black areas‘ – strongholds of the CPM in the 
First Emergency. In these localities, relatives, former CPM sympathisers and personal 
contacts could be relied upon for support and assistance in the creation of an underground 
mass support infrastructure. Indeed, these former CPM bastions were to serve as ‗stepping 
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stones for the creation of a network of guerrilla bases that would eventually envelop the 
entire Peninsula and constitute the spring boards from which the armed struggle would be 
launched‘. 135   In short, the infiltration and movement of CPM groups into Peninsular 
Malaysia and the re-establishment of an underground mass support and supply 
infrastructure constituted the opening and all-important build-up phase of the CPM‘s armed 
struggle from 1968-1973. 
 
The re-establishment of an underground mass support and supply infrastructure was 
not the only objective of infiltration. The CPM needed to familiarise itself with the local 
topography which had changed considerably over the years as a result of federal land 
development schemes. The steady influx of infiltration groups into Peninsular Malaysia 
thus allowed the CPM to develop a better picture of the conditions prevailing on the ground. 
With familiarity with the terrain came increasing confidence. The initial shallow probing 
missions gradually increased in range frequency and scope. On 10 December 1969, the 
CPM staged its first sabotage in Malaysian territory by blowing up a railway bridge at Kok 
Mak near the border town of Padang Besar which was followed up by a night attack on the 
town‘s local police station on 14 December.136  It must be noted that at this early stage of 
the armed struggle, these armed attacks were designed to test the reaction of the security 
forces and for the propaganda effect of publicising the credibility of the CPM‘s armed 
struggle rather than any serious attempt to challenge the security forces head-on.  The 
considerable racial polarisation in Peninsular Malaysia since the 1964 elections and the 
advances of the non-Malay opposition parties roused latent fears among a considerable 
section of the Malay electorate that ‗they might one day lose control of what they see as 
their own country‘.137 The May 13 1969 Riots that followed provided an opportunity for the 
CPM to  increase the frequency of its probes into Peninsular Malaysia which were intended 
to discover the degree of support that the CPM could gain upon the re-establishment of its 
presence in the country.
138
 The CPM however was ill-placed to take full advantage of the 
situation and exploit the fall in public confidence in the Alliance government.  
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Indeed, the focus in the early years from 1964 up to the May 13 1969 Riots was 
very much on building up the CPM‘s support and supply infrastructure. Since 1964, the 
CPM had been actively recruiting Thai Chinese and Malays in the border provinces of 
Southern Thailand. The Chinese recruits come mainly from the Betong and Sadao areas 
where a significant Thai-Chinese population is present while the Thai-Malays are largely 
from Narathiwat.
139
 In the ‗badlands‘ of Southern Thailand, the CPM managed to establish 
a level of influence and authority primarily with the rural Chinese squatters by chasing 
away the bandit-robbers plaguing the border area, sharing food and providing hope and 
empowerment to deprived youths. Indeed, the CPM considered the largely Chinese Betong 
Salient inhabited by about 29,000 Chinese, 5,000 Thais and 2,000 Thai-Malays as a 
‗liberated area‘.140  At the outbreak of the second shooting war, the CPM had a HQ in the 
Betong Salient and three regiments deployed along the Thai border areas facing Peninsular 
Malaysia:  the 8
th
 Regiment in the Sadao area, the 12
th
 Regiment in the Betong Salient, and 
the 10
th
 Regiment in the Weng district. All three regiments had subordinate assault units 
(AUs) in Kedah, Perak and Kelantan respectively.
141
 As a result of a sustained recruitment 
drive in mid-1969, the CPM was able to increase its combat strength in Southern Thailand 
from an estimated 1100 to 1300 in February 1970 to an estimated overall strength of 2,000 
in October.
142
 These armed regiments were supported by the Malayan Communist Youth 
League (MCYL) which boasted an estimated 3,000 to 6,000 members in Southern 
Thailand.
143
 Control of the Thai border areas provided the CPM with permanent bases from 
which it could launch cross-border operations into Malaysia and safe havens in which to 
organise, train, raise subscriptions from the local population, purchase weapons from the 
Thai black market and regroup when pursued by security forces.  
 
The capture of a deserted CPM 12
th
 Regiment camp on 1 May 1970 by a Malaysian-
Thai joint operation indicated that the CPM‘s presence in Southern Thailand was clearly 
more than a temporary arrangement. The camp was surrounded by a ditch and a strong 
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fence, and contained well constructed weather-proofed huts, showers and a large two-storey 
building built to accommodate about 150 insurgents.
144
 The ‗live and let live‘ approach 
adopted by the Thai security forces in the early years of the Second Emergency meant that 
the insurgents were given at least twenty-four hours notice before any Malaysian-Thai joint 
operation, meaning that such operations did little more than keep the CPM on the move.
145
 
This amicable arrangement suited both parties well. The Thais could focus their main 
COIN effort against the more serious threat of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) 
further north and the CPM could build up its strength. In 1970, the estimated strength of the 
three CPM regiments in Southern Thailand was listed as 226 in the 8
th
 Regiment, 566 in the 
12
th
 Regiment and 220 in the 10
th
 Regiment.
146
 
 
The importance of the CPM‘s Thai bases cannot be emphasised enough. Upon the 
winding down of the CPM‘s united front activities, many of the CPM‘s hard-core cadres 
formerly engaged in the constitutional struggle with the Labour Party of Malaya (LPM) and 
Partai Rakyat Malaya (PRM) went underground to pave the way for the forthcoming armed 
struggle. Some of these cadres were sent to its bases in Southern Thailand for further 
training. As the communist underground progressed from the preparatory stage to the 
establishment of jungle operational bases, many of these highly-trained cadres were 
infiltrated back into Malaysia in the latter half of 1969. One such group was able to 
establish a series of jungle operational bases in the Kulim area in Kedah while another 
revived contacts in the Sungei Siput area in Perak which were then used to support the 
establishment of similar bases in the area.
147
 Concealed food dumps were also set by the 
CPM underground in areas where the jungle bases were established.  In short, the main 
objectives of these infiltration groups were to penetrate the area, recruit and train locally, 
return cadres to Thailand for training, establish bases, training camps and supply dumps, 
revive the communist underground network and avoid contact with the security forces 
wherever possible.  In the eventuality of contact, the CPM units which were ‗infinitely 
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superior in jungle craft than either the army of the Police Field Force [PFF] units‘, would 
possess the tactical advantage.
148
 
 
Once an area had been penetrated by CPM infiltration groups, arrangements were 
made to transfer recruits from other Malaysian states to bolster the CPM presence in the 
area. In areas selected for eventual penetration, underground organisations laid the 
groundwork for the anticipated return of CPM. Concealed food dumps were established and 
cadres sent into jungle hide-outs for training.
149
 The revived Min Yuen network was to play 
a crucial support role in all these operations. During the First Emergency, the Min Yuen 
was the MCP‘s life-support-system responsible for its intelligence, finance, logistical 
supply and link to its mass organisations. The Min Yuen was to reprise its crucial life-
support once more in the Second Emergency – particularly in the former ‗black areas‘ 
where CPM sympathisers and links of kinship lingered on.  The establishment of 
operational jungle bases and supply dumps in tandem with the revival of its clandestine 
network in Malaysian territory was a crucial element of the CPM‘s phase one plan to build 
the necessary underground infrastructure to sustain an extended insurgency – an impossible 
task without the arteries, eyes and ears of the Min Yuen. 
 
On 30 May 1970, the CPM‘s ‗New Democratic Revolution‘ was outlined over the 
VMR: 
 
(i) Overthrow the colonial rule of the British imperialists and their puppets, and 
establish a Malayan People's Republic; 
 
(ii) Safeguard the people's democratic rights and respect freedom of religion 
and creed; 
 
(iii) Confiscate and nationalise the enterprises of the imperialists and their 
running dogs, and protect national industries and commercial enterprises; 
 
(iv) Abolish the feudal and semi-feudal land system, implement the system of 
‗Land to the Tiller‘; and abolish usury; 
 
(v) Improve the livelihood of the workers and poorly-paid employees, and 
implement the policy of parity of treatment to both male and female workers; 
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(vi) Implement the policy of equality in all respect for people of various races, 
oppose racial discrimination and strengthen the unity among the races; 
 
(vii) Establish a strong People's Armed Force; 
 
(viii) Develop a patriotic, democratic and scientific culture for all races, and 
oppose the imperialist and feudal culture; 
 
(ix) Support the people of North Kalimantan in their struggle for national self-
consciousness, and support the liberation struggle of all oppressed peoples.
150
 
 
In mid-1970, the CPM was in no position to implement any of the above grandiose aims. 
The armed units of the CPM were in no position to mount a credible challenge to the 
authority of the Malaysian government.  The ‗worker-peasant‘ alliance lacked sufficient 
mass support to lend substance to the CPM‘s vision of land-industrial-labour-social reform 
even at the town level and at the regional level, the party‘s links with other pro-Beijing 
revolutionary movements were largely fraternal. Nevertheless, the appeal of the CPM‘s 
‗New Democratic Revolution‘ to disaffected sections of the Malaysian population.  
 
In October 1970, the CPM penetrated just three areas: northeast of Kulim in Kedah, 
near Grik in Perak and the Tanah Merah district in Kelantan. By September 1971, at least 4 
additional areas in Perak State were found to have been penetrated by CPM infiltration 
groups. In addition, the CPM group at Tanah Merah moved further south to the 
Dabong/Kembu area. An estimated 225 to 300 insurgents were operating in all seven areas 
– a two-fold increase from the 110 to 160 estimate of October 1970.151A Malaysian Armed 
Forces Brigadier-General admitted that in the old hunting grounds of the First Emergency 
era, ‗the social and economic position of the people in the rural areas was...being given 
special attention by the CTs to seek out recruits‘.152 The rich and poor divide within the 
Malay community and racial discrimination faced by ethnic Chinese in Malaysia 
(particularly after the 13 May race riots) were issues exploited by the CPM in its rural 
recruitment drives. Indeed, in an effort to develop a ‗multi-racial capability‘, Malays from 
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the predominantly Malay10
th
 Regiment were transferred to the predominantly Chinese 12
th
 
Regiment to assist in the penetration and recruitment of Malay communities in Perak.
153
  In 
Kelantan, the 10
th
 Regiment instructed its supporters to organise themselves into cells of 
the PAPERI  - a CPM Muslim front organisation responsible for Malay recruitment.
154
 In 
short, the exploitation of volatile issues close to the hearts of both the Malays and Chinese 
rural masses provided a platform from which the CPM could reach out to both ethnic 
communities.  
 
In an attempt to revolutionise the hearts and minds of the Malaysian population, 
cells of the various underground fronts were tasked with bringing the message of the 
CPM‘s ‗New Democratic Revolution‘ to the masses.  The Malayan National Liberation 
Front (MNLF) was the main underground organisation responsible for much of the CPM‘s 
efforts to create a mass support base in Peninsular Malaysia and was recognised by the 
security forces as the largest and best organised communist front organisation.  By 1971, 
cell members of the MNLF have penetrated as far south as Johor – the southernmost state 
of Peninsular Malaysia.  In the Northern states of Kedah, Perlis and Perak, there was a link 
between the MNLF state committees, the CPM armed units and underground cells but this 
relationship did not apply to MNLF cells in the southern Malaysian states which were 
largely inspired and controlled by messages from the VMR.
155
  
 
Front organisations such as the Malayan Peasants Front (MPF) were established to 
organise the ‗worker-peasant‘ alliance. The Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (PRSM) and 
the Labour Party of Malaya (LPM) were two radical left-wing parties particularly 
responsive to CPM manipulation. Both parties were largely Chinese-based, with the PRSM 
operating in the rural areas and the LPM in the towns and cities. Both parties suffered from 
weak leadership and a lack of popular support. Nevertheless, the LPM and PRSM provided 
‗a valuable reservoir of supporters‘ through whom the communist underground 
organisation could be extended.
156
 Members of de-registered pro-communist trade unions, 
intellectuals and students provided another source of potential support for the CPM 
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movement.
157
 The potential of channelling the highly impulsive energies of students into 
mainstream communist activism was also not lost on the CPM. The party leadership paid 
great attention to the harvesting of these young minds – particularly those of students in 
Chinese-medium schools. To that end, branches of the MCYL were established throughout 
the peninsula to penetrate Chinese-medium schools and coordinate student activism.   
 
Likewise in Singapore, the three principal targets for communist subversion were 
radical left-wing parties, students in Chinese-medium schools and trade unions.  April to 
June 1970 witnessed an increase in the number of left-wing disturbances in Singapore. The 
child of a British serviceman was accidentally killed by a CPM booby-trap bomb in April. 
Several fake booby traps attached with CPM flags were also found in various locations. On 
14 June, a demonstration organised by expelled students from a Chinese High School, but 
later taken over by militant members of the BSS culminated in a bus being burned in 
spectacular fashion.
158
  A British High Commission brief on the above indicated that: ‗none 
of this points to any marked deterioration in the security situation but it does underline the 
fact that pro-communist sentiment among certain small sections of society including the 
young – has certainly not been silenced‘.159 Indeed, however prone the Chinese-medium 
high schools and Nanyang University might be to communist subversion, ‗such small group 
cadre activities had been continuously monitored and hounded by the state security 
apparatus [that] their efficacy was limited‘.160 On the labour front, communist influence on 
Singaporean trade unions declined significantly. In March 1967, there were thirty pro-
communist trade unions with a total membership of some 31,000.  Five years on, there 
remained only thirteen pro-communist trade unions of which only three were affiliated to 
the BSS and two aligned to the CPM. Their total membership stood at 6,500 – or six 
percent of the 112,000 members who belonged to the eighty-five non-communist unions.
161
 
By 1972, the few remaining pro-communist unions were weak and there was a lack of 
solidarity between them and the pro-communist BSS.  
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The BSS itself was plagued with internal dissension and its call for ‗extra-
parliamentary struggle‘ in the form of demonstrations, protests and boycotts was generally 
unpopular with the Singaporean public.  In the run-up to the 1972 Singapore general 
election, the Information Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) noted that: 
 
[BSS‘s] tactics and its stilted language paraphrased from Radio Peking and 
[VMR] have become unintelligible to the general public. Its continued 
insistence that Malaysia does not exist and Singapore is not an independent 
state is also too removed from reality for the increasingly sophisticated 
Singaporeans to accept.
162
 
 
Unlike in 1968 when it boycotted the election, the BSS participated in the 1972 general 
election but did not win any seats. The decision of the BSS Chairman, Dr Lee Siew 
Choh to contest the 1972 general elections split the party into those who supported the 
move and a dissident faction that maintained its refusal to recognise Singapore as a 
sovereign state. Thus the participation of the BSS in the 1972 election was to further 
weaken the already emaciated united front movement in Singapore. The PAP repeated 
the success of the 1968 election and won all sixty-five parliamentary seats with 69% of 
the balloted votes.
163
 A South-east Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) Intelligence 
Assessment Committee report on Singapore concluded that: 
 
There is little immediate likelihood that a serious challenge to the PAP will 
emerge...the BSS looks increasingly ineffective as a vehicle for left-wing 
opposition to the PAP...There is no evidence that the Communists in Singapore 
are contemplating, or would be capable of implementing, a policy of armed 
struggle in the foreseeable future...The present Government is very well 
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entrenched...there is unlikely to be any increased popular inclination to support 
Communist activities, which are likely to continue at a low level.
164
 
 
Indeed, by 1966, the BSS was no longer a viable alternative to challenge the PAP, but the 
‗last, pale manifestation of the united front‘ in Singapore.165 By then, any centralised pro-
communist organisation had all but disintegrated. Nevertheless, the CPM persisted in it 
attempts to subvert urban Singapore and rebuilt the communist underground in the island 
city-state. By 1972, the CPM underground in Singapore had reorganised its cadres to 
operate in scattered construction sites instead of mass organisations.
166
 Just as in the 
Southern Malaysian States where centralised control was absent, the VMR acted as the 
Party‘s central control mechanism to inspire and galvanise into action the pockets of pro-
communist sentiments and elements that remained on Singapore-island. 
 
 On 30 April 1972 at the forty-second anniversary of the inauguration of the party, 
the CPM adopted a new constitution which reaffirmed that: ‗its revolutionary practice in 
the past forty years...has proved that encircling the city from the country-side and seizing 
political power by armed force is the only correct line in which they must pursue‘.167  In the 
application of its armed struggle, guerrilla tactics drawn from the Vietcong‘s experience 
were used extensively by the CPM in both defence and offense. Members of the CPM‘s 
infiltration groups were particularly well-trained in the art of ambush and the setting of 
booby-traps as evinced in the statement of a surrendered insurgent: 
 
Comrade XXX was responsible for lecturing on and demonstrating military 
theories/tactics regarding the Vietnam War; Vietcong tunnels/trenches and 
Vietcong anti-personnel devices...We were taught how to rig up booby 
traps..laid at spots where Security Forces were likely to cover...We were also 
instructed in the use of explosives, such as inserting electrically detonated 
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charges into big tree trunks in likely Security Forces‘ approach areas/routes as a 
counter-attack measure; hanging electrically-detonated mines on plants and 
setting up simultaneous mines.
168
 
 
These tactics inflicted numerous casualties on the security forces and were highly effective 
in eroding the confidence of the Security forces. Indeed, the British were less than sanguine 
on the apparent inability of the Malaysian security forces to come to grasp with the CPM 
armed groups: 
 
The situation which results cannot accurately be described as one of 
containment by the Security Forces of the Communist terrorists so much as one 
of co-existence where each side goes about its business uninterruptedly and 
where contact between the two sides appears to be fortuitous.
169
  
 
Indeed, more often than not, engagements were initiated by the CPM rather than at the 
whim of the security forces. From about mid-1970, the CPM were able to adopt a more 
refined pattern of engagement that matched its operations to the situation in particular 
localities and to the capabilities of the opposing security forces.
170
 
 
In sum, the CPM‘s strategy and modus operandi for the years 1968 to 1973 in 
Peninsular Malaysia were as follows: 
 
1.  Activities such as ambushes were conducted to tie up security forces in border areas thus 
permitting maximum ease of infiltration movements; 
 
2.  Establish and operate from static and mobile bases, but do not as permanent base-camps. 
When attacked, the insurgent was to retreat and not to defend the installation other than as a 
delaying force;   
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3. Use infiltration routes and staging points of the First Emergency where government 
inactivity permits; 
 
4. The primary aim is to penetrate deep into Peninsular Malaysia, recruit from local 
population, conduct clandestine training, establish support of the masses for the CPM cause, 
alienate the government in the eyes of the people, and in so doing pave the way for the time 
when the government will be overthrown.
171
 
 
From the outbreak of the armed struggle in 1968 to 1973, the CPM was able to step-up its 
infiltration further south into Peninsular Malaysia. The ability of the CPM largely to avoid 
unwanted contact with the security forces gave the CPM the opportunity to concentrate on 
the crucial phase one tasks of setting up an underground support and supply infrastructure, 
the development of its mass work and links with front organisations throughout the length 
and breadth of Peninsular Malaysia. At the same time, extensive exploitation of the Chinese 
community‘s perceived racial discrimination and local Malay discontent with the Federal 
government in the CPM‘s propaganda won over alienated sections of the Chinese 
population as well as limited Malay support.  These steps were necessary to remedy the 
CPM‘s hitherto embryonic political and logistical support infrastructure, over-stretch 
government security forces and set the right conditions for the eventual full-fledge armed 
struggle that was to come. In Singapore, the decimation of the communist united front 
consigned the CPM to a campaign of long-distance subversion carried over the 
revolutionary airwaves. 
 
1974: Turning Point of the Second Emergency 
 
Documents captured by security forces in May 1971 revealed that both the 8
th
 and 12
th
 
Regiments in Kedah and Perak respectively were to ‗engage in a long term build-up of 2-5 
years for Phase II operations‘ which implied either 1975 or 1976 as the kick-off point for 
phase two.
172
 However, 1974 proved to be a turning-point year which witnessed a 
significant increase in communist armed violence in both Peninsular Malaysia and 
Singapore. As explained in the introduction, by August 1974, the MCP had split into three 
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different factions consisting of the CPM (central), CPMML (formerly the 2
nd
 District of the 
12
th
 Regiment) and CPMRF (formerly the 8
th
 Regiment). The split effectively ruined the 
underground infrastructure that had been built over the years as all three CPM factions tried 
to outdo each other in open battle with the government and amongst themselves. 1974 was 
also the year in which Malaysia formally established ties with the PRC. CPM‘s reaction to 
Kuala Lumpur‘s rapprochement with Beijing was to increase the tempo of its armed 
struggle in order to prove its revolutionary credentials. On the other hand, the CPMML was 
known to have sent out feelers to Moscow. Regardless of sponsors, the objective of all 
three CPM groups remained the overthrow of the legally constituted states of Malaysia and 
Singapore through armed struggle. In short, 1974 was a watershed year marked by 
spectacular acts of revolutionary violence as each CPM faction vied for the legitimacy and 
leadership of the communist movement in Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore.   
 
The period from November 1973 to January 1974 witnessed an increase in the 
number of contacts between the security forces and communist insurgents. So much so that 
as early as late January 1974, ‗these developments have caused speculation that 1974 will 
see increased CT activity in the peninsula, including areas which have been quiet since the 
Emergency ended in 1960‘. 173   In October/November 1973, as part of its ‗Southward 
Advance‘ into the heartlands of Malaysia, the CPM made a thrust through the Cameron 
Highlands into Central Pahang with the intention of establishing a permanent presence in 
the Jerantut, Kuala Lipis and Raub areas.  Once in Central Pahang, the infiltrated insurgents 
could rely on a network of food dumps established by the MNLF. These infiltrators in 
conjunction with the CPM front organisations were to extend their support amongst the 
Chinese population in the penetrated areas.
174
 The CPM‘s thrust into Central Pahang was 
however frustrated in November/December 1973 when the Security forces discovered and 
seized 42 of the CPM clandestine food dumps and arrested twenty-two of its cadres.
175
  
 
By then, it was becoming evident that the communist insurgents were actively 
pursuing a policy of selective assassination of Chinese MSB officers – the real eyes and 
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ears of the security services. The significance was not lost on Donald McD Gordon, the 
British Defence Attaché in Malaysia who reported that: 
 
The CTs seem to be maintaining a systematic programme of selective 
assassination of isolated SB personnel with good knowledge in exposed areas. 
The recent victims have all been Chinese, while the majority of new recruits 
into the SB are Malays (who invariably do not speak or read Chinese). With 
potential Chinese recruits discouraged by limited prospects of promotion an 
intimidated by the threat of assassination, this reinforces fears which we have 
previously expressed that the SB‘s ability to gather intelligence on the mainly 
Chinese CT organisation will deteriorate.
176
 
 
The CPM was well aware that a selective assassination programme coupled with the 
running-down of the MSB‘s intelligence capabilities presented a golden opportunity to 
cloud the vision and muff the ears of the security services. Selective assassination was also 
employed as a tool of psychological warfare and to generate propaganda capital. In the case 
of the CPMML, Malaysian members of the Thai-Malaya General Border Committee were 
specifically targeted in order to relieve the pressure of government security operations in the 
Betong Salient. As a high-ranking committee member, Tan Sri Abdul Rahman bin Hashim, 
Inspector-General of Police (IGP) was targeted for elimination. On 4 June 1974, the IGP 
was successfully assassinated in Kuala Lumpur.
177
 It was a clear signal that the armed 
struggle was no longer confined to the periphery of the countryside and border-states but 
brought ever closer into the metropole and urban areas.  
 
 The assassination of the IGP also announced the arrival of the CPMML on the 
revolutionary scene.  Its existence was however kept under wraps until 22 October 1974 
when the CPMML‘s banners, leaflets and manifestos that openly called for ‗a revolt against 
the old revisionist clique‘ of the CPM were discovered throughout Peninsular Malaysia and 
Singapore.
178
 The CPMML‘s October ‗flag-raising‘ activities (organised essentially in 
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Kuala Lumpur) and the high-profiled assassination of the IGP was intended as a show of 
strength in the urban areas and an open challenge to Chin Peng‘s leadership of the 
Communist cause in the Malay Peninsula. Nonetheless, the slew of CPMML-organised 
urban actions represented a serious rift within the CPM movement rather than a sign of 
growing support amongst disaffected urban Chinese.  
 
 Despite the limited effectiveness of the security forces, particularly in areas of 
intelligence and joint-operations, the increased contact between the security forces and the 
insurgents allowed the authorities to uncover hitherto hidden aspects of the CPM‘s plans 
and modus operandi. It was soon made known that since mid-1970, an estimated 200 
Malaysians from various states with genuine Malaysian documentation had joined the 
communist insurgents. Unlike their veteran comrades from the First Emergency or those 
recruited in Southern Thailand, these insurgents with Malaysian identity cards had the 
ability to move freely throughout the country. Some were absorbed into local armed units 
while others established local support infrastructure in their home areas.  ‗Mobile groups‘ 
of highly trained cadres were set up to perform operational tasks outside of the jungle.
179
 
Such ‗mobile groups‘ were thought to have been responsible for the selected assassination 
of five Chinese MSB officers and the IGP.
180
 Indeed, between 1974 and 1978, at least 
twenty-three police personnel - the majority being Chinese Special Branch personnel were 
assassinated by these mobile groups.
181
 As each CPM faction sought to outdo each other by 
committing their ‗mobile groups‘ to ever more spectacular acts of urban terrorism, cadres 
who were previously unknown to the intelligence services became increasingly exposed.  
 
 The ‗general increase in aggressiveness of the Malayan Communist terrorists in 
Peninsular Malaya‘ inspired a spate of CPM-linked activities across the Causeway.182 In yet 
another hallmark CPM ‗flag-display‘ marking the anniversary of the outbreak of the First 
Emergency‘, a number of communist flags and banners were found throughout Singapore 
in the week of 17 June 1974. On 20 June, a banner-attached booby trap exploded without 
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causing any casualties.
183
  Since 22 June, over 40 alleged CPM members were arrested. 
Most of the detainees were relatively well-educated middle class mature persons from both 
the Chinese and English educational streams – ‗people who had most to gain from a 
buoyant capitalist Singapore and who would be least likely to wish to upset the existing 
form of government‘.184  The fact those detainees did not quite conform to the stereotypical 
profile of a CPM cadre was of particular concern to the Singapore government – 
particularly those who were English-educated. Out of the fifteen members of the VMR‘s 
English section, five were former student activists from the University of Singapore 
Students Union (USSU). These with 3 other English-educated members were known to 
their VMR colleagues as the ‗Englishmen‘.185 There was certainly a concerted effort to 
appeal to the English-educated students and middle-class Singaporeans. The infiltration of 
factories with the hope of recruiting support and sabotage as well as assassination of 
selected individuals at ‗appropriate times‘ similar to the pattern of assassinations in 
Peninsular Malaysia were other CPM objectives in urban Singapore.
186
   
        
The inaugural visit of Tun Razak to Beijing in May 1974, the first ever visit by a 
Malaysian Prime Minister to China since the founding of the PRC prompted a vehement 
response from the CPM. Some 100 insurgents crossed the border from Southern Thailand 
and blew up sixty-three pieces of heavy earth moving plant and equipment that were used 
to build the East/West Highway.
187
 Despite the efforts of CPM at proving its revolutionary 
credentials, the Chinese government assured Razak that ethnic Chinese with Malaysian 
citizenship were no longer Chinese citizens.
188
  On the issue of the CPM split, the CCP also 
chose not to intervene in what it considered as an internal party affair of Malaysian 
communists.  However, the open challenge to Chin Peng‘s leadership and the successful 
elimination of such the high-profiled IGP by a dissident faction (CPMML) could not but 
prompt the CPM to respond.  The CPM Central Committee viewed the refusal of the 
CPMML and CPMRF to participate in the ‗Southward Advance‘ as traitorous acts that 
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sabotaged the revolutionary armed struggle, and exhorted its erstwhile loyal cadres to 
greater effort.
189
  
On the other hand, both the dissident factions asserted that ‗the contradiction within 
the Party had first to be resolved‘ before any ‗Southward Advance‘ and viewed the enterprise as ‗a 
manoeuvre employed by the power-holders in the Central Committee to cover their 
sinister plan of destroying the Party and ruining the Army‘.190The internal schism within 
the movement was a severe setback to the CPM‘s plans for a concerted ‗Southward 
Advance‘ into Peninsular Malaysia. For fear of CPMML and CPMRF attacks, the 
CPM/MNLA incursions into the Northern Malaysian states of Kelantan, Kedah, Perak were 
often platoon-sized operations rather than the large scale offensive that the CPM had hoped. 
CPM had to prove that its ‗Southward Advance was the ‗correct line‘ and in so doing, 
prematurely embarked on the second phase of the armed struggle. The precipitated 
ratcheting-up of the armed struggle had the following consequences: the CPM‘s thrust into 
Central Pahang shook the Malaysian Government into more effective action; Cadres were 
increasingly exposed and made known to the intelligence services; and the piece-meal 
operations attrited away much of the CPM‘s strength. The tactical successes of the CPM in 
numerous small-unit engagements and the inability to the security forces to decisively 
engage the CPM in its strongholds in Southern Thailand masked the strategic setbacks 
suffered by the Malaysian communist movement in 1974 – the establishment of formal 
diplomatic relations between Beijing and Kuala Lumpur and the breaking-up of CPM into 
three separate factions. Instead of rationalising and revising its armed struggle strategy, the 
CPM stood by its ‗Southward Advance‘ roadmap from which there was to be no return. 
Crossing the Rubicon (1975-1981) 
  
Largely driven by local developments, 1974 was the year in which all three factions of the 
CPM committed themselves to the all-out pursuit of revolutionary violence.  Within the 
Southeast Asian region, the fall of Saigon and Phnom Penh to communist forces in 1975 
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provided a considerable confidence boost to the CPM‘s faith in its Maoist strategy.  The 
Communist take-over of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam was the penultimate vindication of 
the CPM‘s line that by ‗using the countryside to encircle the cities...the people of a small 
country can defeat aggression by a big country‘.191 Nevertheless, without any real support 
from its erstwhile CCP patrons, the CPM‘s vision of revolutionary success in Malaysia 
remained unrealistic and unattainable. The establishment of formal diplomatic relations 
between Malaysia and China drove a wedge between the CCP-CPM‘s patron-client 
relationship that was to prove fatal for the CPM. Indeed, the unequivocal support of the 
CCP in 1961 stood in stark contrast to the winding down of the VMR station in 1981 at the 
behest of the both the Singaporean and Malaysian governments.  All the same, as late as 
1980, the VMR continued to maintain: 
 
[The] experience of the CPM in the past 50 years confirms that for the Malayan 
revolution to achieve victory, it is necessary, whatever the circumstance, to 
persist in the road of ‗using the countryside to encircle the cities and seizing 
political power by armed force‘: Our experience tells us that to achieve victory 
in our revolution, we cannot go in for the road of so-called parliamentary 
democracy, nor the road of armed uprising in the cities or urban guerrilla 
warfare. We can only take the road of using the countryside to encircle the 
cities and seizing political power by armed force.
192
  
 
With hindsight, it is all too easy to conclude that without sufficient internal support from 
the Malay masses and external support from the Chinese, the CPM armed struggle was 
doomed to failure.  In 1975 however, the victories of the Indochinese communist parties in 
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam represented for the CPM a real hope of physical links 
between the fraternal communist parties of Southeast Asia.  Moreover the continued 
inability of the security forces to come to grips with the insurgents at the tactical level well 
into 1977 masked the strategic setbacks from which the CPM never recovered. The 
‗Domino Theory‘ did not come to pass, but the dogged pursuit of  all-out armed struggle in 
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the 1975 to 1981 period was a last throw of the dice that the CPM leadership was 
compelled to take. 
 
In Singapore, the CPM clung on to their long-cherished goal of re-establishment of 
the Communist United Front of workers, students and intellectuals.
193
 To that end, its 
subversive and recruitment efforts were widened to include distinctly bourgeois groups 
such as journalists, lawyers, marketing executives, ballet dancers and teachers. One such 
cell organised by lawyer G Raman aimed to: 
 
Force the government to release hardcore communist detainees in readiness for 
the general elections due 1976/77. The released detainees could then group and 
rebuild the Communist United Front to complement the armed struggle of the 
CPM. In part this was in association with Euro-communists, exerting pressure 
through the Socialist International.
194
 
 
The success of the CPM in subverting and recruiting certain sections of Singapore‘s 
urban middle class came as a ‗surprise rather than alarm‘ for the Singapore 
government.
195
 Nonetheless, ISD‘s arrest of a ballerina, a dancing school principal 
and a sales manager who subsequently confessed their involvement in clandestine 
communist activities over television in 1976 revealed that the CPM‘s strategy of 
recruiting members from all classes in society, especially the middle and upper 
classes was becoming a cause of concern.
196
 In 1977 further arrests and confessions 
of a public accountant, a lawyer, a company secretary, a property manager, and a 
journalist led the Singapore government to classify communist subversion as the 
most serious threat to Singapore‘s security.197 Unlike the intimidating thoroughness 
of control exercised by the Communist United Front in the 1950s and 60s, the 
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‗parlour communists‘ of mid-1970s Singapore were ‗all too ready to opt out when the 
going began to get rough‘. 198  Nonetheless, the CPM‘s efforts at subversion and 
rebuilding its urban underground infrastructure in Singapore continued well into the 
1980s. 
 
In the CPM‘s main area of operations, the building of the Temenggor Dam in Perak 
posed a serious threat to the CPM‘s continued ability to carry out operations in the whole of 
Peninsular Malaysia. The eventual completion and flooding of the dam and the completion 
of the East/West Highway would ‗act as a physical barrier against CTO infiltration from 
Thailand, forcing the CTO to seek other, more, difficult, routes‘.199 Attempts were therefore 
made to set up coastal supply routes in Perak State.
200
 Additionally, attempts were made to 
sabotage the construction of the Temenggor Dam and East/West Highway as well as 
attacks on the security forces protecting and involved in the construction efforts. On 14 
March 1976, a soldier from the Malaysian Engineers was killed and three others wounded 
by a booby-trap in the Temenggor Dam area.
201
 The CPM was well aware that Perak was a 
crucial ‗centre of gravity‘ that it must dominate. 
 
To that end, the CPM continued its efforts to win the cooperation of the Malay rural 
masses in the Northern Malaysian states by increasing the presence of Malay-led CPM 
units in Perak and Pahang.
202
  In addition to its traditional Chinese rural-squatter audience, 
the CPM‘s New Draft Agrarian Programme also attempted to seduce the poor Malay rural 
masses with promises of land redistribution and assurances of the compatibility of 
communism and Islam. The programme pledged to: 
 
(a) Confiscate the cultivated land of the British monopoly capitalists, including 
rubber plantation, oil palm plantation, coconut plantation, tea plantation, etc., and turn it 
over to the people‘s republic. Agricultural workers will take part in its management on the 
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basis of developing national economy, ensuring the improvement of the workers‘ livelihood 
and working conditions and promoting the workers‘ welfare.‘ 
 
(b) Confiscate the cultivated land including plantation and padi field as well as agricultural 
installation, building, etc., belonging to the bureaucratic organs, big bureaucrat-capitalists 
and national traitors. The plantations shall be turned over to the people‘s republic. Padi 
fields shall be allotted gratis to those peasants having little or no land; 
 
c) Confiscate the waste land and virgin forest land occupied by the bureaucratic organs, big 
bureaucrat-capitalists and big plantation owners and allot it gratis to those peasants having 
little or no land; 
 
(d) Confiscate the land included in the various land development schemes of the 
reactionary government and allot it gratis to the participants of these schemes. Abolish all 
debts which have been imposed upon the participants through the land development 
schemes for the purpose of exploiting and enslaving them; 
 
(e) Confiscate the land of the tyrannical landlords and allot it gratis to those peasants 
having little or no land; 
 
(f) Protect the plantations of the medium and small national capitalists, improve the 
livelihood and working conditions of the workers in the medium and small plantations and 
promote their welfare through consultations; 
 
(g) Defend the justifiable right of the poverty-stricken peasants to own land. Oppose the 
barbarous annexation of the rubber small-holdings belonging to the poverty stricken 
peasants by the reactionary government; 
 
(h) Return the land to those peasants who have been induced and forced by the bureaucratic 
organs to participate in so-called co-operative societies with their land and abolish the 
peasants‘ debts; 
 
84 
 
(i) Recognise the peasants‘ right of ownership to their land which they have opened up with 
their own labour; 
 
(j) Oppose the barbarous evictions of rural inhabitants by the reactionary government, 
abolish new villages and resettlement areas, abolish land tax, assessment and all other taxes 
and duties and ensure the rural inhabitants the freedom to choose their domicile, freedom of 
movement, freedom to work and freedom to seek their livelihood; 
 
(k) Oppose the savage persecution of the Orang Asli by the reactionary government and 
ensure their freedom to choose their domicile, freedom to till the soil and freedom of 
movement; 
 
(1) Protect the land belonging to religious organisations, mosques and temples, schools, 
public welfare organisations and religious teachers; 
 
(m) Abolish all debts incurred through usury; 
 
(n) Oppose the monopoly of the fishing industry exercised by the bureaucratic organs, 
abolish feudal and semi-feudal exploitation of off-shore fishermen and safeguard their right 
to existence and their immediate interest.
203
 
 
In practical terms, without genuine territorial control of the Northern Malaysian states, the 
CPM was in no position to carry out its proposed land reform programme. As with most 
such proclamations, the initial intended effect was to exploit potential grievances and 
subvert the masses with the hopes of galvanising them into action. The CPM‘s plans for a 
concerted ‗Southward Advance‘ were impeded not only by government action but also the 
internecine conflict between the three CPM factions that prevented the CPM from 
concentrating its resources on any major operations. 
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The months of January and February 1976 witnessed several armed clashes between 
CPM and CPMML in the Betong Salient that were ‗connected with the CPMML desire to 
expand territorially in order to expand their sphere of influence and to force their ideology 
on the Old Guard as the True Believers‘.204  On 14 June 1976, several leaflets issued by the 
MNLF were found in Ipoh condemning its rival  CPMML controlled MPLL faction for 
‗carrying out irresponsible and ill-planned attacks which only led to intensive police 
operations against all underground elements and thus directly affected subversive work by 
the Party‘.205 Indeed, 1975 was remembered as a year in which the MPLL embarked on a 
widespread urban terror campaign. On 31 March 1975, the MPLL mounted a series of 
coordinated attacks with home-made rockets on security forces bases throughout Malaysia 
that varied from an air force base in the capital to the Police Field Force (PFF) camp in 
Simpang Rengam.
206
 These attacks were followed up with a grenade attack on the Central 
Brigade PFF camp in Kuala Lumpur on 4 September and the targeted assignation of 
Perak‘s Chief Police Officer (CPO) in Ipoh on 13 November.207  Since 1975, the CPMML 
had been identified by the security forces as the ‗fastest growing and most aggressive of the 
three [CPM] factions‘.208 The CPM Old Guard‘s and the CPMRF‘s actions were largely 
confined to limited offensives in the border areas as well as attacks on the Tememggor 
Dam and East-West Highway in the case of the main CPM.
209
 Indeed, by January 1977, 
what was formerly the 2
nd
 District of the CPM 12 Regiment had grown to an insurgent 
force some one thousand strong  with one of its companies, 8 Company reportedly 
spawning a further 1, 2 and 3 Combat Companies within its own cell.
210
  
 
In addition to its urban insurgency campaign, the CPMML were making incursions 
into the CPM‘s traditional areas around Kroh and Baling with the intention of establishing 
a permanent presence in the states of Kedah and Perak.
211
 Such a move was a direct 
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challenge to the CPM‘s authority and threatened to cut off the CPM‘s assault units in 
Kedah and Perak from CPM HQ in the Betong Salient .The CPM was also greatly 
concerned with the potential link-up of both the dissident CPMML and CPMRF factions. 
The CPM‘s Special District Force (fourteen percent of the CPM‘s total strength) played the 
specific role of a wedge between the CPMML in the western half of the Betong Salient and 
the CPMRF in the Sadao district.
212
 Such an impact on the CPM‘s strategy and operations 
cannot be underestimated. Substantial manpower resources that otherwise could be 
committed to the ‗Southward Advance‘ were now tied up north.  Moreover, the CPMML‘s 
increased militancy proved to be a direct challenge to the CPM‘s leadership of the Malayan 
communist movement and its survival as an organisation.  
 
At the peak of the 1975-76 violence, the estimated fighting strength of the CPM was 
as follows: CPM HQ (49); Special District Force (130); 12
th
 Regiment (819); and 10
th
 
Regiment (432).  The most aggressive group, the CPMML could count on strength of over 
600 cadres while the smallest of the three factions the CPMRF had 159 members. These 
forces were augmented by underground units of about 2,400 for the CPM and about 700 in 
the case of the CPMML.
213
 In January 1977, there were seven identified CPM units in 
Peninsular Malaysia. They were namely 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 16
 
Assault Units (AU). 7 AU 
in Kelantan was the aboriginal specialist unit responsible for the subversion of the Orang 
Asli. The main threat, 8 AU which re-entered Malaysia in 1976 after retraining and 
reorganisation in Southern Thailand was believed to have been severely disrupted with an 
operational strength of about 20 cadres.  6 AU in Pahang of approximately a hundred 
members was responsible for the CPM‘s eastward expansion with the aim of subverting the 
rural Malays in Trengganu. 5 AU of about 127 insurgents assisted in the establishment of 6
 
AU‘s presence in Pahang and constituted the CPM‘s main base for expansion to the East 
and South. By January 1977, 5 AU was only able to maintain four Min Yuen groups and its 
main supply routes were severed by security operations. It was perhaps inevitable that 
10AU‘s thirty-six strong force soon became charged with the establishment of an Eastern 
infiltration route. Finally, 12 AU operating in the Grik/Temenggor area was tasked with 
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infiltration from Thailand and the harassment of the Temenggor Dam and East/West 
Highway projects.
214
  
 
In the jungle border areas at least, the CPM tactic of ‗the well planned ambush on 
an easy target, the ‗come on‘ situation to lure the unwary and the extensive use of home-
made booby traps, both as camp defensive devices and deterrents to follow-up or counter-
attack operations‘ were extensively and efficiently used to inflict ‗stinging blows‘ on the 
security forces and withdraw to a secure base in comparative safety.
215
 The superior tactical 
jungle skills of the CPM however could not remedy the attrition of its all important 
underground infrastructure. By 1976, the extensive crippling of the CPM‘s underground 
organisation in the Northern State towns denied the jungle-based armed units much of their 
existential support in the four Northern States.
216
 As the security forces became more 
proficient resulting in the arrest and capture of many high-ranking CPM cadres, the CPM 
was forced to scale back on its AU-sized armed activities and concentrate on targeted 
assassinations and subversion. Moreover instead of reprisal attacks on the police or urban 
terrorism, the CPM underground turned its attention to the presumably softer targets such 
as members of vigilante corps and village militias, police informers and those with past 
associations with the military.
217
   
 
By 1976, the CPM was forced back on the defensive in the key state of Kedah.
218
 
Indeed, by the first half of 1976, the main CPM effort was defensively directed toward 
‗building up the communist infrastructure in their existing areas of operation and 
consolidating their possible incursion routes on both sides of the mountain spine‘.219 MNLF 
pamphlets recovered by MSB outlining the objectives for the latter quarter of 1976 directed 
its cadres to ‗reduce terrorist activity and concentrate on the re-activation of united front 
                                                 
214
 FCO 15/2234, Monthly Security Round-up January 1977. 
215
 DEFE 11/849, Defence Adviser Malaysia Annual Report January 1975-May 1976. 
216
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 15/2235, Malaysia: Annual Review for 1976, British High 
Commission, Kuala Lumpur, 31 December 1976.  
217
 NA, Ministry of Defence UK, DEFE 11/849, Defence Adviser Malaysia – Annual Report June 1976-June 
1977, British High Commission, Malaysia. 
218
 FCO 15/2235, Malaysia: Annual Review for 1976.  
219
 DEFE 11/849, Defence Adviser Malaysia Annual Report January 1975-May 1976. 
88 
 
activity by concentrating on the penetration of youth groups, unions, mineworkers and 
student organisations‘.220 By March 1977 it was reported that: 
 
The increase in underground activities has continued. The [AUs] have avoided 
contact where possible and have concentrated their efforts on consolidating 
their position and, not least, survival. There have been no activity from 8 AU 
for 5 months and it is likely that they have withdrawn up to the Betong 
Salient.
221
  
 
As 1977 wore on, it was apparent that CPM efforts to sabotage the construction of the 
Temenggor Dam had failed to produce results. By April, the dam was sealed and 
flooded with the water level reaching an old hill-top Police Field Force (PFF) 
camp.
222
 In short, by mid-1977, not only were the CPM increasingly overstretched 
and forced to adopt a subversion policy, but the search for alternative infiltration and 
supply routes to replace those cut off by the flooding of the Temenggor Dam and the 
construction of East/West Highway became ever more pressing – particularly 
exacerbated by its now severely crippled underground lifelines.  
 
 By February 1978, under severe pressure in its normal area of operations, 6 
AU were forced into Negri Sembilan for space to recover and consolidate.
223
 In April 
of the same year, both 8 AU and 10 AU appeared to be inactive and returned to their 
parent regiments (12 and 10 regiment respectively) in Southern Thailand.
224
 Increased 
security forces pressure as well as that from the other two rival CPM factions 
severely disrupted the CPM‘s underground infrastructure which was in serious need 
of rebuilding. By mid-1978, the CPM was on the strategic defensive and unable to 
move beyond the first phase of Mao‘s textbook definition of People‘s War. The 
                                                 
220
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 15/2161, Monthly Security Round-up October 1976, British 
High Commission Kuala Lumpur, 8 November 1976. 
221
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 15/2234, Monthly Security Round-up March 1977, British 
High Commission Kuala Lumpur, 11 April 1977. 
222
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 15/2234, Monthly Security Round-up April 1977, British 
High Commission Kuala Lumpur, 9 May 1977. 
223
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 15/2357, Monthly Security Round-up February 1978, 
British High Commission Kuala Lumpur, 27 February 1978. 
224
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 15/2357, Monthly Security Round-up April 1978, British 
High Commission Kuala Lumpur, 8 May 1978. 
89 
 
Chartered strength of all three CPM factions (known by a minimum of three persons) 
in October 1978 was as follows: 
 
Southern Thailand 
 
CPM – 1524 
CPMML – 555  
CPMRF – 160 
 
Peninsular Malaysia 
 
CPM – 497 
 
By then, the 3,300 or so insurgents were supported by approximately 1,000 
communist underground members in Peninsular Malaysia. 
225
 These figures were a 
far cry from the initial days of the revived armed struggle just a decade ago when the 
MCYL in Southern Thailand alone boasted an estimated 3,000 to 6,000 members or 
the 2,400 or so CPM underground members just two years ago. Despite a need to 
rebuild its severely crippled underground strength and lifelines in the Northern States 
of Peninsula Malaysia, CPM Central Committee in Beijing continued to assert the 
correctness of its revolutionary warpath.  
 
On 28 April 1980, the VMR proclaimed that: ‗we cannot go in for the road of so-
called parliamentary democracy, nor the road of armed uprising in the cities…We can only 
take the road of using the countryside to encircle the cities and seizing political power by 
armed force‘.226 On 27 June 1980, three days before the cessation of transmissions, the 
VMR once again counselled against the false path of giving up the rural insurgency. It 
played on the spectre of the First Emergency and warned that: 
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Our Party Central Committee had not made a sufficiently deep-going criticism 
of the Right-opportunist line adopted after the Japanese surrender and had not 
been conscious or fully conscious of the need to persist in the road of ‗using the 
countryside to encircle the cities and seizing political power by armed force‘: 
This erroneous line entailed putting an end to the armed struggle and changing 
the form of struggle to facilitate the accumulation of revolutionary strength and 
to create conditions for an armed struggle in a later period.
227
 
 
By June 1980, it was evident that the CPM‘s armed struggle was becoming unsustainable 
and prospects for success unrealistic. Nevertheless, CPM Central Committee considered the 
legal constitution means an even more misguided option. With the collapse of the united 
front in Singapore in 1966, the CPM lost its best chance at the legal route to power. It was 
easy to see why the CPM placed so much more faith in its clandestine arms than any open 
political instrument. The CPM had intended to move into the second phase of its armed 
struggle sometime in 1975, but it was clear that by 1978, it was forced to take the strategic 
defensive. Selected assassinations of high-profile targets and acts of sabotage were 
spectacular, but those activities in themselves did little to further the CPM‘s cause of 
establishing a People‘s Republic on the Malay Peninsula. By early 1979, all three CPM 
factions had still some 2,400 insurgents in its safe havens in Southern Thailand but only 
500 insurgents in Peninsula Malaysia supported by less than 1,000 members of the 
communist underground.
228
 In the case of the CPM assault units active in Peninsula 
Malaysia, ‗in all except 5 and 6 AU, the communist aim is little more than to exist‘.229 The 
CPM could still recruit to bolster its depleted ranks – albeit almost exclusively from the 
Thai Chinese population. 
 
Why then did the CPM choose to persist in the path of revolutionary violence 
in 1978 when most indicators pointed towards its failure? The explanation could be 
found in the ‗push-pull‘ manner that its armed struggle unfolded. The initial phase of 
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the CPM‘s armed struggle characterised by the patient infiltration and movement of 
CPM groups into Peninsular Malaysia and the re-establishment of an underground 
mass support and supply infrastructure  from 1968 to 1973 stood in stark contrast to 
the ‗death-charge‘ of 1974.  As argued, 1974 was a watershed year that witnessed a 
significant increase in revolutionary armed violence as all three CPM groups tried to 
outdo each other. That in itself was a paramount push factor. In the case of the main 
CPM group, the ability to demonstrate its revolutionary leadership was an existential 
matter. Moreover, the formal establishment of diplomatic ties between Malaysia and 
the PRC had the effect of prodding the CPM to prove its international revolutionary 
credentials while the success of the communists in Indochina likewise pulled the 
CPM in the same direction. The lack of direct high-level contacts between the 
Malaysian government and the CPM until the 1980s certainly did little to change 
perceptions.
230
 The CPM‘s lack of dialogue with the Malaysian political 
establishment meant that the legal option simply was not open. If the CPM did learn 
anything from the First Emergency, it was better to stick to one‘s guns than to suffer 
the ignominy of surrender. 
 
By 1975, faced with an aggressively ambitious CPMMF that sought to 
challenge the CPM‘s leadership, the CPM was pushed to respond in a 
correspondingly ‗old guard‘ way of upping the ante and teaching the ‗revisionist‘ 
upstarts a lesson. The challenge posed by the CPMMF‘s encroachment into the 
CPM‘s traditional strongholds in Perak and the flooding of the Temenggor Dam and 
the construction of East/West Highway threatened to cut off the lifelines which the 
CPM had built over the decades and possibly its survival as an organisation. That 
pushed the CPM to an immediate response of fighting the ‗revisionists‘, searching for 
an Eastern infiltration route, maintaining pressure on the security forces in the form 
of selected assassinations as compared to AU-level actions, focusing on subversion 
and buying time to rebuild its devastated infrastructure.  The Beijing-based CPM 
Central Committee had misread the initial tactical successes of the early years as 
possibilities for an eventual strategic victory. In far off Beijing, removed from ground 
realities in Malaysia, that promise became an all powerful pull that sustained the 
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dogged steadfastness in which the CPM pursued its text-book interpretation of the 
‗using the countryside to encircle the cities and seizing political power by armed 
force‘ line to the very end. The manner in which this particular message of 
revolutionary violence was sold to the masses in post-colonial Malaysia and 
Singapore will be the subject of the next chapter.  
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4. 
 
The Role of Mass Persuasion in Shaping a People’s Republic 
 
Critical to the success of People‘s War was the use of mass persuasion - a process that 
exploited all feasible vehicles of communications and means of influence to bring the 
Revolutionary Party to the masses. During the Second Emergency, the VMR came to 
embody the CPM‘s mass persuasion efforts at the strategic level. The use of a 
clandestine radio network might seem like a new found capability, but the operational 
and tactical shifts in CPM propaganda practice should not obscure the underlying 
consistency in strategic objectives – to revolutionise the thoughts and actions of its 
target audience. Thus, any modifications should be rationalised as adaptations of the 
Maoist mass persuasion model to the conditions of the ‗Malayan Revolution‘. Apart 
from certain departures in the selected method of communication and the specific 
issues exploited, there was very little to distinguish between the CPM‘s subversive 
efforts during the First Emergency and those of the Second Emergency. Indeed, there 
were remarkable consistencies in the methodology and practices despite the twenty-
year odd hiatus that separated both Emergencies. This chapter highlights those 
continuities as well as the operational, tactical, and other contextual departures that 
did, in fact, take place.   
 
The fact that the Maoist model was the CPM‘s preferred choice to 
revolutionary power  had a significant impact on both the shooting war and war for 
hearts and minds. The constant reiteration of Mao‘s ‗mass-line‘, indeed, more than 
that, the unstinting veneration of it was evident in the VMR broadcasts as well as 
within official CPM documents. As late as 1980, one of the preliminary statements of 
the CPM‘s New Constitution exhorted that: 
 
The mass line is the basic line in all the work of the Party...We must serve the 
masses of people, be concerned with their well-being, and pay attention to the 
method of work. We should have faith in the masses, be accountable to them 
and learn from them. We should maintain close ties with the masses, vigorously 
94 
 
mobilise them and firmly rely on them. We should adopt the method of ‗from 
the masses to the masses‘; take the idea of the masses and concentrate them, 
then go to the masses to carry them through. It is necessary to bring about the 
integration of the leadership with the masses. We should...define our task 
according to the demands of the local masses at the time concerned, proceed 
from the existing level of consciousness of the masses and certainly guide them 
forward.
231
 
 
The above ‗general line‘ evinced not only the wholesale appropriation of Maoist 
methodology, but also the verbatim incorporation of Mao‘s words into the CPM‘s 
guiding principles and practice. The aforesaid ‗general line‘ was a textbook replication 
of the Maoist ‗mass-line‘ doctrine - maximum possible interaction with the masses at 
the ground level in order for mass persuasion and mass mobilisation to succeed. In 
short, the CPM‘s strategic propaganda campaign during the Second Emergency 
exemplified the CPM‘s efforts to replicate ‗lock, stock and barrel‘ the success of the 
Chinese Communists in creating a revolutionary mass movement that would ultimately 
prevail into a People‘s Republic. 
 
Another Maoist method of influence adopted by the CPM was to play upon themes 
such as class-divide issues, exploitation by imperialists-capitalists, exploitation and 
corruption of traditional power-holders and the compatibility of communism with other 
interest groups (i.e. Islam and petty-bourgeoisie). These were recurrent themes in the VMR 
broadcasts which manifested themselves as the constant reiteration and reinforcement 
of the five following messages: first, the CPM was a party of the masses both 
locally and globally; Second, the masses were being oppressed and neglected by the 
Singapore and Malaysian governments in favour of the capitalist elites and foreign 
powers; third, the practice of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the leadership of 
the CPM was the only way for the masses; fourth,  the people of a small country can 
defeat aggression by a big country; and finally a call for the masses to unite under the 
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CPM against their oppressors.
232
 The CPM‘s practice of the Maoist concept of 
‗thought determines action‘ via the constant reiteration and  reinforcement of these 
five recurrent themes form the main platform on which CPM sought to socialise the 
thoughts of the masses and mobilise them into action. 
 
Mass persuasion also depended on the fusion of the propaganda of the word with the 
propaganda of the deed. On the MCP‘s attempts at reconciling both ends (word and deed) 
during the First Emergency, Kumar Ramakrishna opined that: ‗despite its voluminous 
leaflets suggesting that it represented the oppressed masses in the fight against British 
Imperialism, the MCP‘s basic inclination to violence only destroyed its credibility in the 
eyes of most rural Chinese‘ – particularly the indiscriminate ‗enforcement terror‘ that the 
MCP inflicted on the Malayan Chinese.
233
 Ramakrishna further noted that while Mao saw 
political education as absolutely necessary in eradicating backward bourgeois tendencies 
amongst the party ranks and masses, the MCP regarded political education more as a 
strategy for imposing tight control amongst the rank and file, and seriously neglected it 
with respect to the wider masses.
234
 It was clear that the MCP‘s inclination towards 
‗enforcement terror‘, and its failure to engage in political work among the masses, meant 
that rather than being persuasive, the MCP‘s propaganda efforts of the Malayan 
Emergency served only to discredit its cause.  
 
By the time of Second Emergency, the CPM had gone to great lengths to remedy 
its earlier failings. Prior to the opening of the armed struggle proper, its efforts at 
winning over the local population in Southern Thailand were paying huge dividends.  
Protection from bandits, food-sharing, political education, prospects of empowerment 
and hope and the provision of Min Yuen assistance to the rural masses allowed the CPM 
to turn the Betong Salient into a ‗Little Yenan‘.235 As demonstrated in the preceding 
chapter, much to the consternation of the Malaysian authorities, the CPM also became 
actively engaged in the winning over and recruitment of the Malay rural masses in the 
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economically backward border-states of Northern Malaysia.
236
 Similarly, the discovery 
and arrests of several English-educated middle class communist activists in 1974 was a 
concern to the Singapore government.
237
  In short, these indicators suggested that the 
CPM‘s mass persuasion efforts were reaching out to hitherto untouched segments of 
Malaysian and Singaporean society – a significant departure from the First Emergency. 
 
During the First Emergency, the CPM published an underground newspaper, 
Freedom News - the party‘s most important propaganda organ of that particular conflict. 
According to Ramakrishna, the historical context of Freedom News was defined by five 
distinctively dominant themes: historical backdrop and emergence (1930-1948); rebirth 
amidst urban violence (1949-1951); disruption and reconstitution (1951-1953); supporting 
the united front strategy (1954-1955); and political defensive and ultimate dissolution 
(1955-1957).
238
 Similarly, the VMR mirrored the political and military fortunes of the 
revived CPM from the ascendency of its resurrected armed struggle in 1968 to the explicit 
abandonment by its PRC sponsors in 1981. In charting the CPM‘s mass persuasion 
campaign of the Second Emergency period, the three-phased rubric proposed in the 
preceding chapter will be slightly tweaked to reflect the ‗internationalist spirit‘ that the 
CPM sought to inject into is strategic propaganda. Instead of three phases, the CPM‘s mass 
persuasion campaign will be examined in two distinct periods.   
 
The first from 1969 to 1975 was the high point of the propaganda war when the 
CPM tried to ride on the revolutionary successes in Indochina as well as spectacular acts of 
armed violence carried out by its armed units. Corresponding to its armed struggle, the 
CPM‘s post-1975 mass persuasion campaign from 1975 to 1981 was the second distinct 
period that reflected the tectonic shifts in international and regional developments which 
ultimately drained any hopes of external support. It must be noted that in practical terms, 
however, the CPM was unstintingly consistent in its application of Maoist mass persuasion 
methods in both periods – which the party viewed as the same continuum as the Anti-
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British struggle from the Emergency years.
239
 In short, what mattered for the CPM was not 
the accuracy of its message but the consistency in application of the method. The constant 
reiteration of recurrent messages was designed for the ‗thought determines action‘ 
effect. At the other end of the spectrum, selected assassinations and other highly 
visible violent actions were intended as propaganda of the deed.  The CPM‘s 
attempts at fusing the propaganda of the word and deed from 1968 to 1981 and the 
impact of its efforts at its intended audience will the focus of this chapter.  
 
Riding the Revolutionary Airwaves (1969-1975) 
 
When the CPM revived its armed struggle in the Second Malayan Emergency, 
it also launched its first concerted strategic propaganda campaign. The VMR broke 
the airwaves of Malaya and Singapore on 15 November 1969. On that day, the 
socialist editorial, Mimbar Rakyat proclaimed the birth of the ‗Voice of Revolution‘ radio 
station and that the government‘s monopoly of radio broadcasts had been broken. It further 
claimed that for the first time, the people of Malaya were able to listen to the ‗people‘s 
own‘ radio station, which in itself represented a victory in the Malayan people‘s 
revolutionary war, and urged the revolutionary people of Malaya to: ‗raise high the great 
red flag of Mao Tse-Tung‘s thought, fiercely retaliate against and expose the counter-
revolutionary statements and deception of the U.S. and British imperialists, the soviet 
revisionists and the puppet cliques of Rahman-Razak and Lee Kuan Yew‘. 240  This 
particular editorial piece reveals the core strategy and methodology of the CPM‘s 
efforts at mass persuasion and subverting the populations of post-colonial Malaysia 
and Singapore for much of the Second Emergency.  
 
1969 to 1970 was the opportune moment for the CPM to advance its 
revolutionary cause on both the domestic and international fronts. By 1969 it was 
clear that the U.S. position in Vietnam was becoming untenable. Behind the public 
facade of an expanding war effort, Nixon initiated the process of gradual 
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disengagement from Vietnam and the Nixon or Guan Doctrine which emphasised that 
‗regional states would have to become considerably more self-reliant in defence terms‘.241 
Equally significant local developments were afoot in the Malaysia itself. The 
outbreak of the May 1969 Riots in Malaysia became the precursor to three 
landmark decisions in Malaysian state policy: the New Economic Policy (NEP), the 
Rukunegara which laid down the five principles of national harmony for the 
Malaysian nation, and the declaration of a State of Emergency on 14 May 1969 
which were to suspend parliamentary government until 1971.
242
 While the NEP 
aimed at improving the economic situation of the indigenous Malays, the 
Rukunegara asserted indigenous rights such as ‗respect for Islam and indigenous 
custom‘, and the prohibition of discussion on the sensitive issues of the ‗special 
position of indigenous peoples‘, the national language and citizenship rights. 243 In 
an effort to undermine the Malaysian government, the first two policy decisions 
became for the CPM, the epitome of social injustice, and were extensively exploited 
by the CPM‘s propaganda to agitate, politicise and revolutionise the thoughts and 
actions of its audience.
244
   
 
 The MNLA saw itself as a revolutionary army of the masses and with the VMR as 
its mouth-piece, appealed to the ‗farming and labouring classes to unite‘ and ‗launch an 
armed revolution in order to achieve their final victory‘.245 In order to plant the seeds of 
revolution into the minds of the masses, the VMR portrayed the Rahman-Razak 
administration as a ‗mere puppet of the British imperialists‘ that looked after the interests of 
the ‗feudal landlords, capitalists, bureaucrats and ministers‘ rather than that of the 
masses.
246
 The CPM further held that the rationale behind the NEP was to ‗give 
concessions to foreign imperialists‘ and ‗further suppress the toiling masses so as to 
strengthen the position of the Malay bureaucratic capitalists‘.247 By playing up the notion of 
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social injustice and exploitation, the CPM sought to instil a sense of class consciousness in 
the minds of the Malayan proletariat and sow the seeds of revolution. Success of the CPM‘s 
armed revolution in Malaya hinged upon its ability to create a class conscious proletariat in 
Malaya and the inaugural VMR broadcasts of 1969 reflected the CPM‘s first strategic 
attempt at mass socialisation. 
 
The CPM sought to present itself both as a local as well as a global party, and its 
armed struggle in Malaya in the same perspective. The CPM viewed the various ‗People‘s 
Revolutionary Struggles‘ that raged throughout Southeast-Asia in the 1970s as inter-related 
and interdependent. According to a VMR transmission towards the end of 1969: ‗success of 
the people‘s revolutionary struggles…in Southeast-Asia has greatly inspired the people of 
Malaya…in contributing to the success of the revolutionary struggle‘.248 The CPM clearly 
saw itself as a part of the wider ‗Peoples‘ Revolutionary Struggle‘ in Southeast-Asia, as 
well as the global progressive revolutionary mass movement. The CPM asserted that: 
‗Mao‘s thought had spurred the oppressed people all over the world to carry out their 
revolutionary movement more effectively…and…grasp the great truth about political 
power growing out of the barrel of a gun‘.249 Reviewing global developments in the past 
decade,  the VMR declared that the ‗era of the 1970s would see the surging tide of people‘s 
revolution, the acceleration of total disintegration of imperialism and a sharp fight between 
the rising revolutionary force and the collapsing counter-revolutionary force‘.250 It stressed 
that while the American war effort in Vietnam faced severe setbacks, ‗great socialist China, 
being the centre of world revolution, stood like a giant in the East‘.251 Through its VMR 
mouthpiece, the CPM portrayed its armed struggle as a crucial cog in the global 
revolutionary machinery - by taking up arms with the MNLA, its participants were not only 
liberating Malaya, but playing a role in the greater emancipation of the global proletariat.  
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The impact of such a message on idealistic youths and student activism was of 
serious concern for the Malaysian and Singaporean authorities. A student cadre of the All 
Penang Revolutionary Students‘ Union (APRSU) arrested by the Malaysian authorities 
revealed how he was drawn into the underground student movement: 
 
A leading member of the APRSU...came to my house to give me tuition in 
mathematics at least 2 or 3 times a week...In between tuition periods, he would 
introduce political subjects for discussion and told me that the Malaysian 
Government was not fair...the rich minority suppressed and exploited the 
working class majority...an stressed that everyone must contribute a part to 
bring about a Socialist Republic in our country under which there would be no 
exploitation and suppression, and everybody would be given employment and 
treated equally.
252
 
 
The message particularly chimed with Malaysian youths in Chinese-medium schools. 
Nevertheless, as noted in the preceding chapter, the ‗internationalist spirit‘ of the CPM‘s 
cause also had an effect on students of the English-medium University of Singapore. Five 
out of the fifteen members of the VMR‘s English section were former student activists of 
the USSU. From the early 1960s to 1979, all Singaporean students were required to 
produce a ‗certificate of political suitability‘ prior to enrolment at the University of 
Singapore or Nanyang University.
253
 The CPM‘s message for ‗social justice‘ struck a chord 
with the student left. Many of the VMR‘s English language section members came in the 
mid-1970s from Singaporean and Malaysian universities.
254
 Chin Peng considered these 
student intellectuals to be ‗radical or progressive leftists‘ and ‗liberal socialists‘ rather 
than true card-carrying communists. University students such as Juliet Chin found to be 
‗inappropriate material for jungle living‘ were assigned to the VMR. 255 In short, the 
influence of the intellectual left was minimal on the CPM ideology and strategy. The 
energetic idealism of young student intellectuals were milked for their worth but these 
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student activists never were integrated into the CPM rank and file which continued to be 
drawn from the rural masses.    
 
Despite their relatively small numbers, ISD Singapore ‗considered these pro-
Marxist English-educated activists an incipient security problem‘.256 The group included 
some USSU activists associated with Tan Wah Piow, a pro-communist student activist who 
had fled to London in 1976 and the VMR‘s English language section members.257 In real 
terms, the spread of socialist ideology and Maoist methods of subversion to the 
relatively untainted English-educated was considered a peril to the continued security 
and prosperity of the Singapore state.  This perceived threat in context can hardly be 
bettered by the reiminasences of Lee Kuan Yew: ‗One important reason why we will not 
allow the remnant communist cadres in Thailand to come back without squaring their 
accounts with the ISD is so they will not pass their infiltration and subversion skills to a 
younger generation of cadres, now English-educated‘.258 Exploited but never really accepted by 
the CPM leadership and at the receiving end of the state‘s ire, student activism was perhaps the 
biggest loser in the wider battle for hearts and minds. 
 
On 28 February 1970, a review of the VMR‘s progress since its inauguration 
claimed that: the VMR was the ‗People‘s Radio‘ and ‗trusted spokesman of the people of 
Malaya‘, had boosted the ‗morale of the broad masses‘, ‗thoroughly crushed the 
broadcasting monopoly enjoyed by the enemy‘, and that the broad masses in Malaya were 
now fully aware that the ‗VMR always propagates the revolutionary truth of armed 
struggle‘.259 The CPM‘s strategy clearly was to engage the government in a battle of truth 
and undermine the government‘s legitimacy in the eyes of the masses. Exploiting the local 
grievances of farmers and labourers, the CPM‘s propaganda sought to disenchant them 
from the government (divisive propaganda) and from there on attempt to socialise their 
minds (conversionary propaganda). One such broadcast claimed that peasants in Kelantan 
unhappy with the governments‘ FAMA irrigation project ‗have now realized that they must 
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launch an armed struggle under the leadership of the CPM to fulfil their hope of land to the 
tiller‘. 260  In another programme condemning the Malaysian Government‘s indigenous 
rights policy, the CPM declared ‗all labouring people of various races‘ to be the ‗actual 
masters of Malaya‘ and called upon the people to ‗strengthen their unity, to struggle for 
equality among the various races and to expand their armed struggle under the leadership of 
the CPM‘. 261  The manifold nature of the VMR thus allowed the CPM to employ its 
strategic propaganda in the full spectrum of conversionary, divisive, consolidation and 
Counter-propaganda roles. 
 
The intrinsic appeal of the CPM‘s ‗New Democratic Revolution‘ rested on the 
premise that an inclusive proletarian democracy would eventually be established in 
conformity with the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic environment of the Malayan Peninsula. the 
willingness to concede ‗freedom of religion‘ in the CPM‘s ‗New Democratic Revolution‘ 
should be seen in this light as the Malayan Communists‘ attempt to adapt Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism to suit the local socio-political climate in the opening phase of its mass 
socialisation campaign.
262
 With the declaration of the CPM‘s ‗New Democratic 
Revolution‘, the VMR propaganda campaign against the so-called exploitation and 
oppression of the ‗imperialists and their running dogs‘ was further intensified. According to 
one such broadcast, many unemployed Malay youths were frequently shot or detained for 
trespassing upon British tin mines, and the Malaysian Government instead of solving the 
grave unemployment problem, did ‗everything possible to protect the interest of the foreign 
monopoly capital‘.263 Another transmission along similar lines spoke of ‗rampant Japanese 
economic expansion and infiltration‘ in Malaya and Singapore that the CPM attributed to 
the ‗traitorous and sell-out acts of the Rahman-Razak and Lee Kuan Yee puppet 
regimes‘.264 As a result, ‗capitalists were able to live in luxury while thousands of the 
labouring people can hardly keep their body and soul together with their meagre 
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income‘.265 In line with the fundamentals of revolutionary Psywar to awaken, heighten, 
and sharpen the class consciousness of the masses, the perceptions of social injustice, of 
oppression and exploitation at the hands of an avaricious elite few, were constantly 
reiterated to agitate the VMR‘s listeners who it was hoped, would eventually develop a 
sense of class consciousness and take up the mantle of armed struggle.  
 
In order to persuade its target audience to partake in the armed revolution and 
bolster the morale of its own cadres, the VMR ran frequent ‗Combat News‘ reports and 
articles on the progress of the ‗People‘s Revolutionary Struggle‘ in Malaya and the world 
over. Referring to the MNLA‘s actions in the first half of 1970, the VMR declared that: ‗By 
putting into full play the strategy of people‘s war and guerrilla warfare tactics…The MNLA 
has from February to June eliminated nearly 250 enemy troops, shot down three planes and 
captured a large quantity of military equipment and supplies. The MNLA is growing with 
each battle‘.266 To the Revolutionary Psywarrior, it made little difference that the combat 
reports were only half-truths, so long as they were persuasive enough to be credible. Such 
reports conveyed the message that a small guerrilla force like the MNLA was able to match 
the superior manpower, firepower and resources of the Malaysian and Thai armed forces. 
More importantly, in tandem with developments in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam, the 
VMR reinforced the idea that ‗the people of a small country can certainly defeat aggression 
by a big country, if only they dare to rise in struggle, dare to take up arms and grasp in their 
own hands the destiny of the country‘.267 In short via a steady stream of ‗Combat News‘ 
and other reports, the VMR attempted to persuade its audience that the ‗people‘s 
revolutionary struggle‘ was a ‗David and Goliath‘ tussle in which the smaller of the two 
would ultimately prevail. 
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To mark the first anniversary of the VMR, the following broadcast was issued:  
 
The VMR has stood firm with the proletarian internationalist spirit, fervently 
supported the righteous struggle put up by the peoples of various countries 
against imperialism, revisionism and colonial rule and for national liberation. 
Revolutionary flames are burning and war drums are being sounded throughout 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, volcanoes have erupted one after another on 
the heart of imperialist regions; crowns have fallen to the ground one after 
another; and imperialism revisionism and reactionaries will be buried in the 
revolutionary war waged by the people all over the world.
268
 
 
The ‗proletarian internationalist spirit‘ and the ‗New Democratic Revolution‘ embodied the 
CPM‘s efforts to apply Mao‘s ‗united front‘ concept in its strategic propaganda both 
internationally and domestically. The united front concept was an all-encompassing 
strategy that unified all actions and approaches towards the creation of the new socialist 
order. The emphasis that Marxist-Leninist-Maoist parties place in the truism that 
‗thought determines action‘ meant that propaganda was to be a crucial component of the 
united front. Unlike the CPM‘s haphazard attempt at strategic propaganda during the 
Malayan Emergency which was limited in scope and outreach to a small segment of the 
Malayan population, the VMR worked on domestic and international sentiments and 
audiences alike which allowed the CPM to truly embrace a united front approach on the 
psychological battlefields, both within and without the boundaries of the Malaysia and 
Singapore.  The perceived link between the CPM‘s revolution in Malaya with the greater 
international proletarian struggle allowed the Malayan Communists to assume a sense of 
legitimacy.  The VMR‘s projection of the CPM‘s armed struggle onto the international 
stage allowed the Malayan Communists to project some semblance of an external united 
front - a capability that they lacked in the First Malayan Emergency.  
 
According to the VMR‘s summary of the CPM‘s armed struggle during the period 
of 1971, the MNLA had with the ‗full support of the broad peasant masses in Kelantan‘, 
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crushed a series of large-scale government offensives and ‗carried out extensive 
propaganda activities and organized the people in the guerrilla zones‘ along the Malaysia-
Thai border, and in the rural areas of Perak, Kedah and Kelatan.
269
 The CPM further 
claimed to have ‗opened new battlefields on Perak, Kedah and Kelatan, [forged] closer 
links with the broad masses, and [spread] the raging flames of guerrilla war to the enemy‘s 
heartland‘.270 The fact that the CPM had infiltrated many of its former village-bases in 
Kedah, Kelantan and Perak by 1971, and were making its presence felt in the surrounding 
areas would lend further credence to its claims. This expansion of the CPM‘s armed 
struggle into the so-called ‗enemy‘s heartland‘ was intended as a clear signal that the 
Malayan Revolution was gaining ground in terms of territorial expansion and popular mass 
support - a message that the VMR was quick to amplify and exploit at the government‘s 
expense. Success stories of such a strategy home and abroad figured large within VMR 
broadcasts, which sought to persuade the masses to adopt similar action. Through the 
unrelenting reinforcement of the message that armed revolution was the only viable 
solution for Malaya and the world at large, the CPM had hoped to drill such a belief into 
the minds of the masses thereby inciting them into revolutionary action.  
 
This assiduous propagation of positive developments on the Communist united 
front, both internal and external, served a two-purpose; One was to convert the undecided 
masses to the CPM‘s cause (conversionary propaganda); the other was to consolidate the 
Party‘s grip on its existing cadres (consolidation propaganda). In short, the constant 
reinforcement of the ‗victory on the united front‘ and ‗the people of a small country can 
defeat aggression by a big country‘ message was the CPM‘s adaptation of strategic 
conversionary and consolidation propaganda in its Malayan Revolution. Considerable 
emphasis was placed on transmitting the message that the progress of the ‗People‘s 
Revolutionary War‘ in Indochina, particularly Vietnam, was an unequivocal sign that a 
communist triumph over the capitalist powers in Southeast-Asia was inevitable.
271
 Vietnam 
was the perfect example of how the ‗people of a small country can certainly defeat 
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aggression of a big country if only they dare to rise in struggle, dare to take up arms and 
grasp in their own hands the destiny of their country‘.272 It was a clarion call for the 
Malayan masses to follow the example of their Vietnamese brethren and the half-truth in 
itself was persuasive enough to be credible. By aligning its cause with that of the 
Vietnamese Communists, the CPM had the opportunity to sell its Malayan Revolution as a 
legitimate struggle against the oppression of the ‗imperialists‘ and their ‗running-dogs‘, 
while at the same time, undermine the legitimacy of its adversary‘s actions.  
 
The VMR certainly portrayed the Singapore Government as a puppet of the 
Americans; one that cooperated in the slaughter of the Vietnamese people. One such VMR 
report noted that:  
 
To meet the needs of its aggressive war in Indochina, U.S. imperialism is 
currently stepping up its collaboration with the Lee Kuan Yew clique to turn 
Singapore into its rear area…Fifty US warships sail to Singapore every year, 
[and] Singapore [is] the U.S. dispersing centre for its old military equipment 
ferried from Vietnam. To render political support to the U.S. imperialist war of 
aggression in Vietnam, the Lee Kuan Yew clique bans anti-war demonstrations 
and processions…To top it all, Lee Kuan Yew when interviewed by Newsweek 
in mid-July said that he would like the U.S. to maintain sufficient pressure in 
Southeast Asia to stop another power or groups of powers from gaining 
complete hegemony over the area.
273
 
 
Hence while the CPM tried to legitimise its struggle on the local and international stage, it 
also attempted to challenge the credibility of its adversaries in both those spheres. The 
CPM‘s propaganda sought to impress upon its audience the belief that its adversaries were 
oppressors of the masses both home and abroad, whereas the CPM was the true defender of 
the people.  
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The signing of the Paris Peace Accords on 27 January 1973 marked a significant 
turning point in the annals of the ‗People‘s Revolutionary War‘ in Southeast Asia. It 
allowed the U.S. to ‗slide out of a conflict that was no longer of importance in the context 
of the complex global situation that had developed‘ – particularly the Sino-Soviet 
confrontation.
274
 The DRVN leadership believed that what ‗they appeared to lose at the 
negotiating table‘ could be gained on the ground in the form of military success at the 
expense of the South Vietnamese forces.
275
 The capture of Saigon by the communist forces 
in April 1975 vindicated that belief. In the rest of Indochina, the Pathet Lao Communists‘ 
complete takeover of Laos that led to the proclamation of the Lao People‘s Democratic 
Republic and the Khmer Rouge‘s conquest of Cambodia in 1975 were events that mirrored 
those in Vietnam.
276
 It seemed, as a result, that the ‗Domino Theory‘, whereby the fall of 
one Southeast-Asian nation to the communists would inevitably lead to the collapse of 
others, was coming to pass in 1975.  
 
Taken together the Paris Peace Accords, the Fall of Saigon on 30 April 1975, and 
parallel developments in Cambodia and Laos were a huge propaganda coup for the global 
communist movement. The CPM particularly needed the external political oxygen from 
Indochina to sustain its own Malayan Revolution.  By April 1973, the CPM judged that: 
 
The development of the international situation is becoming more and more 
favourable to the people…U.S. imperialism has suffered serious defeat in its 
war of aggression in Vietnam. Great victories have been achieved by the 
Laotian people in their struggle against U.S. aggressions who together with 
their lackeys have been badly battered in Cambodia. Let us rejoice the 
favourable situations both within and without the country.
277
 
 
The intense propagation of commentaries on developments in Indochina were to 
communicate to the Malayan masses, the idea of the ‗Southeast-Asian Peoples‘ Revolution‘ 
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- thereby increasing their political consciousness and develop their revolutionary thoughts 
that would eventually be translated into action.  
 
The perceived notion of a greater development in social consciousness amongst the 
masses was further amplified to encourage its growth. As the revolution wore on, the VMR 
broadcasted evidence of the increasing social consciousness of the masses in areas where 
the Malayan Communists were most active. One such broadcast in April 1973 noted that: 
 
‗Feeling indignant at the criminal acts committed by the puppet regime, the 
broad peasant masses in Kedah are now waging a sharp struggle by grabbing 
the so-called state land and resisting the puppet police sent there to suppress 
them. More and more peasants are currently joining the struggle for the 
abolition of the feudal and semi-feudal land scheme and for the implementation 
of land to the tiller system‘.278 
 
The above broadcast is the quintessence of how Maoist mass persuasion was adapted 
to Malayan conditions for the socialisation of Malayan minds to create the ‗new 
Malayan Socialist man‘ for the new socialist People‘s Republic of Malaya. The 
broadcast commemorating the forty-third anniversary of the CPM presented the 
apparent growing social consciousness of the Malayan masses and how these 
thoughts were increasingly being acted upon by the people. According to the 
broadcast: 
 
The working class in our country has deeply realised that only by relying on a 
national democratic united front…can…the task of the new democratic 
revolution be fulfilled…Since the beginning of 1973, the struggle against 
suppression, exploitation and persecution by the working class in our country 
was intensified. Class consciousness of the working masses in our country has 
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been greatly raised. Twenty strikes and other forms of struggles were carried 
out by workers in the First Three months of 1973.
279
 
 
This palpable surge of class consciousness was necessary to maintain the momentum of the 
CPM‘s revolution. The VMR was in fact, a vital tool in the development, maintenance and 
expansion of the Malayan class consciousness, and ultimately, the whole mass socialisation 
effort fundamental to the success of the Malayan Revolution.  
 
 While western Psywarriors tend to be specialised operators playing a limited 
specific role in a larger operation or campaign, revolutionary Psywarriors were multi-roled 
‗storm-troopers‘ equally adept at guerilla warfare, propaganda work and most importantly, 
political work among the masses. This fundamentally opposed approach to Psywar reflects 
the crucial role of Psyops in revolutionary war.  The CPM argued that:   
 
In order to consolidate and expand the united front, it was necessary to…launch 
mass movement in all fields…thus integrating the revolutionary armed struggle 
with the revolutionary mass movement. It was necessary to…mobilise to the 
fullest extent the broad masses and carry out in a wide-spread manner a mass 
campaign to support and join the National Liberation Army. In enemy-
dominated areas, it was necessary to make efforts to consolidate and 
continuously expand all revolutionary mass organizations, encourage the 
masses to tune in to the VMR, intensify revolutionary propaganda and use 
various forms and methods to make close contacts with the people of all social 
strata.
280
  
 
In short, unlike the highly specialised and restricted western approach to Psywar which was 
distinct from the military campaign, Revolutionary Psywar was a symbotic part of the 
united front in which the guerrilla and Psywarrior were one and the same, and the physical 
and psychological battles fought on the same plane. 
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The VMR had throughout its broadcast history, linked the Malayan Revolution with 
that of the greater ‗People‘s Revolutionary War‘, but 1975, in terms of the actual socio-
political developments in Southeast-Asia and impact on the CPM‘s armed revolution was 
particularly significant. With the establishment of Communist regimes in Cambodia, Laos 
and Vietnam, and the unilateral withdrawal of the U.S. from Indochina, 1975 certainly 
signified the epoch of the ‗People‘s Revolutionary War‘ in Southeast-Asia. In view of 
recent contemporary developments in Indochina, 1975 was the opportune moment for the 
CPM to expand its revolution in Malaya on all fronts, in both the physical and 
psychological realm as well as in terms of interior and exterior manoeuvre. Indeed 1975 
hinted at the possibility that the CPM might finally be able to establish strong enduring 
physical links with its Communist comrades in Indochina, thereby inordinately increasing 
its united front and prospects of success in its revolutionary struggle.  
 
The VMR hailed the ‗liberation‘ of Phnom Penh on April 17 by the Khmer Rouge 
as a ‗great victory of historical significance [that] has given a big inspiration and strong 
support to the revolutionary struggle of the Malayan people and the oppressed people and 
oppressed nations the world over‘.281 On 1 May 1975, the central committee of the CPM 
sent a lengthy congratulatory telegram to the Central Committee of the Vietnam worker‘s 
party for the successful ‗liberation‘ of Saigon and whole of South Vietnam. The telegram 
was incorporated into the VMR broadcast for 8 May which stated that: 
 
By persisting in the protracted people‘s war to crush the counter-revolutionary 
strategy of U.S. imperialism, the Vietnamese people have made big 
contributions towards the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle of the 
Southeast-Asian people and the people the world over…The great victory of the 
Vietnamese people…is also the common victory of the Malayan people and the 
revolutionary people of the world...The great victory of the Vietnamese people 
is a new and great inspiration to the revolutionary armed struggle of the people 
of Malaya. Under the leadership of the CPM…the Malayan people are 
determined to continue to stand together with the Vietnamese people and the 
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revolutionary people of the world, persevere in smashing all the counter-
revolutionary plot of the enemy and carry the revolutionary armed struggle in 
our country through to the end.
282
  
 
It is obvious that the CPM strove to establish an image of correlation between its own 
revolution with that of the Vietnamese to increase the legitimacy of its struggle, and 
strengthen its united front. Events in Indochina in 1975 certainly did inspire the CPM in 
their own revolutionary struggle, and there is no doubt that: ‗the great victories of the 
national liberation wars in Vietnam and Cambodia have exerted a great influence on the 
revolution of the Southeast-Asian countries including Malaya‘.283 The impact of events in 
Indochina on both the word and deeds of the CPM was immense. Observing events from 
Beijing, the CPM leadership was certain that: 
 
The tide was turning inexorably in the communist world‘s favour, particularly 
as far as South East Asia was concerned… Ultimately, [they] were hoping 
regional developments would continue moving to [their] advantage to the point 
where [they] could begin absorbing new recruits. [They] were looking to building 
up a 3,000-strong army once more.
284
 
 
The fall of Saigon and Phnom Penh was the penultimate vindication of the CPM‘s line that 
‗the people of a small country can defeat aggression by a big country‘, by ‗using the 
countryside to encircle the cities‘. Building upon the momentous events in Cambodia, 
Laos and Vietnam, 1975 provided the perfect platform for the CPM to further revolutionise 
the minds and actions of the Malayan masses, expand the Malayan Revolution, and 
establish greater links with the Communists in Indochina.  
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Lee Kuan Yee and Abdul Razak, Prime Ministers of Singapore and Malaysia 
respectively, however believed that the Domino Theory ‗was now obsolete‘.285  Razak was 
confident that although: ‗the Domino theory...may give some encouragement to the 
[communist] terrorists lurking in our jungles‘...‗Malaysia [faced] no immediate danger 
arising out of the communist victories in South Vietnam and Cambodia [as] the situation in 
Indochina and that in Malaysia [were] different‘. 286  In short, while the CPM clearly 
perceived its revolution to be part of the greater ‗People‘s Revolutionary War‘ in 
Southeast-Asia and tried to ride on that franchise, ground realities precluded any substantial 
links between the CPM and its Indochinese counterparts. In order to cut off the CPM from 
its external political oxygen, and undermine the relationship between the Malayan 
Communists and their Indochinese comrades, both the Singapore and Malaysia 
governments were prepared to officially recognise communist control of a unified Vietnam 
and in the case of Malaysia establishment of formal diplomatic relations with the PRC. As 
in the case of the CPM‘s shooting war, these setbacks further encouraged the CPM to prove 
its revolutionary credentials by stepping up its mass persuasion campaign.  
 
Three key events of 1974 to 75 significantly shaped the trajectory and results of the 
CPM‘s quest for a people‘s republic. At the highest level, the shift in the PRC‘s foreign 
policy and the warming of relations between the non-communist states of Southeast Asia 
and the PRC changed the complexion of the Cold War. China‘s once deep-rooted 
links with the communist parties of Thailand (CPT), Malaya (CPM), Indonesia 
(PKI) and the Philippines (CPP) were adversely affected by Beijing‘s new 
strategy of divorcing its ‗party-to-party‘ relations from its ‗government-to-
government‘ ones. The result was a noticeable reduction of aid to Pro-Beijing 
Southeast Asian communist parties - including the closure of the VMR radio 
station in China.
287
 Next, at the regional and intermediate level, the communist take-over 
of Indochina by mid-1975 paradoxically led not to the fruition of the domino theory, but 
dissension and conflict within the communist camp which ‗set the stage for a move 
towards a measure of regional stability and cohesion in the rest of Southeast Asia‘ – 
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notably between ASEAN and the Vietnam-dominated bloc .
288
 On the other hand, the 
CPM were compelled and inspired to follow in the violent footsteps of their Indochinese 
comrades. Similarly, at the local level, the open split within the CPM movement led to an 
internecine all out struggle between the three competing factions. Like its shooting war, the 
subsequent 1975 to 1981 phase of the CPM‘s mass persuasion campaign was locked into 
the spirit of the ‗final push‘.        
 
The Final push: Sustaining Mass Persuasion Through the Waves of Change (1975-81)  
 
It cannot be emphasised enough that the Western ‗words and deeds‘ approach to Psywar is 
fundamentally different from the Maoist ‗thought determines action‘ one. Therefore, to 
analyse the CPM‘s the most sustained foray into mass persuasion using the ‗words and 
deeds‘ methodology would be incongruous and ultimately misleading.  To a Revolutionary 
Psywarrior, propaganda has to be persuasive enough to agitate minds and thoughts, and its 
truth is defined by the power to socialise the minds and actions of the masses rather than 
matching words with deeds. Revolutionary Psywar therefore does not fit into any western-
centric model, but is a blend of White, Black, Grey, Conversionary, Divisive, 
Consolidation and Counter Propaganda adapted to meet the requirements of a protracted 
revolutionary war. In short, Revolutionary Psywar has to meet the various stages and 
conditions of the protracted revolutionary armed struggle.  The manifold nature of the 
‗thought determines action‘ approach thus allowed the CPM to employ its VMR 
mouthpiece in the full array of conversionary, divisive, consolidation and Counter-
propaganda roles in accordance with situational changes. Moreover, in tandem with the 
spike in CPM armed violence, the vehemence and intensity of the VMR broadcasts of the 
1975 to 1981 period masked the severe problems caused by the shift in Chinese foreign 
policy and the three-way split within the CPM movement.  
 
 Instead of exploiting the CPM split for propaganda capital, government authorities 
in Malaysia and Singapore chose to focus on highly visible incidents of CPM armed 
violence to maintain the spectre of a much revived communist threat. More than anything 
else, the Malaysians tend to attribute tactical successes to the vigilance and professionalism 
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of their security forces rather than the serious internal schisms within the CPM 
movement.
289
 For CPM Central Committee however, the three-way split was a serious set-
back to plans for the Southward Advance. From 1975 to 1981, broadcasts that addressed 
the split were constant features on the VMR. While quick to condemn the ‗handful of 
chieftains of the anti-Party clique‘ in the Second District of the 12th Regiment, the CPM 
Central Committee nonetheless: 
 
Sincerely call[ed] upon the broad ranks of our cadres, Party members and 
fighters in the Second District to distinguish the counter-revolutionary features 
of the so-called Marxist-Leninist Faction, resolutely draw a clear line of 
demarcation between themselves and this handful of enemy agents, bravely free 
themselves from their control and come back to the side of the Party and the 
people.
290
 
 
Clearly, Party Central Committee did not wish to close its doors to any ‗misled‘ cadres. 
This ‗open-door‘ stance was an act of pragmatism. The loss of manpower and key areas of 
operations in the Betong Salient to the other two dissident factions threatened the very 
existence of the CPM - hence the appeal for reconciliation. The available documents do not 
shed much light on the effectiveness of the Central Committee‘s call for ‗misled‘ cadres to 
return to the fold. The persistence of the message reflected the urgency of the strength-
retention problem. Nonetheless, the refusal to admit the 1971 purge as a ‗mistake‘ was a 
notable absence from the broadcasts. It is debatable if a formal apology for the ‗purge‘ 
would have had any positive effect. An analysis of VMR broadcasts suggests that 
perceptions of Central Committee‘s aloofness from ground realities and grievances that 
arose from the purge were never adequately addressed. Indeed, calls to ‗resolutely stand on 
the side of the CPM Central Committee to wage a tit-for-stat struggle with the Marxist-
Leninist Faction‘ rather than feelers for reconciliation set the predominant tone for the 
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VMR on the issue.
291
 The CPM had to be the leader of the Malayan Revolution – on that 
there could be no compromise.   
 
 This uncompromising stand dictated much of the CPM‘s words and deeds as each 
faction strived to outdo each other. In Singapore, the explosion of a booby trap attached to a 
communist banner on the anniversary of the State of Emergency in Malaya, the discovery 
of CPMML leaflets and banners denouncing the split were isolated incidents in 1974 which 
in reality announced a new tempo of urban subversion and in the case of Malaysia, urban 
violence.
292
 On 26 August 1975, a mobile unit of the MNLA succeeded in damaging the 
National Monument in Kuala Lumpur. The highly visible and dramatic incident just days 
before Malaysia‘s National Day was described over the VMR as follows: 
 
A mobile unit of the MNLA meted out due punishment to the reactionary 
regime by blasting the so-called National Monument in Kuala Lumpur...the 
monument is a symbol of British colonialism. It is the most despicable piece 
of sculpture aimed at disparaging the heroes of our people who have fought 
against the colonial rule. Standing on the monument, four figures represent 
the British imperialist mercenary soldiers and another one with the bogus 
national flag in his hand...The two lying beneath the feet of the mercenary 
soldiers actually represent the dauntless MNLA fighters who have shed their 
blood for the cause of genuine independence...Thus, the revolutionary action 
taken by our army to blast the monument is justifiable.
293
 
 
The poorly laid and mistimed explosive device went off at 0520 hours instead of 0600 
hours thus failing in the twin objectives of destroying the monument and killing the flag 
party at the morning flag raising ceremony.
294
 The attempted destruction of the National 
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Monument was conceived as a visible display of the CPM‘s ability to strike at will on 
targets in the capital – and more importantly its revolutionary leadership to the CPM rank 
and file, CPM sympathisers, potential recruits and the two CPM dissident factions. The 
attack formally signalled the CPM‘s intent to challenge the CPMML‘s campaign of urban 
violence. The CPM went so far as to appropriate a successful MPLL action as its own. The 
3 September 1975 attack on the PFF Central Brigade HQ in Kuala Lumpur was claimed by 
the VMR to be the work of one of its Flying Squads which resulted in 65 government 
casualties.
295
 In fact, the attack was carried out the MPLL and the actual casualties incurred 
by the PFF amounted to two killed and fifty-one wounded.
296
 In an attempt to reassert and 
prove its revolutionary leadership, every single available means of mass persuasion - 
including grey and black propaganda from less than credible sources was justified.  
 
The blowing up of the National Monument was followed up an increase in targeted 
assassinations of security personal and suspected informers. Again, these incidents were 
played up by the VMR as demonstrations of the CPM‘s revolutionary leadership – 
particularly around key dates on the revolutionary calendar:  
 
On the eve of the 27
th
 anniversary, our mobile unit again shot and killed another 
enemy agent Low Kam Fook, the Deputy Superintendent of Batu Gajah 
Detention Camp...On 20 June, with the support of the broad masses, our mobile 
unit gunned down the bogus Ipoh Special Branch agent Wong Siong Seng. 
These...mark the advent of the 27
th
 anniversary of the glorious Anti-British 
National Liberation War.
297
  
 
Targeted assassinations and other propaganda of the deed actions had a role in undermining 
the morale of the security forces and the faith of the citizens in the ability of the 
government to secure the country. The fact that virtually all of the victims of target 
assassinations in 1975 were members of the security forces was designed to impress upon 
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its audience the legitimacy of the CPM‘s cause.298 More importantly, in face of the open 
challenge by the CPMMF and the highly aggressive CPMML for leadership, eye-catching 
acts of violence were deeds that proved the CPM‘s credentials as the foremost 
revolutionary party in the Malay Peninsula. Other highly visible actions that the CPM 
exploited for propaganda capital were the clandestine planting of flags and distribution of 
leaflets in widely dispersed areas of Malaysia and Singapore.
299
 As with most CPM actions, 
its urban agitprop efforts were exaggerated by the VMR. A November 1975 broadcast 
claimed that:  
 
In Singapore and Johore broad masses of people went haywire on seeing red 
flags fluttering in the sky. In some places, people even passed the leaflets on to 
friends or neighbours after reading them...Their enthusiastic response to this 
campaign has eloquently illustrated...That the plot of the enemy and his agents, 
the so-called Marxist-Leninist Faction for carrying out anti-Party activities to 
shake the confidence of the people in the CPM led by Comrade Chin Peng in the 
past three months had completely gone bankrupt [and] That the political 
consciousness of the people and their ability to distinguish fragrant flowers from 
poisonous weeds had further been raised and enhanced.
 300
 
 
The ‗flag-displays‘ sent strong signals to the CPM‘s rival factions but such open 
demonstrations together with highly visible acts of violence had the tendency to disclose 
erstwhile hidden subversives and provided state authorities with the justification to crack 
down on suspected communist sympathisers and activists. 1975 was a year in which all 
three factions of the CPM demonstrated their ability to operate not just in the jungle but 
also in the main urban centres of Peninsula Malaysia.
301
 The surge of such open 
demonstrations in capabilities however led to a severe bleeding of strength that decimated 
the all important CPM urban underground infrastructure – a setback from which the CPM 
never recovered. 
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The arrest of Samad Ismail, Managing Editor of the New Straits Times and his 
colleague Samani Amin, News Editor of the Berita Harian in 1976 under the Malaysian 
Internal Security Act (ISA) shook Malaysia.
302
 Both Samad and Samani were prominent 
members of the Malay intelligentsia particularly Samad who was one of Tun Razak‘s 
confidential advisors. The arrests showed that communism had penetrated even UMNO.
303
 
Prior to his arrest in Malaysia, Samad was earlier arrested in Singapore in 1951 for 
‗engaging in communist activities as a CPM member and [was] on record as having been 
directed by CPM cadres operating in Indonesia‘.304 On 1 September 1976, Samad admitted 
in a televised public confession that ‗he had some success in converting the younger group 
in UMNO to his way of thinking‘. The right wing of UMNO led by the UMNO Youth and 
Partai Islam (PAS) seized the opportunity to spearhead a call for UMNO to purge its ranks 
of pro-communist elements and apply political pressure on the Prime Minister.
305
 The 
Hussein Onn administration was in no danger of collapse but the conservative elements 
within UMNO were on the political ascendant. In short, rather than galvanising the masses 
into action, the open displays of CPM revolutionary violence had the unintended effect of 
sparking a clap-down on the political left and further weakening the CPM movement.  
 
Since the success of the CPM‘s armed revolution in the Malayan Peninsula hinged 
upon its ability to create a class conscious proletariat, the masses had to be convinced 
that they were being oppressed and neglected by the Singapore and Malaysian 
governments and their policies. By the mid to late 1970s, the rapid growth of both 
the Malaysian and Singapore economies certainly convinced the majority that an 
UMNO-led coalition in Malaysia, and a PAP-dominant government in Singapore 
was preferable to a People‘s Republic of Malaya. Nonetheless the CPM sought to 
agitate the masses - particularly in the rural Northern Malaysian states where long-
term federal development schemes such as FELDA were slow to bear fruit. The 
CPM were quick to exploit the teething problems of these projects for propaganda capital. 
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A recurrent theme played up by the VMR was the alleged corruption and 
exploitative nature of these schemes. When the Third Five-Year Plan for Malaysia 
was announced, the VMR was quick to reiterate that:  
 
Only by abolishing the neo-colonial and feudal agrarian system and by making 
the peasants, agricultural workers and other labourers in the rural areas masters 
of the land can the problem of rural poverty be solved. However the reactionary 
government has acted in a diametrically opposite way by giving large tracts of 
land gratis to big foreign plantation owners as well as big domestic landlords 
and big bureaucrat capitalists under the signboard of developing agriculture and 
increasing employment opportunity in rural areas. As a result, the problem of 
rural poverty far from being solved has become more and more acute...This 
cannot but greatly accelerate the process of class polarisation in the rural areas... 
This is the actual content of the restructuring of society peddled by the Hussien 
Onn clique.
306
 
 
In short, this line of propaganda aimed at the rural masses with an emphasis on the 
low-income Malays was a direct appeal to the poorer and landless farmers of both 
ethnic groups to reject the government‘s New Five-Year Plan which the VMR 
argued would place a disproportionate amount of the country‘s resources and 
wealth into the hands of foreign conglomerates and a small minority of the Malay 
elites.  
 
Despite the involvement of British companies such as Harrison and Crossfield 
in federal land development schemes, the FCO assessed that: ‗it is the failure of 
[the Malaysian] government to respond to the genuine needs of the rural population 
rather than the appeal of communism which has the greater effect‘. The same report 
noted the ‗the erosion of public support for the government‘ in communist 
sanctuaries in the border areas where ‗a number of Malay plantation workers in 
Kedah...were quite open in their support for the guerrillas.‘ On the subversive 
threat posed by the CPM, it concluded that even though the total number of CPM 
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supporters might be relatively small, ‗it is the potential subversive threat tha t 
Malaysian MSB consider to be the most important factor‘. 307  This so-called 
‗potential subversive threat‘ was well-articulated in the VMR‘s appeal to visceral 
feelings of neglect and exploitation and its utility as a latent tool of socialisation.   
 
The use of federal development schemes as means of social control was a key 
message propagated by the VMR. On that score, much attention was given to the 
FELDA scheme – a government programme designed to win over the very same 
rural masses targeted by the CPM. The implementation of the FELDA scheme and 
its transformational impact on the landscape and the communities of the Northern 
Malaysian states will be discussed in the next chapter. The relevance of here was 
the very real threat posed by FELDA to the CPM efforts of winning over the rural 
masses in the border region. In February 1981, just months prior its shutdown, the 
VMR ran a critique of FELDA as an insidious tool of government social control:    
 
On the surface, FELDA seems to be run on a rather progressive basis [but]...A 
FELDA community is not like the traditional kampong community. The settlers 
of a scheme are mostly former landed peasants, fishermen, and ex-
servicemen...uprooted from their kampongs and planted in the land schemes. In 
this newly planted community there are no village headman, no village 
traditions. In their place are functionaries and a set of rules and regulations. All 
of these are imposed on the community...The debt trap...is by far the most 
effective policy FELDA has adopted in controlling the settlers. Because of their 
debts, the settlers are robbed of their right to sell their agricultural produce to 
dealers of their own choice. Under the rules laid down, settlers must sell their 
produce to FELDA even if the prices offered are lower than market prices; 
otherwise it‘d be an offence, and an offender is punishable by the FELDA code. 
The punishment includes confiscation of their produce, suspension of credit 
purchase at the FELDA shops, and expulsion from the scheme without 
compensation. That is not all. Because of the debts, FELDA is able to run the 
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schemes such that rules are extended to almost every aspect of life of the 
community, making it more like an institution of rules and regulations than an 
independent community of farmers. What has been imposed on the settlers is a 
social structure in which FELDA is the authority while the settler is a subject 
who must be obedient to FELDA... FELDA is an institution to exercise control 
over the settlers economically, politically and socially.
308
 
 
Despite its Marxist-Leninist vitriol, such articles represented an attempt at 
constructive criticism of government policy. The constant reiteration of the 
state social control peril associated with FELDA however reflected a very real 
fear of the CPM. By 1977, major development projects such as the FELDA 
scheme, the MUDA irrigation project, the building of the Temenggor Dam and 
the East/West Highway had vastly changed the landscape and socio-economic 
conditions of the rural North – much to the consternation of the CPM.309 These 
shifts in local conditions not only paved the way for the Malaysian 
government to secure the local population by draining the CPM of its ‗living 
spaces‘ and sanctuaries but also had a huge impact on the credibility of the 
CPM‘s revolutionary agenda.  
 
If the Maoist ‗using the countryside to surround the cities‘ template was the 
CPM‘s preferred formula to winning the local shooting war, the CPM‘s interpretation of 
socialism and external policies were constantly in tune with that of the CCP‘s.  A detailed 
examination of the VMR broadcasts from 1969 to 1981 reveals that not once did the CPM 
deviate from Beijing in matters of socialist doctrine and foreign policy. The formal 
establishment of formal diplomatic relations between the PRC and the U.S. in January 1979 
were attributed by the VMR to ‗the new victories won by the Chinese people in their 
socialist revolution and socialist construction or in their support for the struggle of the 
people of various countries against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism‘ rather than 
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the pragmatism of Deng‘s foreign policy.310 When the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in 
December1978, the VMR promptly labelled the Vietnamese as ‗aggressors‘ and 
‗hegemonists‘. The subsequent conquest of Cambodia by Vietnam was pronounced by the 
VMR as ‗thoroughly expos[ing] the expansionist character of the Vietnamese authorities 
and the ambition of Soviet social-imperialism for hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region‘.311 
The Chinese response to the Vietnamese annexation of Cambodia came in a cross-border 
invasion  of Vietnam on 17 February 1979. The fact that the Chinese were the first to strike 
across the border did not prevent the VMR from proclaiming:  
 
On 17 February, frontier troops of the Chinese People's Liberation Army launched 
a counter-attack against the Vietnamese aggressors in the border areas of 
Kwangsi and Yunan...The action taken by the Chinese army and people in 
countering the armed incursion of the Vietnamese...is a just action. The Malayan 
people firmly support the Chinese people's just war to defend their frontier region 
and counter attack the Vietnamese aggressors.
312
 
 
The VMR broadcasts made it glaringly clear that the CPM was firmly in the pro-Beijing 
camp. It also painted a very rosy picture of CCP-CPM relations that seemed to be free from 
conflict. What the VMR does not tell us however, is the flux and evolution of the CCP-
CPM relationship; from one of active support; to fraternal support; and finally 
abandonment of the CPM‘s cause. More tellingly, it does not explain the rationale behind 
the CPM‘s resolute support for the CCP which did not waver even in the face of less than 
positive developments such as the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
PRC and Malaysia.  
 
If these statements were linked to the broader relationships at play, the CPM‘s 
steadfast pro-CCP stance could be deciphered. In light of the acrimonious internal split, any 
admission of any serious error by CPM Central Committee would further dissolve the 
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leadership credentials of the CPM in the eyes of the rank and file and potential supporters. 
Moreover, having thrown in their lot completely with the Chinese since the early 1960s, 
turning to the Soviets was simply not an option. Clearly, to antagonise its CCP sponsors 
would have sounded the death knell for the CPM.  Thus, every single item of the VMR 
indubitably took a pro-Beijing line.  Despite slim chances of success, the only realistic 
option for the CPM was to stick to its guns in the hope of proving its revolutionary 
credentials to its CCP sponsors. To antagonise the Chinese at the risk of losing all forms of 
support would be tantamount to suicide. However, that should not disguise the fact that the 
top CPM leadership were firm believers of the Maoist model – a belief which even the 
mortal passing of Mao did not shake. Deng‘s pragmatic ‗open-door‘ policy of engaging the 
non-communist ASEAN bloc including the states of Malaysia and Singapore did not go 
down well with Chin Peng who in his memoirs accuse Deng of holding personal grudge.
313
 
Profuse in its praise of Maoist thought, not once did the VMR carry an article in praise of 
Deng. The Deng-era VMR‘s articles were pro-CCP, but they were by no means pro-Deng.  
In short, the VMR‘s and CPM Central Committee‘s steadfast faith in Maoism was a 
reaction to Deng‘s new post-Mao-era policies. In light of the Sino-Soviet split, the pro-
Beijing CPM had even less room room for manoeuvre when it came to choosing sides.   
 
Without ready access to CPM documents of the Second Emergency period, it is not 
possible to provide an adequate explanation to the CPM‘s inability to devolve from the 
Maoist model of People‘s War and mass persuasion or even develop a foreign policy of its 
own. As we have seen in this and the previous chapter, the Vietnamese model provided not 
only the basis of the CPM‘s guerrilla ‗Viet-Cong‘ tactics but also inspiration for success. 
However, in the denouement of the Sino-Soviet split and that between the Vietnamese and 
the Cambodian communists, the Chinese-backed CPM had to walk the walk with Beijing or 
risk losing everything. The failure of the CPM to develop a genuinely distinct Malayan 
socialist model translated into a lack of success of its mass persuasion campaign.  The 
penultimate aim of the CPM‘s mass persuasion campaign was to revolutionise the masses 
towards the destruction of the existing socio-economic-political-cultural system of the 
Malayan Peninsular, and in its place, establish a new socialist order in the form of the 
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People‘s Republic of Malaya. Such a feat was only possible through the development of a 
sense of class consciousness and class struggle amongst the Malayan people.  
 
In the CPM‘s attempt to advance the class consciousness of the masses, and the 
cause of its armed revolution, the VMR was an indispensable tool. The VMR was vital to 
the development of the Malayan class consciousness, and the whole mass socialisation 
effort on which the success of the Malayan Revolution ultimately hinged upon. However 
despite its sustained propaganda campaign, the CPM failed to generate any significant level 
of class consciousness amongst the greater majority of the Malayan and Singaporean 
population. Moreover just as in the Malayan Emergency, the CPM‘s armed struggle in the 
Second Malayan Emergency was isolated from the wider ‗People‘s Revolutionary War‘ in 
Indochina thereby depriving the Malayan Communists of any substantial external support . 
The fact that the VMR station had to transmit from China spoke volumes about the difficult 
conditions under which the CPM operated.  
 
In 1979, ISD Singapore noted a decline in the number of VMR propaganda items 
against the island-city-state. This decline was attributed to the shift in Post-Mao Chinese 
foreign policy particularly expectations that the curtailment of the VMR‘s attacks against 
Singapore would result in ‗Singapore‘s tough stand against Vietnam within ASEAN and 
internationally‘.314 In his meeting with China‘s Paramount Leader, Lee Kuan Yew made it 
clear to Deng that:   
 
ASEAN governments regarded radio broadcasts from China appealing directly 
to their ethnic Chinese as dangerous subversion. It was most unlikely that 
ASEAN countries would respond positively to his proposal for a united front 
against the Soviet Union and Vietnam. He realised that he had to face up to this 
problem if Vietnam was to be isolated.
315
  
 
The ISD‘s assessment and the impact of Lee‘s words was confirmed by Chin Peng who 
was hard-pressed by Deng on the issue of the VMR:   
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I listened carefully to Deng‘s account of his meeting with the Singapore prime 
minister. Understandably, I was not happy. But I recognised the pointlessness 
of arguing. He knew what I felt and how much I disapproved of his request. He 
also knew that I had no alternative but to adhere to his remarks.
316
 
 
In this case, as with most affairs associated with the changing dynamics of the Cold 
War, international relations and foreign policies were matters which could do little to 
influence. To Deng, what mattered most was that Singapore and the ASEAN bloc had 
votes and a voice in the UN – precious commodities which an overseas-based 
movement with weak local indigenous support such as the CPM did not have. The 
CPM was almost totally dependent on Chinese financial and moral patronage with 
little international support for its cause. Thus, survival of the CPM movement was 
dependent on adherence to a pro-Beijing line. Indeed, the CPM was becoming a 
liability to the Chinese in the betterment of Sino-ASEAN relations.  In the post-Mao-
era, the Chinese could very well do without the CPM, but the same cannot be said for 
the CPM leadership ensconced in Beijing. The palpable decline of CPC-CPM 
relations gave the Malaysian government a distinct strategic advantage over the CPM 
in the battle for hearts and minds. As a corollary, the next chapter shall examine how 
the Malaysian and Singapore governments responded to the CPM-inspired 
insurrection and subversion through the stages of the Second Emergency from 1968 
to 1981. 
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5. 
 
The Response of the Post-colonial state to Maoist Insurgency (1968-1981)  
 
Contextual background 
 
Conceding managed independence to British administered Malaya was always an integral 
part of Britain‘s post-war foreign policy. The questions were when, how and most 
importantly what form the post-colonial Malayan state should take, rather than if such a 
state should take shape.
317
 A key outcome of the Emergency was the formation of an 
independent Malaysia and subsequently Singapore, each of them controlled by fervently 
anti-communist leaderships with strong ties to Britain. During the Emergency,
 
the main 
burden of the COIN effort was shouldered by a British-led effort that drew its manpower 
resources from various corners of the Commonwealth. It was just as well as more extensive 
use of the Royal Malay Regiment would have exacerbated the very inter-communal Malay-
Chinese tensions that the British sought to limit.
318
 Upon the transfer of power, the native 
Malay elites, impressed by the strategic behaviour of their colonial overlords, adopted 
virtually identical policies, procedures, and institutions evolved over decades of British 
imperial administration.
319
 Indeed, prior to 1964, the Chief of Staff of the Malaysian Armed 
Forces (MAF) was British, and only during the mid-1990s, when the ‗last of the long line 
of Sandhurst-trained Malay generals‘ retired from active service, were some of the residual 
British military traditions finally relinquished.
320
 In short, the Emergency years despite 
their brevity were fundamental in shaping the strategic culture, doctrine, force structure and 
institutions of the Malaysian security landscape. 
 
 This chapter essentially charts the post-Emergency security landscape of Malaysia – 
particularly through the lens of an emergent post-colonial state that had to exert its brand of 
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nationhood and statecraft in the midst of an insurgency. Sketching the narrative of the 
Malaysian government‘s response to the CPM challenge is crucial in explaining how an 
emergent post-colonial state was able to contain an insurgent threat and consolidate its 
place as a regional actor.  This chapter explains the COIN response of the Malaysian and 
to a lesser extent the Singapore governments and sets them within an inter-connected 
quadrant of: utility of military force, civil-military relations, population security, and 
propaganda. Throughout the chapter, attempts will also be made to draw out the 
departures as well as continuities between the First and Second Emergencies. This 
chapter emphasises the point that the consolidation of Federal Malaysia and eventual defeat 
of the CPM insurgency would not have been possible without the firm building blocks 
bequeathed by the British during the First Emergency. Many aspects of the Malaysian 
‗Comprehensive‘ approach to COIN and the narrative of its development were deeply 
rooted in the First Emergency years. Nevertheless, these will be juxtaposed against the 
political, geographical, socio-economic and military conditions of the Second Emergency 
to tease out departures unique to the post-colonial COIN campaign. At this point it would 
be useful to set the context of Malaysia‘s post-colonial security environment before delving 
into the chapter proper. 
 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, independent Malaya‘s first Prime Minister saw fit to rely on 
a continuing British and Commonwealth military presence to guarantee the external 
security of the immediate post-colonial state. This policy of reliance on the British for 
Malaysia‘s external security continued under his successor Tun Abdul Razak. The 
arrangement was enshrined in the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) of 1957 
which was superseded after the British withdrawal in 1971 by the Five-Power-Defence-
Agreement (FPDA). These Anglophile leanings reflected the attitudinal formation of the 
Malay elite plus a pragmatic realisation that the Malaysian security forces were better 
suited for internal defence. The need to place a higher priority on socio-economic 
development also imposed strict limits on defence spending.
321
 Thus, even after the 
rundown of Britain‘s East of Suez role, Malaysia‘s external defence throughout much of the 
Second Emergency period came to depend on its Emergency-era British and Antipodes 
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Commonwealth partners. As will be seen in this chapter, much of the colonial inheritance 
of the Emergency period was consciously or subconsciously absorbed and rationalised into 
the security and state apparatus of a post-colonial Malaysia.  
 
The conceptual underpinnings of Malaysia‘s post-colonial COIN strategy, 
KESBAN were deeply rooted in the Briggs Plan of the First Emergency years. Although 
much of the KESBAN concept was adopted by the Malaysian government in 1970 to 
combat the threat posed by the CPM‘s armed insurgency during the Second Emergency, it 
was only on 5 February 1980 that KESBAN was formally legislated by the National 
Security Council (NSC) as ‗Directive no. 11 dated  Feb. 1980‘.322 The assassination of 
High Commissioner, Henry Gurney, almost thirty years earlier and the lacklustre results of 
large-scale military sweeps in the first phase of the original Emergency provided the 
impetus for the Briggs Plan. Similarly, during the opening stages of the Second Emergency, 
the heavy reliance of the Malaysian security forces on air power, artillery bombardments 
and large-scale division-sized operations failed to deliver a military solution. To add to 
these problems, the revival of the CPM insurgency in 1968 struck at the time when the 
Malaysian Special Branch (MSB) was being wound down with adverse consequences for 
the depth of its Chinese expertise. As in most if not all COIN scenarios, the initially heavy-
handed military response in both Emergencies signified an instinctive ‗reflex action‘. In 
similar vein, as both Emergencies progressed, there was a shift from a military-driven 
campaign to a more comprehensive and integrated approach. However, it must be noted 
that in the Second Emergency the Malaysian government was faced with a much reduced 
threat and was less constrained by time or by the moral considerations that confronted the 
British colonial authorities. While the First Emergency threatened to derail the 
decolonisation project in Malaya, the same cannot be said of the later CPM insurgency 
which did not pose quite the same existential danger to the survival of the Malaysian state. 
As such, the Malaysian government had the luxury of fine-tuning the KESBAN concept 
over a ten-year period before it became enshrined in official doctrine. 
 
At the same time, the colonial apron strings were gradually undone, particularly in 
the realm of regional security. The perceived threat from communist subversion compelled 
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the non-communist regimes of Southeast Asia to subordinate their conflicts to the mutual 
requirement for regional security. The creation of the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) reflected official cognisance that the survival and stability of each 
individual nation was intertwined with that of its immediate neighbours. Unlike the FPDA 
or the short-lived Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), ASEAN, founded upon 
the core states of Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, was a 
strictly regional pact that did not include any former colonial or extra-regional powers. As 
Clive Christie observed: ‗a post-colonial logic of regional security was now replacing the 
security structures of the era of colonialism and decolonization…regional resilience, 
therefore, was being built up along with regime resilience‘. 323  Aimed at preventing 
interference by outside powers, ASEAN established the Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971. The ZOPFAN declaration called for ASEAN members to 
use national and regional resilience as the basis for the ‗neutralisation‘ of Southeast Asia. 
However, the continued reliance of all ASEAN members except Indonesia on security links 
with the U.S., the UK and other Western powers meant that ZOPFAN was a long-term 
aspiration rather than a display of concrete regional consensus.
324
 Nevertheless, the creation 
of a regional collective centred on a local and Southeast Asian identity was a milestone in 
the politics of regional security. It symbolised the arrival of an independent post-colonial 
Southeast Asia that was capable of looking after its own affairs unfettered by its colonial 
past. 
 
 Yet the process was far from smooth-sailing. The British-proposed Malayan Union 
plan of 1946, which guaranteed equal citizenship rights to all peoples of Malaya regardless 
of ethnicity, provoked the unanimous hostility of the ethnic Malays and the creation of the 
United Malays National Organization (UMNO). In the face of this ‗comprehensively 
powerful and unprecedented display of Malay unity‘, the British were compelled to 
bequeath a new postcolonial constitutional framework that guaranteed the indigenous rights 
of the Malays.
325
 The project to define the Malaysian nation and create a Malaysian identity 
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was a contested struggle throughout much of the post-war and post-colonial period. In the 
words of Tim Harper: 
 
As a political project, nationalism in Malaya sought to create a modern nation-
state, on a model thrust upon it by a European colonial power, where the 
linguistic and cultural basis of that state had yet to be resolved. Post-colonial 
Malaya had to cope with the contradictions that arose in this period… Yet the 
relationship between the Rulers and rakyat [people] was subject to increasing 
tensions. They rumbled below the surface in the 1960s and 1970s…When 
Malay nationalism became subject to a new ethos in the early 1980s open 
clashes erupted.
326
 
 
Indeed, ideology, ethnicity, language, national identity and national culture were hotly 
contested spaces in post-colonial Malaysia. In the battle to define the political forms of the 
new polity, the UMNO-dominated Federal government and the CPM sought to impose their 
own conflicting visions of a new Malaysian state. However, as the ties to the former 
colonial overlord became still looser, the imperative to stand on one‘s own feet and ‗catch 
one‘s own fish‘ demanded that some things be approached in different fashion from the 
First Emergency era. The Second Emergency epitomised the symbiosis and syncretism of 
the colonial and post-colonial, but it also marked an important departure. On one hand, 
institutions, doctrines and practices from the previous Emergency were absorbed and 
indigenised. On the other hand, some of the developments were uniquely Malaysian and 
post-colonial. The way in which the Malaysian state dealt with the CPM insurgency was 
thus indicative of how post-colonial Malaysia came to be defined. 
 
In many ways, the environs and spirit of the Haadyai peace talks in 1989 were very 
different from those of Baling in 1955. The most obvious difference was the absence of a 
British presence. At Haadyai, the Malaysians sat with the Thais at the conference table - 
two Southeast Asian neighbours, and more importantly, ASEAN partners that could 
successfully guarantee their own national and regional security without the interference of 
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extra-regional powers. Indeed, one fundamental paradigm shift is the cross-border aspect of 
the insurgency. By 1960, the CPM had completed its ‗long march‘ from the Malayan 
interior into Southern Thailand. While the first Emergency was largely waged within the 
confines of colonial Malaya‘s Peninsula borders, in the Second Emergency, the CPM had 
become a pseudo-state within a state in Southern Thailand. In short, the counterinsurgent 
response had to be different. Regardless of political motivations, the Malaysians faced 
being consigned to fighting a longer war as opposed to a very long one had they opted for a 
unilateral solution to the problem. 
 
ASEAN‘s distinctive political, economic and security histories evolved before its 
members emerged as independent nation states. In ASEAN, it was possible for military 
leaders to both evoke the precedent of pre-colonial Southeast Asian monarchies and to 
draw upon the ideology of post-Westphalian Western states. However, distinguishing 
themselves from the ‗professionalism‘ of conventional Western armies, post-colonial 
Southeast Asian militaries came to be associated with ‗development‘ and ‗nation-building‘. 
This augmented role was rationalised by the concept of ‗new professionalism‘.327 Indeed, 
the need to maintain internal security in the face of challenges to state authority was the 
primary raison d’etre for the armed forces of all ASEAN member states except 
Singapore.
328
 The collapse of the non-communist Indochinese regimes in 1975 reinforced 
the ASEAN community‘s commitment to the notion that ‗economic and social 
development was an essential weapon‘ against communist subversion. In light of such 
events, even the Konfrontasi (1963-1966) between Indonesia and Malaysia served as a 
timely reminder of the need to institutionalise intra-regional relations under the ASEAN 
banner. As such, in 1976, ASEAN-TAC formally declared ‗a determination to strengthen 
national resilience in political, economic, socio-cultural as well as security fields [and] to 
cooperate in all fields for the promotion of regional resilience‘.329 In the case of post-
colonial Malaysia, the perceived primary dangers of communism and communalism were 
seen as being internally generated. As such, in the aftermath of the devastating May 13 riots, 
the Malaysian government aimed to defeat the CPM‘s armed struggle and subversion 
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through a strategy of developing national cohesion by political, socio-economic and socio-
cultural means.  
 
The emphasis on the socio-economic basis of security and the priority accorded to 
development as part and parcel of the overall COIN effort was enshrined into a national 
security concept Keselamatan dan Pembangunan, (KESBAN). The first and second 
syllables were derived from the Malay words keselamatan (security) and pembangunan 
(development). The principal underlying assumption of the KESBAN doctrine was that 
‗security can only be obtained if there is a lack of economic deprivation‘.330 This strategy 
was a streamlined and indigenised version of proven methods and concepts utilised by 
Briggs and Templer in the colonial phase the MCP insurgency. The Malayan Emergency 
(1948-60) was the ‗determining strategic experience for the formulation of a national 
security policy for much of the first two decades of independence‘, but an ‗overhaul of [its] 
fundamental goals was undertaken‘ in the wake of the post-election May 13 riots in 
1969.
331
  The rational that in the event of further communal conflict, a Malay dominated 
MAF would be needed to back up the government and defend Malay nationalism became 
deeply embedded in the psyche of the post-Abdul Rahman administrations. 
 
 A significant departure from the colonial era was the role, composition and force 
structure of the security forces. In order to reduce inter-communal Malay-Chinese tensions, 
the British-led COIN effort of the First Emergency had a multi-national, multi-ethnic make-
up. The Malayan Emergency was essentially a Commonwealth campaign that involved 
British regulars and national servicemen, Australian, New Zealand, Gurkha, Fijian, Dyak, 
Orang Asli and East African contingents.  The Armed Forces of the independent post-
colonial Malaysia, however, was predominantly Malay. In 1969, 64.5 per cent of army 
officers in the MAF were Malay. In response to the May 13 riots, the security forces 
expanded rapidly, particularly the Malay-only Royal Malay Regiment which grew to 
twenty-six battalions by the mid-1980s.
 332
 The Ranger battalions, the multi-ethnic 
component of the MAF were also heavily dominated by Malays. At the height of CPM‘s 
armed insurrection in the mid-1970s, it was the police rather than the military – particularly 
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MSB that was the primary counterforce to the communist underground. Indeed, there was 
no real need for the MAF to actively recruit from the Malaysian Chinese community which 
even in colonial times were disinclined towards military service. The effects of a Malay-
dominated MAF were somewhat ameliorated by efforts to rebuilt MSB‘s Chinese-speaking 
expertise.   
 
The post-colonial geopolitical picture, and the international system that underpinned 
it, were also vastly different from those of the Emergency era. Both were characterised by 
rapid tectonic shifts in ideological alignment that ultimately consigned the CPM to isolation 
at the local, regional and international levels. Relationships between the non-communist 
regimes of Southeast Asia and their rising Chinese neighbour were of particular 
significance. In 1969, official Chinese publications were still openly deriding the 
governments of the five original ASEAN member states (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Philippines and Thailand) as ‗Asian lackeys‘ of America who had received a ‗shot in the 
arm‘ through a ‗so-called ―regional economic cooperation organisation‖‘.333 However, by 
the early 1970s, Beijing‘s relations with Southeast Asia were primarily shaped by the forces 
of Sino-Soviet rivalry and Chinese attempts to prevent a Soviet ‗encirclement‘ of the region 
rather than by ideology. In 1971, China supported Malaysian and Indonesian claims to 
administer the Straits of Malacca against the internationalisation demands of the major 
maritime powers. Peking also endorsed ASEAN‘s proposed establishment of Southeast 
Asia as a ‗Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality‘ in 1973. 334   When it came to 
establishment of formal diplomatic relations, Malaysia became the first ASEAN member 
state to break the ice in 1974. In his 1976 visit to China, Lee Kuan Yew agreed to formally 
recognize the PRC after the Indonesians had done so. By the end of the 1970‘s, the PRC 
had established diplomatic relations with all the ASEAN member states but Indonesia, 
Singapore, and Brunei. 
 
 Under the pragmatic leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China's material support for 
various revolutionary Southeast Asian parties (including the CPM) was gradually reduced 
to negligible proportions even though propagandist endorsement lent credibility to the 
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CCP‘s claim of legitimacy as a Marxist-Leninist Party genuinely committed to 
revolutionary internationalism. In truth, Deng‘s foreign policy was guided more by 
pragmatism and realpolitk than by ideological commitment. Chinese support for the Khmer 
Rouge in Cambodia was rooted in its unbending hostility to Vietnam, the key Soviet  ally in 
Southeast Asia. China‘s 1979 invasion was substantially launched ‗to teach Vietnam a 
lesson‘ and ‗remind its old ideological ally of China's enduring geopolitical interests in 
Indochina‘.335 In the case of Malaysia, its relations with China were also characterised by 
pragmatism, particularly the perceived necessity of better relations with the Southeast 
Asia‘s closest continental power. The improvement in ASEAN-China relations was evident 
in ASEAN‘s opposition to the subsequent Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the 
ending of Beijing‘s claims to authority over the overseas Chinese populations of Southeast 
Asia. Over time the CPM thus not only lost the material support but also the ideological 
and moral support of its erstwhile Chinese sponsor.  
   
The remaining sections of this chapter explore the counter-measures adopted by 
both the Malaysian and, to a lesser extent, the Singaporean governments in response to the 
CPM‘s efforts to subvert and revolutionise hearts and minds in the Malay Peninsula. The 
Malaysian COIN doctrine of the Second Emergency period, KESBAN will be discussed 
and assessed. Juxtaposed against the strategies adopted in the first Emergency, the 
evolution of KESBAN and the concept of ‗Comprehensive Security‘ can be better 
appreciated. Despite the comparative approach, it must be recognised that the political, 
geographical, socio-economic and military conditions of the First Emergency were 
different from those of the Second. As such, this chapter will examine each and every of the 
aforesaid aspects within the relevant context, but also within the framework of the earlier 
established four key touchstones of the utility of military force, civil-military relations, 
population security, and propaganda. The first sub-section will deal with the utility of 
force by the Malaysian government – particularly the military-centric approach of the 
early to mid 1970s. The second seeks to explain why the big-guns approach still 
persisted. The third and final section will cover the palpable shift towards a more 
population-centric that would eventually allow the Malaysian government to secure the 
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border areas. Throughout the chapter, attempts will be made to situate the strategy of 
the Singapore government into the wider picture. The regional and international 
dimensions will also be addressed albeit the focus on Thai-Malaysian relations and the 
relationship between Malaysia and its ANZUK security partners.  
 
Marching to the Big Gun Response: The First Emergency Forgotten? (1968-1974) 
 
At the risk of drawing overly-deterministic parallels, it seems clear that many aspects of the 
Malaysian COIN approach during the first decade of the Second Emergency closely 
resembled the American ‗Big Guns‘ paradigm of the Vietnam War. Similar to the 
Americans, the MAF came to rely on heavy artillery and air-power as the initial solution to 
the CPM‘s ‗Viet-Cong‘ tactics - albeit on a smaller scale. Prior to the Briggs Plan‘s 
inception in 1950, reliance on military force also dominated the opening phase of the First 
Emergency. Similarly, the Malaysian government's initial reaction to the resurrection of the 
CPM‘s revolutionary violence can be interpreted as an instinctive reflex state action – a 
perceived military threat met with a military response. Indeed, as Richard Stubbs 
recognised, such a strategy is particularly appealing when the insurgents have little support 
which presents the opportunity of eliminating the movement before it gains any 
momentum.
336
 Thus, the Malaysian Government could well be forgiven for misreading the 
signs in the early years of the insurgency. What needs explaining is why did the Malaysian 
Government take over a decade to abandon the military-centric approach and fashion a 
coherent population-centric response? The previous chapters hinted at some of the answers 
– the most obvious was the lack of Chinese-speaking MSB officers that resulted in a 
‗black-gap‘ in the intelligence picture. The Malaysian security forces could only adopt a 
more targeted and responsive approach with reliable intelligence and the cooperation of 
their Thai counterparts which up to 1977 was largely ineffective.  Adequate answers to the 
above can be found by dissecting the growing pains of the post-colonial Malaysian security 
forces prior to the development of the KESBAN doctrine. From 1968 to 1974, it seemed as 
if the Malaysian security forces had to relearn COIN all over again. That journey is the 
focus of this section. 
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Part of the state‘s response to the May 13 May 1969 Riots which was attributed to 
CPM instigation by the Malaysian government was the creation of the National Operation 
Council (later renamed the National Security Council or NSC) in 1969 under the Prime 
Minister‘s Office.337 The NSC would be the overall coordinating body of national security 
policies and the direction of security matters including development efforts. This structure 
not unlike that of the Executive Committee structure implemented the First Emergency was 
to extend across the national, state, district and village levels. In practical terms, the system 
did not function as planned due to a lack of intelligence during the early years. The 
renewed CPM insurgency came at a time when MSB had atrophied during the slow run-
down at the end of the First Emergency. Another factor in its decline was the influence of 
the Bumiputra policy that gave preferential treatment to the indigenous Malays in Malaysia. 
On that subject, J B Johnston, High Commissioner to Malaysia noted that:  
 
The principal weakness is the deterioration of morale among Chinese officers 
who are now denied promotion to the senior ranks because of the policy of 
advancing the Malays. They are consequently frustrated by finding themselves 
subordinate to less able and less experienced Malays...the loss of Chinese 
capability by retirement, lack of incentive and the pitifully low level of 
recruitment is an increasing disability‘.338  
 
Another contemporary commentator, J K Hickman of the FCO observed that the efficiency 
of the MSB had ‗suffered through loss of morale among its Chinese officers, who have 
always been its cutting edge‘.339 Indeed, Malay MSB officers were often systematically 
promoted in preference to their Chinese colleagues at the cost of MSB‘s effectiveness.340  
During meetings with Lord Carrington, the British Defence Secretary, Lee Kuan Yew 
indicated that ‗Chinese officers were leaving [MSB] to its great detriment because of 
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discrimination in favour of Malays [and] inadequate intelligence was a crucial defect in 
Malaysian efforts to deal with communist terrorists‘.341 In recognition of Lee‘s assessment, 
both the British Defence Secretary and Secretary of State agreed that ‗specialist assistance to 
Malaysia in rebuilding a really effective intelligence organisation, in particular liaison 
between [MSB] and the Army, would be one of the most valuable contributions we could 
make‘. 342   The deterioration of the Malaysian intelligence apparatus – particularly 
cooperation between the main intelligence agency (MSB), police and armed forces was 
evident. 
 
The UK was directly concerned about the situation not only because of its ‗interest in 
seeing a stable Malaysia unthreatened by such a menace but also because of [its] possible 
involvement through the [FPDA].
343
 The UK was particularly worried that any Malaysian 
request for British or FPDA help in a deteriorating international security situation ‗could 
involve HMG [Her Majesty‘s Government] in very difficult decisions‘.344 In order to guard 
against that possibility, the UK was mindful of the various acceptable ways in which it could 
unobtrusively help the Malaysian COIN effort. These included the training of the Malaysian 
police in COIN techniques by the SAS, training in psychological warfare, provision of infra-
red equipment for use in operations in the border area, support for the MSB, and 
photographic reconnaissance flights.
345
 In short, the outbreak of the Second Emergency 
placed the British government in a Catch-22 situation. The FPDA was designed to guarantee 
the security of Malaysia and Singapore from any external threat – including externally 
promoted insurgencies, but the FPDA was essentially meant to be a ‗consultative 
arrangement‘ and ANZUK forces deployed within the FPDA were ‗principally in support of 
diplomatic rather than military objectives‘.346 In reality, the British were committed to the 
complete wind-down of their remaining military forces in Singapore by 1971 but at the same 
time, they could not allow the revived CPM threat to menace the security of Britain‘s show-
case decolonisation project in Southeast Asia.   
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The security situation was also of concern to Australia, the largest FPDA power in 
terms of troop contributions. Like the British, the Australians were quite unprepared for the 
sudden revival of the CPM threat as evinced in a particular letter from the Australian High 
Commission: ‗When we decided in 1969 to leave forces there to help if necessary with the 
Communist insurgency, we thought they would be merely ornamental, the possibility is now 
in sight...that we might actually be asked to do something‘.347 Like their British counterparts, 
the Australians took the view that the Malaysians should ‗continue to face the essential 
responsibility of handling their security situation themselves‘ but were favourable to the 
notion of ‗unobtrusive help in the early stages‘ rather than ‗stand aside until the situation 
[was] beyond their capacity to handle‘.348 Indeed, a directive to the Officer Commanding, 
Royal Australian Airforce, Butterworth, Malaysia stated:  
 
Notwithstanding Australian Government policy regarding direct participation, it 
is recognised that continuing Malaysian military and police action against the 
insurgents is essential to the internal security of that country. However, you may 
provide indirect support from on-base facilities providing such support is within 
the capacity of your current established resources.
349
    
  
Much like their British colleagues, the Australians were ‗open and flexible‘ about the ways 
in which training and technical assistance could be provided and were prepared ‗to do more 
in the way of in-country activity‘ if necessary.350 An additional Supplementary Directive 
was added to Air Directive 565/1/2 of 1964 that allowed the Officer Commanding RAAF 
Butterworth to ‗without specific authority, provide on-base support facilities to the extent 
that provision does not prejudice the readiness of your forces to perform their primary 
role‘. 351  The directive was very much in line with the stand that ‗the deployment of 
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additional units to the ANZUK Force [would] be politically unacceptable during the initial 
stages of [COIN] operations‘.352  
 
Any potential shifts in Southeast Asian security would have had a more direct impact 
on Australian security and strategic interests and those of the UK. The Strategic Basis of 
Australian Defence Policy, 1971, recognised that: ‗In Malaysia/Singapore...It is important 
that we be clearly seen to have the military capability to act, if so decided, under the [FPDA]; 
this involves a capability to reinforce our deployed forces in a timely fashion‘.353 To that end, 
the three armed services were therefore directed in 1972 to conduct studies into how 
ANZUK units presently deployed in Malaysia and Singapore could be used to support 
Malaysian COIN operations.
354
  These plans were made on the assumption that the 
Malaysian Government would not ‗call on foreign forces except in extremis‘. 355  One 
battalion of the ANZUK Brigade based in Butterworth was planned to support Malaysian 
COIN operations in its own area of operations with the second Butterworth-based battalion 
as a reserve for forward operations. The remaining ANZUK battalion was to be retained in 
Singapore.
356
 ANZUK air forces were also prepared to provide tactical reconnaissance, close 
air support, air transport support from Butterworth as well as maritime surveillance in 
support of COIN operations from Singapore.
357
 Prospects of deployment of an ANZUK 
naval force to prevent infiltration by seas and provide limited naval gunfire support on both 
coasts of West Malaysia by four ANZUK naval ships and Royal Malaysian forces were 
considered unsustainable and unable to meet the tasks assigned.
358
 The request for combat 
assistance from its ANZUK security partners was never invoked by the Malaysian 
Government which monitored Malaysia‘s internal security situation closely nonetheless. 
 
 J. Clementson, a retired RAF Squadron Leader assessed the Malaysian 
government‘s COIN strategy to be a combination of coercive legislative and military 
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measures which included the reactivation of Emergency Laws based on the Internal 
Security Act (ISA) of 1960 that were further reinforced through the mid-1970s by the 
Essential Security Cases Regulations of October 1976 (ESCAR).
359
 These legislative 
measures allowed for detention without trial and in-camera special courts where evidence 
was given incognito and suspects were presumed guilty until proven innocent. The 
Emergency Laws enacted in the aftermath of the May 13 1969 riots and their potential for 
abuse aroused concern among numerous foreign observers sympathetic to Malaysia‘s cause 
such as Clementson. Maureen Sioh, for his part, argued that in the course of the First 
Emergency, the colonial state, and its independent successor institutionalised much of the 
‗repressive legislation‘ such as the ISA that continues to haunt Malaysia today.360 At this 
juncture, it is necessary to remind ourselves that this thesis has focused on the degree of 
continuity and effectiveness in COIN approaches from the colonial to the post-colonial era 
rather than on changing perceptions of repression. Malaysia‘s Emergency Laws and the 
ISA formed part of a broader ‗stick and carrot‘ strategy inherited from the British approach 
to the First Emergency. In the case of post-colonial Malaysia, the lack of reliable 
intelligence in the early days of the Second Emergency meant that the stick comprised the 
dominant knee-jerk response to any perceived CPM threat.  The ill-coordinated anti-
communist sweeps from 1968 until the mid-1970s that produced little in terms of contacts, 
intelligence or serious disruption of the CPM‘s infrastructure and network were a source of 
anxiety to Clementson and Malaysia‘s ANZUK security partners.  
 
The period between 1969 and 1974 has been described as ‗one of the most 
challenging to the Security Forces, in particular the army‘.361 Following the withdrawal of 
British Forces in 1967, the MAF took over full responsibility of the defence of both 
Peninsular and East Malaysia with two divisions and five brigades. The 1
st
 Infantry 
Division was responsible for East Malaysia and the 2
nd
 Infantry Division Peninsular 
Malaysia.
362
 Thus, the army had to deal with the resurgence of the CPM threat and soon 
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after, restore public order in the aftermath of the May 13 1969 riots with the strength of a 
single infantry division. In the Thai-Malaysian border region, the operational area was 
divided into nine sectors, but not all were permanently occupied by Malaysian security 
forces.
363
 Plans were put in place to expand the quantity and quality of the security forces 
but implementation and results took time.  
 
It was, however, more than just a case of too few men for too big a task. Lacklustre 
progress was also a reflection of the lack of effective Malaysian-Thai cooperation at all 
levels. The virtual absence of coordinated and effective Malaysian-Thai liaison was a 
significant barrier to any sort of successful COIN action. In 1970, it was apparent that the 
Thai authorities had ‗far too little precise knowledge‘ of the CPM presence within their 
borders and there was no clear definition of responsibilities within the Thai chain of 
command.
 364
 In February 1970, responsibility for COIN in the Malaysian-Thai border 
areas was transferred from National Security Command to Communist Suppression 
Operations Command (CSOC) under a Thai General, but the National Security Command, 
not CSOC was still responsible for Thai-Malaysian cooperation.
365
 At the operational level, 
the Border Patrol Police (BPP) Commander in Songkhla had multiple direct responsibilities 
to Central BPP Command in Bangkok, the local police commander and CSOC.
366
  
 
An unprovoked ambush attack by the CPM in Sadao on 12 November 1969 which 
left seven Thai policemen dead provided a clear signal to the Thais that the CPM‘s 
presence was ‗a definite danger not only to the Malaysians but also to the Thais 
themselves‘.367 In a display of their new found willingness to cooperate, the Thais mounted 
a series of joint operations with the Malaysians. On 1 May 1970, a joint Thai-Malaysian 
force of about eight platoons captured a large deserted CPM camp in Sadao which was 
believed to have been used by HQ 12 Regt to accommodate up to 150 insurgents.
368
 The 
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previous day witnessed the capture of a large CPM camp in Amphoe Betong by a Thai-
Malaysian force of fourteen platoons.
369
 From the end of February to early June, a total of 
five CPM camps had been captured by security forces on the Thai side of the border.
370
 The 
Thai practice of giving notice of their operations often forty-eight hours in advance 
frequently resulted in the capture of empty enemy sanctuaries – and after the CPM had 
vacated in good time.
371
 Although the capture of empty bivouacs was less than what the 
Malaysians wished for, it was nonetheless a demonstration of the readiness on the part of 
the Thais for greater cooperation in joint operations.  
 
CPM infiltration of the Southern border villages and concerns over political 
indoctrination of the rural youth led the Thai authorities to take a more serious view of the 
CPM threat.
372
 The establishment of contact between the CPM and the CPT and the 
realisation that the ‗presence of the CTOs cannot simply be winked at on the comforting 
assumption that they only intend to be nasty to Malaysia‘ could also not be ignored.373 In 
recognition of the severity of the CPM threat to their own security, a New Border 
Cooperation Agreement was concluded by Malaysia and Thailand on 7 March 1970. For 
the first time, security forces from each country would be permitted across the border for 
joint operations in ‗hot pursuit‘ of up to five miles and a period of seventy-two hours.374 
The 1970 agreement was the third between Malaysia and Thailand since the CPM 
completed its ‗long march‘ toward the end of the First Emergency.  
 
The Malaysians were never satisfied with the preceding two agreements. The first 
accord of December 1959 created a joint Senior Staff Committee which met bi-monthly to 
set policy as well as a Border Operations Committee that met monthly to plan the conduct 
of ground operations. The agreement also permitted police forces of each state the right of 
‗hot pursuit‘ within twenty-five miles of the border. The Second agreement of 1965 was 
even more restrictive. The aforementioned upper limit for hot pursuit was reduced from 
                                                 
369
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 24/827, Capture of Communist Camp,Telegram No.222, 
British Embassy, Bangkok, 1 May 1970. 
370
 FCO 24/827, Thai Action Against CTs in the Far South. 
371
 Ibid. 
372
 FCO 24/827, Comments by Defence Attache Bangkok on Situation Near Thai-Malaysian Border. 
373
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 24/827, Insurgency and Subversion in Thailand, Diplomatic 
Report No.255/70, 13 April 1970. 
374
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  FCO 24/827, Malaysia-Thailand: New Border Agreement for 
Cooperation Against Communist Terrorists, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 16 March 1970. 
143 
 
twenty-five miles to five. The number of meetings at the Senior Staff Committee level was 
curtailed to only two per year and those of the Border Committee to once every quarter. 
The only positive outcome of the 1965 agreement was the establishment of the Combined 
Intelligence Centre at Songhkla. For the Malaysians, the 1970 agreement was a significant 
improvement in that for the very first time, joint military-police forces and command 
centres were now incorporated into the agreement – including the use of combat aircraft.375 
In itself, the inclusion of military forces in the 1970 agreement partially explained why the 
Malaysians were so eager to use conventional military means as the primary resort. The 
1970 agreement offered the prospect of blasting the CPM out of the border areas with 
heavy artillery and airpower. That assumption was proven false as the Second Emergency 
wore on into the late 1970s.   
 
Compared with the 1959 and 1965 agreements, the 1970 agreement elicited more 
systematic cooperation from the Thais. HQ Fifth Combined Communist Suppression Force 
was officially opened in Songkhla in May 1970. As joint commanders of the new local 
CSOC HQ, the Colonel of the Fifth Combined Army Regiment and the Superintendent of 
Zone Nine BPP had the authority to order operations without the approval of CSOC HQ in 
Bangkok.
376
 After his brief March 1970 visit to the Malaysian-Thai border provinces of 
Nakorn Sithammarat, Songkhla, Hat Yai, Betong, Yala and Pattani, Pritchard, the British 
Ambassador in Bangkok noted with extreme cautious optimism that: ‗Nobody gave the 
impression that the recent Thai-Malaysian border agreement, publicised as a major change 
in effective cooperation, had really altered anything. But the Thais do seem to have hoisted 
in the point that this is not solely a problem for Malaysia‘. 377  Pritchard‘s Australian 
colleagues drew similar, but more scathing conclusions. At a confidential Department of 
Defence briefing, the consensus was that the Thais gave ‗only lip service to cooperation‘ 
which was reflected by the fact that at least fifty percent of the Betong Salient remained 
under the control of the CPM.
378
  The main point for Malaysian frustration is the peculiar 
imbalance in the relationship between their respective security forces. The Malaysians were 
obliged to pass all their intelligence to the Thais but not vice versa. The decision to carry 
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out operations and the nature of the operations rested entirely with the Thais. Any 
unauthorised crossing of the border by Malaysian security forces and aircraft were treated 
with extreme sensitivity by the Thais and permission to cross generally arrived so late that 
the benefit of hot pursuit ‗has been either nullified or negated‘.379   
 
In 1970, the Malaysian government‘s COIN strategy rested, in theory at least, on a 
two-pronged approach – ‗the disruption and arrest of the infiltration process by the 
conventional military and police machine and by a combination of economic development 
and hearts and minds activity to neutralise the breeding grounds from which the 
communists hope to harvest support‘.380 The concept was later codified by the NSC within 
the KESBAN doctrine of 1980.
381
 In theory, all operations against the CPM were 
coordinated by a series of joint committees under the direction of the National Security 
Council (NSC).
382
  In practice, Malaysian military-police cooperation was plagued by the 
lack of coordination, inter-force jealousies and the lack of respect by the police for the 
army‘s operational abilities. 383  A PFF battalion (3 PFF) was under the operational 
command of HQ 6 Malaysian Infantry Brigade at Sungei Patani but remained under the 
command of PFF North Brigade at Ipoh – thus permission must be received from the latter 
before any redeployment could be carried out.
384
 The PFF Ulu Kinta Training Depot 
erected at a cost of RM30 million was the only training facility with an electric target range 
in Malaysia at that time but the army was forbidden by the police to use it.
385
  
 
Moreover, the thrust of the MAF‘s COIN strategy was based the military-centric 
concepts of ‗Framework Operation‘ and ‗Search and Destroy Operations‘ of CPM 
insurgents. The Framework Operation involved monitoring Orang Asli settlements; safe-
guarding vital targets such as hydropower stations, highway and transmitting stations; 
denial of supplies to CPM assault units; and checking the smuggling of controlled items 
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and infiltration along the border.
386
 Such a strategy harassed the CPM but did little to strike 
at the CPM‘s havens across the border or addressed the issues that the CPM exploited to 
garner support and boost their ranks. Moreover, the introduction of the NEP intended to 
reduce the economic disparities between the Chinese and Malay communities led to the 
practice of Malay advancement at the expense of the Chinese in employment and 
educational opportunities as well as government patronage.
387
 Such affirmative action 
grudgingly accepted by the Chinese business elite to preserve their continued interests 
might be resented by the poor Chinese whose grievances the CPM sought to exploit. Indeed, 
the Malaysian Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), Colonel Hassan admitted that the 
CPM had been able to exploit the race issue as a successful recruitment tool.
388
 By 1971, 
the government realised that the New Villages into which the Chinese squatters were 
settled during the First Emergency had been thus far neglected.
389
 Steps were therefore 
taken to bring the New Villages under closer government administration – which in theory 
was not very different from the British population-centric approach of the colonial COIN 
effort. 
 
Countermeasures were taken to put the theory of the joint civil-military and 
population-centric approach into practice – particularly in the state of Perak. On 25 
September 1971, a large joint military-police operation codenamed Operation Loyalty 
(Gerakan Setia) was launched to assess the size of the Communist threat in the Sungei 
Siput and Ulu Kinta areas of Perak – traditional strongholds where the CPM influence 
remained deeply rooted.
390
 The main aim, however, was to ‗take a strong government 
presence into areas where the government‘s influence was sufficiently weak as to enable the 
[CPM] to intimidate the local population with impunity‘.391 In order to cut the CPM off from 
its sympathisers and potential recruits, a blend of carrot and stick population control 
measures were imposed by the Perak State government as part of Operation Loyalty. They 
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included the fencing of villages, demolition and relocation of squatter houses, household and 
tenant registration, and tighter control over local food supplies. The authorities also pursued 
increased contacts with community leaders and appointed civil affairs officers who spoke 
the local village dialect to ascertain villagers‘ complaints. Temporary occupation licences to 
legalise squatting on unalienated land were also issued and smallholders were encouraged to 
switch to production of new cash crops in depressed areas.
392
  
 
In recognition that squatters cultivating tapioca in old tin tailings along the jungle 
fringes provided an ideal situation for the CPM to meet and recruit supporters, the Perak 
State government announced that it would release 4,000 acres of land in the Kuala 
Kangsar/Sungei Siput area. The State Development Corporation and private firms were also 
invited in to set up factories to process the tapioca.
393
 A hearts and minds campaign focusing 
on nine New Villages and their surrounding areas lent weight to these measures. A joint 
civil-security team of senior officers were tasked to ‗find out the needs and aspirations of the 
people‘ and ‗have a dialogue with community leaders‘.394 In addition additional forts will be 
established to protect the Orang Asli aborigines and cut off the CPM‘s escape routes.395 The 
Malaysian mass media was harnessed to impress upon the public that the Perak State 
Government was in charge rather than the military. In sum, the aim of Operation Loyalty 
was not so much to engage the CPM‘s armed units, but to disrupt the links between the 
CPM and its sympathisers, thus bringing the writ of the government back into a ‗black‘ 
area. 
 
Australian observers noted that these Malaysian government ‗carrot and stick‘ 
population control measures were ‗increasingly reminiscent of the last Emergency‘.396 As an 
example of what uncooperative ‗black‘ villages could come to expect, the village of Tanah 
Hitam was fenced off and put under curfew. In an address reminiscent of Templer during the 
First Emergency, Razak made it known to the inhabitants of Tanah Hitam that there were 
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communists and sympathisers amongst them and warned that unless they cooperated, the 
government would take action.
397
 The First Emergency-era practice of anonymous 
questionnaires and special post boxes was also readopted. Operation Loyalty began under a 
blanket 24 hour curfew during which questionnaires were handed out to the villagers with 
the option of either speaking securely to officers on operation or sending them to a special 
post box.
398
 To that end, 20,000 copies of the questionnaires in Malay, Chinese, Tamil and 
English were distributed amongst the 50,000 people of the area asking for information on: 
who and how supplies food and medicine to the CPM; location of CPM camps, supply 
dumps and courier posts; identity of couriers and propagandists; youths missing from their 
homes and jobs; and CPM movements and activities.
399
 The information received led to the 
arrest of several CPM cadres and sympathisers, arms and food dumps in the Chemor area, an 
abandoned camp and rest areas near Sungei Siput and more importantly – security forces 
were able to ascertain the methods used by the CPM to recruit the rural youth and Malays.
400
     
 
Drawing lessons from the First Emergency, the Malaysian government recognised 
that development and security should proceed hand in hand rather than in separate domains. 
The new philosophy advanced since 1970 was the objective of achieving national security 
(keselamatan) while pursuing development (pembangunan) or KESBAN.
401
 There was a 
realistic realisation by Razak that the ‗long-term answer to Malaysia‘s communal and 
communist problems lay in prosperity rather than in the police‘.402 Central to KESBAN 
was Razak‘s conviction that ‗only in circumstances of steadily-increasing prosperity can 
communism be defeated and the difficult task of bringing a sense of unity to the disparate 
communities of Malaysia be attempted.
403
 Even though KESBAN became only formalised 
as a directive in 1980, the ‗development as security‘ concept was adopted as the model and 
fleshed out both strategically and in operational terms from the early 1970s. At the 
operational level, there was now a common operations room at each centre from which both 
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development plans and security initiatives were controlled.
404
 Federal development schemes 
such as FELDA (for smallholder farms growing cash crops), RISDA (for rubber and oil 
plantations) and FELCRA (building of roads and highways) were actively implemented to 
improve the quality of life in the rural border areas.  
 
The concept was not much different from that instituted by Briggs and improved 
upon by Templer. FELDA was established under the pre-independence Land Development 
Act of 1956 to alleviate rural poverty through resettlement and its development role has 
remained relatively unscathed through the decades.
405
 Even with the introduction of 
KESBAN, FELDA‘s role remained as the rehabilitation of state land schemes development 
of land schemes with the approval of state government, and the rehabilitation, consolidation 
or development of alienated lands.
406
 Another lesson revisited was that it should be the 
responsibility of local officials to make contact with the people in their locality rather than 
the other way around. As for security, the security forces‘ new operational concept aimed to 
protect government officials by maintaining a wedge between CPM and the people.
407
 
Henceforth, the MAF took on a substantial role in providing aid and security to the various 
civil government agencies in instituting socioeconomic development projects in rural areas 
– particularly in the border areas.408  
 
In reality, putting concept into practice was extremely difficult. Military manpower 
was acutely overstretched from the strategic to the tactical level. In 1971, out of a total of 28 
infantry battalions, the MAF had to maintain eight infantry battalions on the Thai-Malaysian 
border and another eight in East Malaysia to deal with two separate Communist insurgencies 
– one against the CPM in West Malaysia and another against the North Kalimantan 
Communist Party in East Malaysia.
409
 By 1972, the entire MAF was fully committed to two 
different COIN actions within Malaysian territory separated by a distance of 600 kilometres 
at the nearest point. Forty percent of the MAF‘s operational air and ground units were 
involved in COIN operations in East Malaysia with the remaining operational committed 
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against CPM or undergoing retraining in COIN techniques.
410
 Faced with this multiplicity of 
demands, it was practically impossible to spare the men and time for the retraining required 
to improve the MAF units‘ specialist capability. Moreover, the programme of rapid 
expansion for both the army and the PFF (the main COIN paramilitary force) without 
adequate training resulted in a dilution of efficiency that could only be remedied by allowing 
more time for the new units to acquire the expertise needed.
411
 As such the federal 
government countermeasures were concentrated on rallying popular support against the 
communists and police actions ‗designed to improve intelligence and disrupt the activities of 
the Communist [insurgents] and isolate them from their supporters‘.412 
 
In sum, the main reasons behind the Malaysian forces‘ lack of progress from 1969 to 
1972 might be summarised as follows. First, a lack of information and support from the 
Chinese that itself reflected an undercurrent of communal tension. Second, a lack of an 
overall strategy that became particularly evident in joint operations. Third, indifferent Thai 
cooperation, which, although variable in extent, remained a serious issue. Fourth, the 
dilution of army efficiency by inadequate training and over-rapid expansion since 1969. And 
fifth and finally, core differences between army and police practice that resulted in the 
failure to implement standard COIN procedures for resettlement and food control.
413
 
 
Despite their expansion in both operational and organisational terms, in 1972 the 
Malaysian security forces stood little chance in gaining control of the border areas. That said, 
the CPM still lacked the capability to ‗expand their forces to the extent which would be 
necessary to change the present situation significantly‘.414 The Malaysian security forces 
were thus able to prevent the further expansion of the CPM threat within the Malaysian side 
of the border areas but unable to obtain the strategic initiative. The development strategy 
adopted at the national or grand strategic level promised better returns than kinetic military 
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force. Plans to turn the larger New Villages of Jelapang, Kamunting, Tanjong Malim, Lumut 
and Telok Anson in Perak into townships announced by Lim Keng Yaik, the Minister with 
Special Functions responsible for the New Villages in October 1972 offered the prospects of 
not only job opportunities to the rural masses but also better government administration of 
those areas.
415
 Since 1970, the Malaysian central government had adopted the ‗development 
as national security‘ model as the grand strategic template. Nonetheless, its implementation 
across states, districts, security services and government agencies required much resources 
and time to be implemented – a process that would continue well into the 1980s.  
 
The Singapore government faced different dilemmas from those of its Malaysian 
counterpart. In 1972, the CPM still lacking the capabilities to bring its armed struggle into 
the urban heartlands of Singapore had to contend with a strategic subversion campaign 
amplified by an occasional show of force in the form of booby trap bombs.  By late 1960s 
the CPM underground in Singapore was decimated and crippled by security action. With 
the CPM‘s leading cadres in Singapore either behind bars or withdrawn overseas, ISD 
disbanded its CPM section.
416
 S. Falle, British High Commissioner to Singapore in 1972 
observed that the ‗Chinese-Communist inclined Barisan Sosialis which [was] weak and ill-
organsied...[was] allowed to exist only in order to keep the supporters of the extreme left 
from having to go underground‘. 417  By that time, SEATO‘s Intelligence Assessment 
Committee considered the Singapore Police Force and ISD to be ‗well-trained, well 
equipped and capable of dealing effectively and efficiently with any Communist-inspired 
activity‘.418 The approach by the Singapore government was in principle similar to the 
‗stick and carrot‘ strategy of its Malaysian counterpart which differed only in certain 
operational aspects.  
 
The insignificant threat of urban insurgency reinforced by the confined physical 
limits of the island city state meant that any potential subversive threat within the 
metropolis would be much easier to spot and contain. In the absence of an urban insurgency, 
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the CPM threat was strictly dealt with by the internal security agencies thereby removing 
the pitfall of problems associated with the use of military force. Moreover, the close tabs 
kept by the authorities on potential subversive and student groups allowed swift action 
against any attempted civil disorder. More importantly, measures were taken to remove the 
conditions in which subversion could flourish.
419
 Major industrial projects to reduce 
joblessness, under-employment and to absorb future school-leavers and university 
graduates into the labour market were implemented.
420
 SEATO Intelligence concluded that 
‗provided that there is no serious decline in the economy, there is unlikely to be any 
increased popular inclination to support communist activities, which are likely to continue 
at a low level‘.421 In the assessment of George Wong, a British diplomat based in Singapore, 
Post-1965 Singapore offered:  
 
The man in the street the possibility of upward social mobility. The averaged 
Singaporean however poor, believes that with luck and hard work, he can 
improve his material well-being, or at least, the material well-being of his 
children. As long as such a belief persists, the attraction to the Marxist way of 
life can only be superficial.
422
 
 
In short, the most potent weapon of the Singaporean Government against communist 
subversion and ideology was sustained economic growth that provided the population with 
tangible prospects of social advancement and material well-being. As noted in the previous 
chapter, the CPM‘s propaganda struck an unexpected chord with a small section of the 
middle-class which ostensibly had much to lose under a Marxist state. The revival of the 
CPM subversive threat led to the reestablishment of the ISD CPM section in June 1974.
423
 
Nonetheless, the upsurge of the CPM‘s activities in Singapore must be viewed in the 
context of the CPM split that drove all three CPM factions to prove their revolutionary 
credentials and in the case of the main CPM – its leadership.  
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In Malaysia, the strategic stalemate in 1974 was broken by the high-profiled 
assassination of the IGP and the increase in revolutionary violence as all three CPM 
factions tried to outdo each other. In late October 1973, the fifty-six member 6 AU was 
detected moving south into Pahang from Perak. The CPM unit was tracked by PFF 69 (the 
Malaysian police SAS equivalent) through Cameron Highlands into the Raub area which it 
reached in late November.
424
 By then the security forces had considerable success in the 
discovery and removal of food dumps. During November/December 1973, the security 
forces uncovered 42 food dumps mainly in the Jerantut and Kuala Lipis area.
425
 The seizure 
of their food dumps and pressure from the security forces forced 6 AU to split up with 
elements withdrawing to the Slim River. Most of the Slim River group were later found to 
have died either from starvation or as a result of eating poisonous wild fruit.
426
 The 
scattered remnants of 6 AU went into hiding in Central Pahang and remained a limited 
local threat.
427
 Nonetheless, the CPM thrust into Central Pahang shook the Malaysian 
government into a vigorous response. The Malaysian Prime Minister and other Cabinet 
Ministers toured the country to instil a sense of urgency in the state administrations and 
breathe new life into the state security committees.
428
  
 
In early 1974, GOC 2
nd
 Division, Major General Ghazali bin Datuk Mohd Seth in 
conjunction with the Perak Special Branch, made an assessment of the principle CPM 
strongholds in Perak and identified an area of about 30,000 square metres adjacent to the 
notorious townships of Sungei Siput, Chemor and Tanjong Rambutan as the epicentre of 
CPM sittings. An operation was planned to surround the area and search it systematically 
square by square.
429
  This large-scale cordon and search operation that involved the 
Malaysian Army‘s 2nd Division and two PFF battalions was launched on 8 April 1974 as 
Operation Gonzales.
430
 The sheer size of the operation made the element of surprise 
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impossible. As a deception measure, Operation Gonzales was concealed under the guise of 
a ‗divisional exercise‘ as the three brigades of 2nd Division converged on their assembly 
areas near Taiping and Ipoh by road and rail.
431
 During the month-long operation, the 
security forces accounted for about a dozen insurgent kills, located two CPM camps and 
discovered documents containing details of CPM supply dumps as well as CPM and MNLF 
structures throughout Malaysia and Singapore at the cost of thirteen wounded men and a 
killed tracker dog.
432
 The main achievement of Operation Gonzales was however the 
improvement of military leadership at battalion, company and platoon levels that came with 
the required operational experience. 
 
The large-scale search and cordon Operation Gonzales and breaking up of 6 AU 
were operational successes in military terms but any real change in the strategic picture 
required more than just aggressive military action. The British High Commission in Kuala 
Lumpur advised that: 
 
Without minimising the careful preparation and skilful execution of Operation 
Gonzales...it is clear that the Malaysians have had an unusual run of good 
fortune in the past few months which must not be allowed to obscure their 
weaknesses, the most significant of which is the diminishing capacity of the 
MSB to acquire intelligence.
433
 
 
Indeed, the policy of according preferential treatment to ethnic Malays in government 
service continued to take its toll on the effectiveness of MSB. The Director of MSB was 
assessed by the British High Commissioner to Malaysia to be a ‗well connected Malay 
officer who is clearly not up to the exacting demands of this post‘. 434  As the Second 
Emergency wore on into its sixth year, the failure to bring MSB back to the level of 
efficiency that it was renowned for during the First Emergency was a impediment to any 
real progress. Hence, the authorities could only rely on a military-centric approach that 
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harassed and applied pressure on the CPM but not quite enough to tilt the strategic initiative 
in favour of the government side. 
 
The Persistence of Conventional Force and Incremental Reform of the Security 
Services (1975-1977) 
 
The heightened violence of the CPM and its dissident factions needed containment. This 
came in the form of increased curfew and search operations in the New Villages and CPM 
hotspots – particularly between late 1975 and early 1976. In an operation personally 
directed by the Deputy IGP, Serdang Baru, a New Village just ten miles south of the 
Malaysian capital was put under an eight-and-a-half hour curfew as 1,270 police officers 
searched 2,550 houses and vehicles, screened 5,110 people and detained forty-three 
suspects.
435
 As part of Operation Nisbah, an operation to flush out communist sympathisers, 
subversive elements and criminals, a 180-strong police party led by the CPO Senior 
Assistant Commissioner detained 109 people in a pre-dawn curfew and search swoop on 
Penjom New Village.
436
 Since the police would be at the forefront of such operations, 
considerable effort was undertaken to boost morale and recruitment of the Malaysian police 
force – particularly the RELA armed auxiliary. Plans were announced to expand RELA 
from a force of 200,000 in March 1976 to 500,000 by the end of the same year as well as 
the provision of modern weapons, insurance and death gratuity schemes for its members.
437
 
As for the PFF, two key changes were made. One was an extensive re-equipment 
programme intended to equip the PFF units with modern weapons, vehicles and radios. The 
other was a change in service terms whose goal was to dispel the ‗feeling of being the poor 
relations of the [MAF]‘ thereby improving morale and efficiency among frontline men.438 
As of mid-1976, in addition to the MAF, PFF, MSB and regular police, the Malaysian 
security apparatus included a substantial auxiliary element of 500,000 RELA village militia, 
Area Security Units (ASU) of platoon-sized auxiliary police which supported regular 
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security forces within the confines of their own states, and, finally, the Rukun Tetangga 
vigilante corps for which all adult males were required to register and respond when called 
up for duty.
439
 
 
 The discovery of a large CPM camp with a system of underground tunnels that 
could hold up to 500 insurgents in the Gubir border area led to the launch of Operation 
Gubir II on 14 April 1976 to capture the location.
440
 A large cordon was put around the 
CPM camp prior to air strikes by Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) Tebuan COIN jet 
aircraft and F5E fighter jets on 21 April. The airstrikes formed part of a ‗locate, cordon, 
bomb and hope to catch the survivors on their way‘ out tactic that replaced the previous 
‗locate, cordon and assault on foot‘ tactic that had caused too many booby-trap casualties 
and high levels of stress among patrols.
441
 During the course of Operation Gubir II, 3,000 
bobby traps were found to be planted around camp which accounted for most of the twelve 
deaths and nineteen injuries sustained by the security forces in the operation.
442
 Three of 
the booby-trap casualties were sustained by a commando team airlifted in by helicopter to 
confirm the location of the camp - which had been evacuated by the time of the 
commandos‘ arrival.443 Fearing the adverse impact on morale, the Malaysian authorities 
censored press coverage of the constant flow of reports about booby-trap casualties. 
Publicity was instead diverted to police activities such as curfews and police operations in 
the Negri Sembilan/Pahang border areas.
444
 To be sure, the CPM‘s ‗Vietcong‘ booby-trap 
tactics exacted a huge psychological toll on the security forces. The fear of being killed or 
incapacitated by the unseen booby-trap led to a more cautious approach by the security 
forces in a negative way. The ‗locate, cordon and assault on foot‘ approach gave way to an 
even more conservative and firepower-heavy ‗locate, cordon, bomb and hope to catch the 
survivors on their way‘ mindset. 
 
                                                 
439
 Ibid. 
440
 Sharon Bin Hashim , The Malaysian Army’s Battle Against Communist Insurgency in Peninsula Malaysia 
1968-1989, 154 
441
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 15/2161, Monthly Security Round-up April 1976, British 
High Commission Kuala Lumpur, 10 May 1976. 
442
 Sharon Bin Hashim , The Malaysian Army’s Battle Against Communist Insurgency in Peninsula Malaysia 
1968-1989, 154 
443
 FCO 15/2161, Monthly Security Round-up April 1976. 
444
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 15/2161, Monthly Security Round-up May 1976, British 
High Commission Kuala Lumpur, 14 June 1976. 
156 
 
 Operation Gubir II achieved few tangible results to justify all the MAF‘s resources 
and efforts put into the operation. The increase in the tempo of helicopter operations in the 
border area had alerted the insurgents who were able to react effectively. During the course 
of operations, an RMAF S61 helicopter was shot down by small arms fire in the Ulu Muda 
forest reserve that resulted in the death of eleven security forces members.
445
 During the 
one and a half month operation that ended on June 2 1976, a total of four CPM insurgents 
were killed at a significant cost in both human casualties and treasure.
446
 Moreover, the 
termination of the operation was determined by the operational requirements of the 
Malaysian security forces but a reflection of the unhappy state of affairs in Thai-Malaysian 
relations. Alleged violations of Thai territory by Malaysian security forces led to the 
termination of the 1971 Thai-Malaysian Border Agreement and withdrawal of 378 PFF and 
21 MSB personnel from the Betong Salient on 7 June 1976.
447
 The major significance was 
not the withdrawal of the PFF ‗who really achieved nothing operationally significant‘, but 
the loss of MSB intelligence cover in the Betong Salient and the ‗possible granting to the 
CPM of the Liberated Areas‘ - a secure base to from which to spread and retire at will.448 
Since the revival of the CPM‘s armed struggle in 1968, one of the impediments to any 
effective response by the Malaysian Government was the inability to crack the CPM 
strongholds in Southern Thailand. A concerted joint Thai-Malaysian response was even 
more elusive in 1976 than it was in 1968.     
 
A slew of unilateral security measures were implemented by the Malaysians to 
compensate for the lack of joint operations in the border areas. As part of Operation Kota 
they included the flooding of the Temenggor Dam and the establishment of a defensive line 
along the constructed East/West Highway as physical barriers to deny the CPM its favoured 
infiltration routes.
449
  The East-West Highway linear defence line was conceptualised as a 
series of dug-in platoon locations at one kilometre intervals backed by fixed fire-support 
bases. Together with the flooded Temenggor Dam and the mining of certain border areas, 
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these defensive positions blocked the CPM‘s main infiltration routes, thereby potentially 
channelling the CPM infiltrators into designated kill zones.
450
 In addition to this corralling 
effect, the MAF believed that as the CPM probed for gaps, the necessary built-up of supply 
dumps in support of such missions would enhance the likelihood of contacts and planned 
ambushes.
451
 Instead of intensive jungle patrolling, the preferred security force tactic 
became the saturation area ambush with battalions operating in platoon to four-men section 
groups in likely areas of infiltration or known mass contact areas. In theory, these groups 
could detect and intercept infiltrators while also obviating the ‗possibility of reinforcements 
being ambushed‘. 452  The increased reliance of field commanders on a ‗Maginot Line‘ 
strategy to contain the border infiltration threat in place of aggressive foot-patrols stemmed 
primarily from the requirement to reduce the incidence of booby-trap casualties.
453
 It also 
reflected the limited options available in the absence of Thai cooperation. The linear static 
defences did force CPM infiltrators to seek more difficult routes across the border but could 
not in themselves significantly change the direction of the conflict. Not a single tactical 
success was reported for the month of September 1976 which in many ways represented the 
static progress of the MAF for the July to October 1976 period.
454
  
 
Since June 1976, the ‗we are a country at war‘ theme became the norm in public 
speeches and media appearances by political and military leaders. As a corollary, the nation 
was warned not to expect too much in the form of material benefit from the recently 
promulgated Third Five Year Plan as all government resources needed to be ‗diverted to the 
fight against the communists in order to ensure a quick victory‘.455 1976 was the year in 
which Malaysian Prime Minister Hussein Onn gave the security situation the highest 
priority. Ample provision was made in the Third Five Year Plan for the expansion of the 
police by 20,000, the increase in numbers being facilitated by a substantial across-the-board 
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pay increase.
456
 Efforts were made to improve the efficiency of MSB by a change of 
directors including the appointment of an experienced Chinese deputy. The establishment 
of a new Border Brigade Headquarters to coordinate police aspects of border and trans-
border operations together with PFF actitivities in Kedah-Perlis-Penang was also 
planned.
457
 
 
In contrast to the military, the police enjoyed considerable success in its operations 
against the communist underground. In Kuala Lumpur, 28,463 people were questioned over 
a two month period in which forty CPM underground cadres were arrested and weapons 
and subversive literature seized.
458
 In Perak, police operations were stepped up in an 
attempt to forestall further attempted assassinations of prominent security personnel by 
known agents of the MNLF.
459
 In Sungei Patani, a successful operation resulted in the 
arrest of eight out of nine members of an underground cell that was responsible for the 
blowing up of a railway line, rocket attacks and planting of communist flags in the area for 
the past year.
460
 Large scale police cordon and search operations were carried out in Ipoh, 
Grik and various areas of Southern Pahang and Negri Sembilan with considerable success – 
particularly in Negri Sembilan where up to some 150 suspected members of the MPLL and 
MNLF were detained in a widely dispersed area covering Jelebu, Kuala Pilah and Port 
Dickson.
461
 
 
These operational successes were clearly the result of the priority accorded to the 
reform of the police and MSB. Nevertheless, the strategy of the Malaysian Government 
was at this point largely focused on the containment of the CPM threat through a system of 
urban vigilante patrols, tenant registration and sweep and search operations.
462
 Taken 
together these measures checked the movements of the communist underground forcing the 
cells to break up and remain constantly on the move. According to the British High 
Commissioner, it also compelled the underground ‗for the moment to withdraw its 
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aggressive horns and concentrate on subversion‘. 463  A major strategic breakthrough, 
however, required more than the defensive ‗sweep, search‘ strategy that typified the 
Malaysian COIN approach for 1976.  Even so, by December 1976, the Malaysian police 
had consolidated its operational successes, further penetrating the communist underground 
and disrupting the Communists‘ intelligence network through the constant pressure of 
police action.
464
  
 
From 1975-1977, Operation Planet resulted in the rounding up of eighty-six alleged 
members of the MNLL including the ‗Plen‘ group - the elite of the CPM underground 
structure responsible for the specific task of infiltrating the upper echelons of the Malaysian 
community.
465
 The degree of MSB penetration and the arrest of 466 alleged MNLF 
members and the substantial disruption to the MNLF infrastructure including vital courier 
routes was a serious cause of concern for the CPM.
466
 Arguably the greatest boost to public 
confidence was the arrest of two MPLL members who confessed to the November 1975 
assassination of the Chief Police Officer of Perak and that of the IGP in Kuala Lumpur in 
June 1974.
467
 In towns where police action had been successful and police competence 
demonstrated, it became increasingly commonplace for members of the public to proffer 
information of high security value.
468
 The recent growth in the number of Chinese MSB 
officers undoubtedly contributed to the organisation‘s success in disrupting the CPM‘s 
underground structure.
469
 Yet these recent successes concealed a structural problem, 
namely, the need to replace the senior Chinese MSB officers – many of whom were 
veterans of the First Emergency and approaching retirement age by 1977. Many of the 
Chinese MSB officers were overstretched or replaced by Malay officers who lacked both 
the language skills and ‗inherent understanding to effectively among the Chinese 
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Community‘.470 The IGP‘s solution to the problem was to concentrate his Chinese expertise 
in units directly concerned with the communist threat.
471
 
 
In addition to police operations targeting the CPM underground, the security forces 
were committed to three continuing operations: Operation Ukor (the protection of a Thai 
Border Survey team, usually by the PFF), Operation Kota (a linear defence operation to 
detect and deter CPM incursions into Peninsular Malaysia) and Operation Hentam (the 
harassing of all resident CPM groups in Peninsular Malaysia).
472
 Despite the lack of 
progress in penetrating the CPM strongholds, the MAF‘s linear defence strategy 
ameliorated the deleterious ‗booby-trap effect‘ and boosted the morale of the security 
forces. The sealing of the Temenggor Dam and the failure of the CPM to disrupt 
construction of the Dam and East-West Highway increased the confidence of the security 
forces in their ability to protect federal development projects throughout Peninsular 
Malaysia. In time, the new ports planned for Johor Bahru and Kuantan and the Federal 
Highway and Karak Highway projects proceeded without any significant degree of CPM 
interference.
473
 The completion of these federal projects, particularly in the Northern states, 
were crucial to the economic development of those areas and would, in turn, undermine the 
capability of the resident CPM groups in those areas.   
 
The change of Thai Prime Minister in the aftermath of the 6 October 1976 military 
coup was another positive change – at least for the Malaysian state. The problem of the 
CPM bases in Southern Thailand was appreciated by Prime Minister Tanin Kraivixien‘s 
anti-communist right-wing government. As a result, hopes were rekindled of the restoration 
of hot pursuit rights into Thai territory and more effective joint COIN operations in 
Southern Thailand.
474
 Soon after the formation of the Tanin administration, an agreement 
was reached to mount a series of joint operations against CPM sanctuaries in the border 
area – although the revised Border Agreement was not formally signed until 4 March 
1977.
475
 A major event in January 1977 was the launch, execution and conclusion of 
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Operation Daoyai Musnah (Big Star) against the CPM (RF) in east Sadao.
476
 The joint 
Thai-Malaysian operation involving some 3,500 troops began on 14 January in an area 
fifteen miles northwest of Padang Besar, a border town on the Perlis-Thai border in the 
Sadao district of Songkhla province.
477
 Lasting a full month, it was a conventional 
‗blocking‘ operation that relied on airstrikes and artillery fire to flush out the insurgents 
from known bases before the follow-up search and destroy mission.  
 
During the operation two large camps and ten smaller ones were located and 
destroyed. Large quantities of ammunition, explosives and both CPM and CPT literature 
were also recovered.
478
 As with previous similar operations, most of the insurgents flushed 
out simply moved on to another area. Only one insurgent body was recovered by the Thai-
Malaysian security forces in the course of the operation. On the other hand, the Malaysian 
security forces suffered one killed in action (KIA) and another eight wounded in action 
(WIA) casualties – all by booby traps. 479  Until the threat of booby-traps could be 
sufficiently countered, if not neutralised, air and artillery strikes followed by search and 
destroy sweeps (well after the insurgents had fled) were still the preferred means of coming 
to grips with the enemy. The underlying significance of Operation Big Star lay not in the 
operational realm but in the signature of a new Thai-Malaysian Border Agreement that 
allowed the operation. This opened the way for future joint operations in Thai territory. In 
fact, Operation Big Star was carried out at the request of the Thais rather than on the 
initiative of the Malaysians.
480
 The Thais, however, faced a chronic shortage of available 
troops with the requisite operational capacity to deploy in the border area.
481
 Nonetheless, 
even though few joint ventures were likely in the short-term, Operation Big Star heralded a 
new era of improved Thai-Malaysian security cooperation.  
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A further operation involving 3,000 Malaysian and 2,000 Thai security forces 
codenamed Operation Daoyai Musnah (Big Star) II was launched on 14 March 1977, again 
in the Sadao district against the CPM (RF).
482
  The conventional search, cordon and clear 
operation led to the discovery of eighteen major CPM (RF) camps and a single insurgent 
killed.
483
 Again, the significance of Operation Big Star II did not derive from a spectacular 
success in the field but, rather, from the visible improvement in Thai-Malaysian 
cooperation. Operation Big Star II witnessed the first combined coordinated airstrikes by 
the RMAF and RTAF in Thai territory.
484
 The operation further demonstrated the 
determination of the MAF to refine techniques and establish operating procedures for 
further joint operations against the more formidable CPM forces in the Betong Salient.
485
 
Operation Big Star II also uncovered rubber estates, a tin mine and a heroin laboratory that 
the CPM RF were using to finance their activities.
486
 Having been left largely unmolested 
by the Bangkok government since the completion of its long march into Southern Thailand 
in 1960, the CPM had set up parallel socio-economic infrastructures that confirmed its 
existence as a state within a state in the Southern Thai provinces. The presence of such a 
large Thai presence in Operation Big Star II was an official signal that the Thai government 
would no longer tolerate the existence of the CPM micro-states within its borders. 
 
On the surface, both Big Star operations appeared to have disrupted the training and 
base areas of the CPM (RF). MSB, however, was bitterly disappointed by the failure of the 
operation to destroy a substantial part of the CPM (RF), which it blamed on inadequate 
intelligence and lack of operational security.
487
 In both Big Star operations, the objectives 
of the security forces were known to the insurgents. In fact, during Operation Big Star II, a 
copy of the Malaysian Operational Order in Thai was discovered in a CPM (RF) camp, 
suggesting a leak from Thai sources.
488
 Both operations were so reliant on the ‗American 
sledge-hammer approach of using artillery, air strikes and gun-ships [that] one might 
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question whether the aim was to move the [insurgents] rather than to confront them‘.489 
Within weeks of the conclusion of the Big Star operations in mid-April, the Headquarters 
Group of the CPM (RF) was reported to have returned to its former operational area.
490
 By 
mid-June, CPM (RF) was assessed by MSB to have ‗returned at full strength to their old 
areas.
491
 Any chances of building upon the apparent operational success very much 
depended on the Thai government‘s ability to control the border areas - which seemed 
unlikely with the withdrawal of troops at the end of both operations.  
 
For all that, as we have seen, the true import of the Big Star operations was difficult 
to measure in strictly military terms. It was better gauged in the political gains that allowed 
both operations to take place as well as the opportunities it presented to iron out Thai-
Malaysian differences in tactics, command and control and liaison procedures. Of 
significant political note was that both operations were the first Thai-Malaysian joint 
operations that involved the MAF as opposed to the PFF across the border.
492
 In short, the 
Big Star operations were the precursor to future joint operations of increasing scale, 
intensity and effectiveness. The Revised Agreement on Border Cooperation signed in 
March 1977 led to the revival of the Malaysian-Thai Regional Border Committee which 
reconvened in Penang in June 1977. Major points agreed during the meeting were the 
definition of the common enemy as well as the development of command and control and 
standard operating procedures for future joint operations. The regional border committee 
reiterated that it was only mandated to act against the common enemy defined as the 
‗Communist Terrorist, be he Muslim, Buddhist or Christian‘ (which specifically excluded 
the Muslim irredentists). 
493
 HQ 2
nd
 Malaysian Division and HQ 5
th
 Royal Thai Army 
Division were designated as Combined Task Force Headquarters (CTFHQ). In order to 
ensure effective communications, both Headquarters were to be linked by a system of 
military communication and liaison staff.
494
 A review of both Big Star operations by the 
committee led to a cognisance of the need for standard operating procedures and a 
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combined standing operating procedure for border operations was to be formulated for 
further joint operations.
495
  
 
July 1977 witnessed two simultaneous joint trans-border operations – Operation 
Cahaya Bena (Sacred Ray) I and Operation Sacred Ray II. Sacred Ray I was launched in 
the Betong Salient with the Malaysians (targeting the 1
st
 District of the CPM in South 
Eastern Betong as well as elements of the CPM (ML) in the west and south western part of 
the salient. For their part, the Thais were to operate against the CPM 3
rd
 District in the north 
and CPM supporters and sympathisers in the urban areas.
496
 Operation Sacred Ray II was 
directed against the 10
th
 Regiment of the CPM in Weng district with the Thais operating in 
the north and the towns whilst the Malaysians pushed north from the border.
497
 As in the 
case of the earlier Big Star joint operations, the fear of booby-trap casualties led to the 
reliance on airstrikes and artillery fire to flush out the insurgents from known bases before 
the follow-up search and destroy operation characterised by a slow ground advance. 
General Ibrahim, Chief of Armed Forces (CAFS), privately admitted his ‗reluctance to 
order his troops into the attack against prepared dug, booby trapped positions for fear of the 
morale problem which this would engender‘.498  
 
The substantial delay between the Big Star and Sacred Ray operations provided the 
CPM and CPM (ML) an opportunity to prepare their positions against the initial aerial and 
artillery bombardment and refine their break-up plans that would see them disperse into the 
deep jungle with sufficient supplies to outlast any government operation.
499
 In an 
assessment of the four major joint operations, Major Oakden, the British Defence Advisor 
in Kuala Lumpur drew the conclusion: ‗we fear, however, that as far as the will to strike 
exists the CT booby-trap has won, and will continue to win, the day‘.500 In a statement 
reminiscent of similar failures by American ground forces to make contact with the 
Vietcong guerrillas at the end of a massive aerial/artillery bombardment, the Malaysian 
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force commander of Operation Sacred Ray remarked: ‗the CTs appeared to have melted 
into the countryside‘.501 
 
The task of dislodging over 2,000 well-trained insurgents protected by layers of 
booby-traps from sanctuaries which had been occupied since 1955 was a daunting 
challenge for a Thai-Malaysian joint force hampered by its need to make allowances for 
certain political sensitivities. The improvement in Thai-Malaysian relations permitted 
Malaysian troops to be stationed in Southern Thailand, but only on short operational tours 
‗as and when requested by the Thais‘.502 A Malaysian proposal to leave a single battalion in 
Betong to guard the civilian population at the end of operations was rejected as ‗politically 
unacceptable‘ by the Thai government.503 The Thais recognised that the villagers must be 
protected but had neither the manpower nor money in the Southern provinces to implement 
such a policy.
504
 Stretched with operations against the CPT in other parts of Thailand, in the 
circumstances, the Thai Armed Forces could do little other than allow the Malaysians to 
undertake operations in Southern Thailand ‗on an unprecedented scale‘.505 The inability of 
the Thais to leave behind enough troops or police at the end of operations to ensure the 
protection of the villagers and the politically unacceptable long-term presence of Malaysian 
security forces meant that the locals frequently felt unable to come out in support of the 
government for fear of reprisals when the CPM returned.   
 
Despite MSB‘s impressive successes against the communist underground, the pro-
Malay policies of the Malaysian government played into the CPM‘s propaganda line of 
upholding Chinese rights – particularly among the young Malaysian Chinese.506 Similar to 
the experience of the First Emergency, the challenge of winning over the young Chinese 
was a battle that the government could not afford to lose. The pre-KESBAN 1975-1977 
period was in many ways similar to that of 1950 in the First Emergency. Both witnessed the 
climax of communist violence and the seeding of concepts that would later turn the 
strategic tide in the government‘s favour. During the First Emergency, the Brigg‘s Plan laid 
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the foundations for a comprehensive strategy that integrated the relevant civil-military 
agencies across all levels and essentially secured the population from the reach of the MCP. 
Equally, the efforts of the Malaysian government to bring development into the northern 
border states, thus addressing the grievances of the rural population were not much 
different from those of the Emergency years. The main difference lies in the available 
resources. Whereas Briggs and later Templer drew on the resources of the British Empire 
and its Commonwealth (up to 300,000 in security personal alone), for much of the Second 
Emergency, the Malaysian government had only the full strength of a division with the 
rotation of various brigades. Additionally, the Malaysians had a much trickier problem of a 
cross-border insurgency. 
 
In Singapore, rapid economic growth was the most effective tool against CPM 
subversion. Encouraged by its sweeping victory in the December 1976 elections, the PAP 
government seized the opportunity to detain those who have had contact with communists, 
including those who might not necessarily be supporters of violent revolution.
507
 The group 
of pro-communist intellectuals arrested in February 1977 were all subsequently released 
after recantations of their pro-communist activities.
508
 The British High Commission in 
Singapore was ‗persuaded that by its tough measures the government will have done much 
to deter others of leftist leanings from becoming involved in communist subversion‘.509 In 
March 1977, Goh Keng Swee, Singapore‘s Defence Minister described the three lines of  
defence against communism as economic development, police intelligence and the 
Armed Forces.
510
 The 166 Community Centres (CCs) run by the People‘s Association 
(PA) provided recreational facilities, disseminated information on policies, and acted as 
an advance warning system for the monitoring of local grievances.
511
 At the constituency 
level, Citizen Consultative Committees (CCCs) were created to address the grievances of 
residents living in the public housing estates that housed seventy-seven percent of 
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Singapore‘s population.512 In short, the CCs and the CCCs acted as the eyes and ears of 
the government and a channel of communication at the grassroots level that was 
effectively used to consolidate support for the PAP government at the expense of the BS 
and the CPM.  
 
By the late 1970s, the blistering pace of Singapore‘s economic growth had all but 
nullified the effects of CPM propaganda on the urban masses. The Singaporean 
government authorities‘ use of the mass media to remind the public of the serious extent 
of the CPM threat and what they stood to lose – including the use of public confessions 
over television became an effective tool in the containment of communist subversion. 
The contrast between the highly politicised communist subversives and the political ly 
apathetic Singaporean masses upon which the future of the non-communist system 
depended could not have been more glaring.
513
 By 1977, the CPM threat in Singapore 
was reduced to limited incidents of clandestine subversion. Of the sixty-one prisoners 
detained without trial in 1977, ten were held briefly and released after televised 
confessions to having had ‗sympathies for Euro-Communists‘.514 Complete elimination 
of such a threat, however, depended on events in Peninsular Malaysia, Southern 
Thailand and Beijing – geographical areas beyond Singapore‘s limited jurisdiction.  
 
Turning the Tide (1978 – 1981)  
 
Ironically, the operational successes of the MSB and police against the communist 
underground had turned it into a force to be reckoned with as its remaining hard-core 
members grew increasingly desperate.
515
 By 1978, the police had been sufficiently 
expanded to secure much of Peninsular Malaysia, even in the deep mountain-jungle of 
Northern Perak where the Orang Asli aborigines live. During the First Emergency, jungle 
forts from which medical supplies, food, paid work, and tools could be offered to win over 
the Orang Asli who were subject to MCP pressure provided the colonial security forces 
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with vital support and information.
516
 The first Orang Asli Senoi Praaq unit was created in 
1956 under the colonial administration to counter the MCP‘s influence over the Orang Asli 
settlements. Not only was the Senoi Praaq force retained by the Malaysian government, 
both its size and role were further expanded to include operations against the MRLA 
beyond the borders of Malaysia proper.
517
 In fact, one of the biggest ongoing operational 
contribution was the PFF‘s unilateral Operation Bamboo – operating from a series of jungle 
forts in Perak and Kelantan, the PFF aimed to counter the subversion efforts of the CPM on 
the Orang Asli and disrupt the CPM‘s infiltration routes from Southern Thailand.518 The 
establishment of the Kroh HQ as the training centre and the HQ for all three Senoi Praaq 
PFF battalions was a positive sign that government efforts in winning over the loyalty of 
the Orang Asli as well as the conversion of former CPM Orang Asli recruits and trackers to 
the government‘s cause were bearing fruit.519 
 
When the formal press announcement was made in February 1978 that the Senoi 
Praaq PFF was to be expanded to three battalions, 19 PFF and 20 PFF had become 
operational with the formation of 21 PFF well underway.
520
  In the Fort Kemar area 
(founded by 22 SAS in 1952), the state government of Perak had built a school and clinic 
administered by the Orang Asli hospital sited at Gombak which allowed for them to 
‗wander off into the jungle if the spirit so moves them‘.521 In the neutral mountain-jungle 
home of the Orang Asli, the security forces rather than the CPM were beginning to emerge 
as the dominant force that translated into the expansion of the Senoi Praaq force and 
separation of the CPM from the Orang Asli population.
522
 When out on patrol, the Senoi 
Praaq troopers, who rarely failed to make contact, would often return with a bagful of 
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hands, heads or ears ‗as proof of a kill‘.523 The feats of the Senoi Praaq force as trackers 
and jungle warriors were an essential contribution to the Malaysian government‘s security 
and intelligence apparatus and a tactical determining factor – particularly when army units 
were employed in a static defensive role with the Senoi Praaq positioned behind them in a 
sweep mode.
524
 At the squadron level, Senoi Praaq patrols probed deep into Southern 
Thailand in search of insurgents who had eluded security further south penetrating 
anywhere between five and twenty-five miles depending upon the Border Agreement at that 
particular time.
525
  
 
However successful the Senoi Praaq might have been at tactical cross-border 
actions, any significant change in the strategic picture depended on more lasting 
improvements in Thai-Malaysian cooperation. By 1978 the tempo and quality of Thai-
Malaysian cooperation began to improve considerably. April 1978 was to mark a new 
phase in joint Thai-Malaysian operations.
526
 Under the auspices of the Selamat-Samadee 
series of joint operations, continuous operations were conducted from April 24, 1978 to 
July 5 1980 in the Betong salient, Kroh and Banding in Northern Perak.
527
  To begin with, a 
joint command post exercise under the joint directorship of Major General Datuk Jamil, 
GOC 2
nd
 Division Malaysia and Lieutenant General Jen Pin, GOC Thai Fourth Army 
Region at Ban Kok Liang, South of Haadyai was carried out to test the feasibility of the 
revised standing operational procedures for future joint operations through the practice of 
staff work at all levels and the highlighting of differences.
528
 On the eve of the 23
rd
 General 
Border Committee which took place in Kuala Lumpur from 26-28 April, a small joint 
operation was announced involving a battalion from each side supported by a Malaysian 
artillery battery in the Betong Salient.
529
 The operation was publicised as the first of several 
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short, sharp military thrusts to prevent the CPM from regaining its strongholds and a shift 
from the ‗1977 sledgehammer technique‘.530  
 
The first phase was launched on 24 April 1978 against the CPMML in the west of 
the Betong Salient particularly against the 25
th
 Company.
531
 In June 1978, Operation 
Selamat-Samadee moved into the crucial second phase to be conducted in the South and 
Southeast of the Betong Salient.
532
 During this period, a small scale joint operation targeted 
the 3
rd
 Combat Company of 12 Regiment – widely considered to be the toughest nut in the 
CPM.
533
 Two companies of Malaysian Rangers and one company from the Thai army 
entered from the north and swept south towards a squadron of MSSR and a battalion of 
PFF. Company positions designed to dominate the sector while inhibiting insurgent 
movement and disrupting food collection were also established.
534
 The fact that the security 
forces suffered between forty to seventy booby-trap casualties as a result of the operation 
demonstrated their willingness to close with the enemy despite the booby-trap threat.
535
 
Nonetheless, such was the prevalence and proliferation of the ‗CT booby-trap‘ fear that 
more often, operations continued to be preceded by artillery and air strikes to ‗soften up‘ 
both the insurgents and their booby traps.
536
 By the end of 1978, the original Operation 
Selamat-Sawadee had ground to a stalemate situation. On 4 February 1979, a new initiative, 
Operation Selamat-Sawadee 792 which was essentially three joint Thai-Malaysian 
operations against the CPMRF in Sadao District (subsequently expanded to include Special 
District E of the CPM; against the 4
th
 Company of the CPMML and 7
th
 Platoon of the 12
th
 
Regiment (CPM) in the north-east of Betong; and against the CPMML‘s 25th Company was 
launched in Southern Thailand.
537
  
 
When the 34
th
 Regional Border Committee Meeting took place in Penang on 16 
October to assess the results of the original Operation Selamat-Samadee, the notable figure 
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was not the eleven killed and six surrendered insurgents or even the twenty-four camps, 
five resting places and ten food dumps that were uncovered, but the considerable size of the 
Thai delegation that included twenty-one representatives led by Lieutenant General Pin 
Dhamsri, Commander, 4
th
 Royal Thai Army.
538
  The marked improvement in Thai-
Malaysian cooperation however resulted in the unintended consequence of closer 
cooperation between the CPM and the CPT - including the exchange of CPM booby-trap 
expertise for Thai-supplied weapons.
539
 The development clearly pointed toward the 
increasing effectiveness of joint Thai-Malaysian cooperation which was making a 
significant strategic impact on the cross-border situation. Despite the limited civilian and 
military resources of the Thai government in its Southern States, Thai-Malaysian border 
cooperation against the CPM was now run on smaller, more efficient, and realistic lines.
540
 
By October 1978, the PFF could boast a detachment of seventy parachutists – all trained in 
Thailand under the direction of the Royal Thai Police.
541
 
 
Any genuine strategic shift depended on much more than the containment of the 
CPM‘s armed units. The real achievement of the Malaysian government was the creation of 
the so-called ‗KESBAN Belt‘ that ultimately turned the once ‗black areas‘ dominated by 
the CPM into a thriving development zone.  The KESBAN Belt covered 358 square miles 
in an area fifteen miles south of the Malaysia-Thailand border from the state of Perlis to 
Kelantan in which all socio-economic development projects fell under the responsibility of 
the National KESBAN Committee which in turn was directly responsible to the NSC.
542
 
Between 1981 and 1990, a total of about 786 projects were implemented within the 
KESBAN belt that included infrastructural development, upgrading of agricultural 
productivity, educational development, housing for the rural poor and construction of dams 
/hydroelectric plants.
543
 Many of these were ‗quick impact projects‘ designed to uplift the 
socio-economic standards and welfare of the rural communities through the provision of 
immediate tangible benefits.
544
 Within the KESBAN Belt, the Malaysian government 
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started an ‗agricultural revolution‘ that promoted rubber, oil, palm, and paddy cultivation 
among the rural population as well as the construction of the Temenggor and Pedu 
hydroelectric dams which to power the light industries that would process the cash crops 
and create employment in the rural areas.
545
 The development projects represented the 
Internal Development or IDEV aspect of KESBAN designed to remove the causes or 
potential causes of popular discontent by visible measures of political, economic and social 
progress.
546
  
 
The IDEV arm of KESBAN was complemented by the Internal Security or IS arm 
of the security forces. As part of the KESBAN strategy, both the MAF and the police 
worked to create a secure environment in which the KESBAN development projects could 
be carried out without any CPM interference.
547
 The presence of security forces along the 
East-West Highway and enclose proximity to the construction sites had enabled the civil 
agencies to complete the various socio-economic projects under the KESBAN scheme.
548
 
The security forces also carried out strike operations on specific targets based on accurate 
intelligence. Additional roles included provision of medical and dental services by the 
medical corps, troop participation in community self-help programmes and construction of 
minor engineering projects.
549
 By the time of KESBAN‘s formal implementation in 1980, 
the development focused and population-centric strategy had worked in winning over the 
confidence of many Orang Asli and rural communities living in the border areas. This 
concept of operations represents the final apotheosis of Malaysian‘s post-colonial COIN 
approach that would eventually endure until the end of the Second Emergency in 1989.  
 
The refinement of KESBAN into a population-centric approach designed to win the 
confidence of the rural communities was not much different from Briggs Plan or the 
development schemes of Templer. There were certainly shifts in the local, regional and 
international contexts but both the colonial and post-colonial governments had to grapple 
with their respective insurgencies within the inter-connected quadrant of: utility of 
military force, civil-military relations, population security, and propaganda. Despite 
                                                 
545
 Nathan and Govindasamy, Malaysia: A Congruence of Interests, 271. 
546
 Restricted Report on the KESBAN doctrine, 8. 
547
Ibid, 6. 
548
 Ibid,15. 
549
 Ibid, 10-12. 
173 
 
teething problems, both COIN campaigns and approaches eventually came to the 
conclusion that population security and winning over the population was the sine qua 
non. As we have seen, in the development of the Malaysian approach, the Malaysians 
persisted in the use of large-scale military action more frequently than the British and 
the Malaysian propaganda effort was less extensive than that of the First Emergency 
but, other than these two issues, continuity was their most obvious feature. Why and 
how the Malaysian approach worked, despite the less measured use of military force 
and lack of an effective propaganda campaign, at least when compared to that of its 
British forebear, is the subject of the next chapter.  
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6. 
 
The Making of a Winning State: Lessons in Post-colonial COIN and Nation-building 
 
Why did the CPM fail in its second armed struggle? Why were the CPM‘s early 
tactical successes against the security forces never translated into strategic victory? To 
answer these questions, this chapter will critically examine both the interior and 
exterior terrain of the ‗battlespace‘, meaning that it situates events and the actions of 
both the insurgent and the state within those spaces in which conflict occurred at the 
local, regional and international level. At this point, it must be pointed out that one of 
the core objectives of this thesis is to highlight the indelible imprint of the CPM 
insurgency on state formation in Malaysia rather than debate the moral dilemma of the 
Emergency-era regulations. In order to explain how the post-colonial Malaysian state 
ultimately triumphed over its CPM opponents, it is useful to revisit Charles Tilly‘s 
famous ‗war make states‘ dictum and set it as a backdrop for the discussion of the final 
substantive chapter. Drawing from the classic European state-building experience, 
Tilly posits that war-making, state-building, extraction and protection were in-
terdependent and inextricably intertwined: 
 
Power holders‘ pursuit of war involved them willy-nilly in the extraction of 
resources for war making from the populations over which they had control and 
in the promotion of capital accumulation by those who could help them borrow 
and buy. War making, extraction, and capital accumulation interacted to shape 
European state making.
550
 
 
In the post-colonial age, Tilly‘s hypothesis is perhaps more relevant to Southeast Asia than 
Western Europe. The processes and outcomes of these prolonged low-intensity conflicts 
(LIC) often defined the balance of power within many a Southeast Asian state. These COIN 
campaigns have had a profound impact on the evolution of the institutional state in all 
ASEAN member countries including Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. 
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In the case of Malaysia, both the Malayan Emergency and the subsequent Second 
Emergency were foundational historical experiences that shaped the emergence, 
institutionalisation and consolidation of the post-colonial state. At the start of the first 
Emergency, the state structure was relatively weak and was in no position to contain the 
initial phase of the insurgency. The subsequent commodities boom during the Korean War 
was a windfall that funded the expansion of the Malayan state apparatus including the 
extensive resettlement of rural Chinese under the Briggs Plan. At the same time, the COIN 
campaign aided the development of a tax structure which paid for the expansion of the 
governmental administration. As the bureaucracy grew, more resources were mobilised and 
services to secure the support of the Malayan population put into place. The united front 
party system that ultimately came to represent the legitimate independent Malay and 
‗underpinned the state centralising process‘ (centred on the UMNO and MCA partnership) 
also emerged during the Emergency years.
551
 With the end of the Emergency, most of the 
British and Commonwealth forces and administrators went home bequeathing a heavily 
centralised state with a highly-developed civil administration and a highly profitable 
economic system based on the export of commodities.  
 
In many ways the expansion of the centralised colonial administration in the 
Emergency years was a promethean flame that shone the writ of the state into hitherto unlit 
areas of the Malayan interior. State efforts to securitise and territorialise the rainforest at the 
outbreak of the Emergency years gradually expanded to encompass the entire physical 
space of the Malay Peninsula. Many of the Emergency-era laws promulgated between 1948 
and 1957 were revisited to contend with the insurrection of the CPM in 1968. Indeed, the 
architecture of state control in post-colonial Malaysia was deeply rooted in the colonial 
government‘s attempt to dominate the jungle space and deny it to the insurgents. According 
to Maureen Sioh, the struggle for power between the colonial government and the 
Communists in the jungles of Malaya was ‗a synecdoche for [the] territorialisation of 
Malaya‘ which eventually grew to encompass ‗new urban configurations in the form of the 
New Villages as part of the state's strategy to control populations expelled from the 
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forest‘. 552  Indeed, the need to territorialise and securitise the jungle space enabled an 
unprecedented consolidation of centralised state power, authority and reach within the 
Malayan Peninsula. The creation and development of New Villages allowed the state to 
secure the rural Chinese from the CPM and brought the presence of the state into areas 
where its presence was hitherto minimal or absent.  
 
One of the most far-reaching of the Emergency-era initiatives was population 
registration. From the urban centres to the Malayan-Thai frontier, all citizens were assigned 
an individual identity. For many Malayans this marked their first direct contact with state 
authority. As Tim Harper puts it, the Emergency regulations such as detention without trial, 
reinstatement of the capital punishment for the possession of firearms, restrictions on 
freedom of the press and media marked the final end of the ‗Malayan Spring‘ – a period of 
unprecedented political freedom in Malaya and Singapore which began in the first weeks of 
1946.
 553
 Both Harper and Maureen Sioh maintain that fifty years on, many of these 
‗repressive measures‘ remain on the statute book having become interwoven within the 
nation-building narrative and thereby justified as more permanent juridical practices. For 
better or worse, post-colonial and in many ways, contemporary Malaysia and its national 
psyche are very much shaped by the political, military and socio-economic actions of the 
state in the fight against communist insurgency. 
 
At this juncture, it is worthwhile to consider John Ikenberry‘s ‗After Victory‘ thesis. 
Although Ikenberry‘s thesis addresses changes to post-war international order, his 
discussion on ‗how victors treat losers‘ bears some relevance. More often than not, the 
stakes in wars are total – win or be destroyed. Factions therefore have every incentive to 
battle to the death. Ikenberry‘s suggests that: 
 
Winning is always limited and temporary, gains by one group cannot be used to 
engage in the permanent domination of other groups. Where the returns to 
power are low, the stakes in political battles are low. The implications of 
winning and losing are less significant: to win is not to gain a permanent 
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position of superiority and to lose is not to risk everything. Political orders with 
low returns to power are more stable than high return systems because the risks 
of domination and coercion are reduced. Because of this, losers are more likely 
to agree to their losses and prepare for the next round.
554
 
 
To posit Ikenberry‘s thesis within the context of the communist insurgency in Malaysia, the 
failure of the Baling Peace Talks of 1955 demonstrated to the MCP that it had more to gain 
from the continued armed struggle and would lose everything if it had agreed to the 
surrender terms. It must be remembered that the end of the Emergency was declared 
unilaterally by the Kuala Lumpur government rather than bilaterally at the peace 
conference table. The vast majority of the central committee and the hardened core that 
survived the long march from the Malayan interior to the Thai-Malaysian border could 
never accept the creation of the ‗neo-imperialist‘ Malaysian federation and were keen to 
continue the fight. There was no opportunity for closure or room for negotiation in 1960 as 
both sides sought to impose their distinct vision of Malaya. Simply put, a political order 
with low returns to power was not possible. Battered but not cowed, in a sanctuary far from 
the writ of the Malaysian and Thai governments, the CPM reorganised, reviewed its 
strategy and bided its time. In 1968, inspired by the Cultural Revolution in Mao‘s China 
and events in Indochina, the CPM sought for a second time to establish a ‗People‘s 
Republic‘. The acrimonious split within the CPM movement further reinforced the high 
stakes in a perceived ‗winner takes all‘ environment.  
 
As demonstrated in the preceding chapter, state institutions, legal frameworks, 
security apparatuses and government policies developed during the Emergency all played a 
critical role in shaping the response of the Malaysian state at the outbreak of Second 
Emergency. The contested physical space differed somewhat, however. As before, much of 
the shooting war was waged in the jungles, but no longer in the interior of Malaya. The 
jungles, New Villages, squatter settlements and border towns of the porous Malaysian-Thai 
border were the main contested physical and psychological battlefields of the Second 
Emergency. By 1966, the back of the urban communist underground movement was largely 
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broken in Singapore and thereafter subversive propaganda became the CPM‘s main 
strategy in Singapore‘s urban space. Despite its spectacular acts of revolutionary violence 
and tactical successes in jungle engagements against the Malaysian security forces, the 
CPM never did seriously challenge the authority of the Malaysian state. In fact, the Second 
Emergency provided the impetus for the central state to reassert and stamp its authority on 
the hitherto much ignored ‗Black areas‘ of the northern border states. Furthermore, the 
revolutionary ideology carried on the clandestine airwaves of the VMR also failed to strike 
a cord with the masses in Malaysia and Singapore. With hindsight, it is easy to conclude 
that the CPM were doomed to failure, but the drawn-out nature of the conflict suggests that 
the outcome was more nebulous than predictable in the years of 1968 to 1975. Only in 1977 
did the strategic tide visibly turned in the Malaysian government‘s favour. Why and how it 
did will be explained in the following subchapters. 
 
The first subchapter will deal with the interior terrain - local socio-economic-
demographic conditions that the CPM could not and ultimately failed to exploit for any 
long-term gains. The second will deal with the exterior terrain - developments in the 
international and regional arena that irrevocably set back the CPM‘s cause - particularly the 
fundamental shift in Chinese foreign policy which led to the establishment of formal 
diplomatic relations between the PRC and the non-communist states of ASEAN. The twin 
concepts of KESBAN and ‗Comprehensive Security‘ will be revisited in the final 
subchapter and set into the context of Malaysian state and nation building. We shall see 
how ‗Comprehensive Security‘ which had its roots in the Malayan Emergency days became 
appropriated and institutionalised by the centralised state in its nation-building efforts. This 
strategy became a successful counterforce to the CPM‘s revolutionary ideology and 
allowed for the consolidation of the Malaysian state. More importantly, the 
‗Comprehensive Development as Security‘ strategy allowed the Malaysian state to secure 
the population that mattered most – the rural Malays in the northern Border States. In short, 
this chapter will detail the development of Malaysia as a ‗counterinsurgent state‘ and the 
demise of the CPM as a revolutionary force and the ideology that sustained the movement. 
To a lesser extent, parallel developments in the PAP-dominated city-state of Singapore will 
also be included when appropriate. In both cases, the ability of post-colonial Malaysia and 
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Singapore to win over the population groups that mattered was the key factor in the CPM‘s 
demise. 
 
Contest for the Interior Terrain and Local Spaces 
 
ISD‘s capacity to undertake sophisticated operations against local threats in Singapore 
would have counted for little without any real progress up north. Despite the low threat 
posed by communist subversion, Singapore could not escape the effects of a serious 
deterioration in Malaysia‘s Security situation.555 If Malaysia had been wrenched apart by 
communist insurgency, Singapore would not have survived.
556
 Indeed, Singapore‘s security 
cannot be viewed in isolation from Malaysia.
557
 Cognisant of the fact that its survival was 
bound to the stability of the other non-communist states in Southeast Asia, Lee Kuan Yew 
recognised the need to assist Malaysia against the communist insurgents – to the extent of 
conducting holding operations in Malaysia if the threat became acute.
558
 Malaysian-
Singaporean internal security cooperation at the working level was characterised by the 
close relationship between MSB and ISD. Information from the MSB set in motion an 
operation that resulted in the arrest of thirty-nine MNLF members and in Singapore over a 
three month period – twelve of whom were Malaysians.559 The operation also broke up the 
four MNLF units responsible for the recruitment of members, financial, logistical and 
manpower support in Singapore.
560
 Differences at the political level did not impede the 
close working relationship between MSB and ISD that had its roots in the Emergency days. 
Moreover, the resurgence of communist subversion and revolutionary violence in 1974 
further strengthened cooperation between the security forces of both countries.   
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In the long run, the CPM‘s inability to convert the Malaysian heartland to its cause 
meant that Singapore, too, was safe. On the other hand, the events of 1974 reinforced the 
Singapore government‘s belief that for its own national survival it must do all that was 
necessary to prevent a CPM takeover of Peninsular Malaysia. This stance had some 
repercussions on the PAP government‘s relationship with Singapore‘s professional 
community (some of whom were compelled to emigrate in search of greater freedom), but 
the majority of Singaporeans accepted and credited Lee Kuan Yew‘s authoritarian style of 
leadership for Singapore‘s and their personal growing prosperity.561 By the late 1970s, the 
widespread benefits of Singapore‘s rapid economic development convinced the majority of 
Singaporeans that communism meant a much reduced standard of living. In Singapore, 
communism no longer had the appeal of ‗an irresistible revolutionary force‘ that it once 
held in the 1950s and 60s.
562
  
 
Indeed, by the early 1970s, the VMR‘s revolutionary message was increasingly out 
of phase with the material aspirations of the average Singaporean. In 1971, when legal 
action was taken against the owners and editors of a leading Singapore Chinese newspaper, 
Nanyang Siang Pau for ‗excessive glorification of the People‘s Republic of China, with the 
result that Chinese chauvinism was being encouraged‘, the majority of Singaporeans ‗did 
not appear to have been unduly upset‘.563 In his analysis of the event, the British High 
Commissioner explained that Singaporeans were ‗more interested in making money in a 
stable environment than in liberal trends of thought or serious criticism of their government 
of whose overall performance they generally approve‘.564 In an environment whereby the 
1972 GNP growth was predicted to match the 1969-1971 average of fourteen percent per 
annum, ‗very few Singaporeans [saw] any credible alternative to PAP rule‘.565 Even during 
the 1974 economic crises, Singapore fared better than many countries and was expected to 
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post a balance of payments surplus of S$500 million and a GNP growth of five percent.
566
 
The Singapore government‘s persistence in diversifying the economy and establishing 
Singapore as a high technology base for technical and financial services created a national 
economy that had already achieved a balance of payments surplus in the region of $1000 
million and was well-poised to take advantage of any global economic upturn in 1976.
567
 
The 1976 General Election in which the PAP secured all sixty-nine parliamentary seats 
further vindicated the perception that the vast majority of Singaporeans were willing to 
accept certain restraints in personal freedoms in exchange for greater stability and 
economic growth.
568
 In short, the PAP government had effectively kept the CPM out of 
Singapore by guaranteeing a continued reasonable standard of living to its citizens.  
 
The PAP government was able to secure the urban population of Singapore by a 
carrot and stick approach which was heavy on the sweet carrot of continued improvement 
in the peoples‘ standards of living. The prospects of socio-economic advancement and 
stability were so appealing that the majority of the electorate were prepared to allow a 
diminution of personal freedoms for the greater sake of national security and cohesion. It 
was a strategy to which the CPM and the VMR had no effective counter-response. An ISD 
report on the subversive effect of the VMR broadcasts on Singapore in 1979 concluded that 
the VMR‘s messages had: 
 
...little appeal to the average Singaporean. Successful economic development 
and an able government have provided him a comfortable and secure life. [It is] 
unreasonable for him to sacrifice what he has acquired for an ideal which can 
never materialise but bring dire consequences, as was starkly revealed in the 
tragedy of the Indochina ‗revolution‘. The VMR understood the implications 
that Singapore‘s growing affluence had on the effectiveness and credibility of 
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its propaganda...It could only exploit real grievances. But grievances were 
scarce in a well managed and prospering Singapore.
569
  
 
On this point, Chin Peng‘s views converged with those of the administrations that he 
once sought to subvert and overthrow. In his autobiography, Chin Peng conceded the 
following: 
 
A revolution based on violence has no application in modern Malaysia or 
Singapore. None of the conditions favourable to armed struggle exist today in 
relation to these territories. You need complementary international and 
internal situations to set hearts burning for armed revolt. If the people lead 
reasonable lives and feel accepted in society, how can you ask them to put 
their lives on the line?
570
 
 
Even though Chin Peng‘s comments were made with hindsight and in the post-1989 
context, they were reflective of ground sentiments in post-1975 and even post-1971 
Singapore. In the 1980 general election, the PAP swept all 75 seats in parliament with 
77.7% of the votes – the second highest score since its 1968 general election win with 
86.7% of the votes.
571
 By then, the political climate was tame enough to lift the 
requirement of ‗political suitability certificates‘ for entry into Singaporean universities. 
Considering the fact that the Singapore government had always maintained a close watch of 
all activities inimical to the security of the state, the dissolution of the political suitability 
certificates‘ requirement could only mean that the flame of student leftism in Singapore 
was well and truly extinguished. In an environment whereby the majority of the 
Singaporean electorate were willing accomplices to their securitisation, the revolutionary 
message of the VMR fell very much on deaf ears. 
 
After 1979, there was a perceptible focus of the VMR on Malaysia rather than 
Singapore particularly on the exploitative nature of the Federal government‘s development 
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schemes. These major development projects were the main weapons of the Malaysian 
government‘s arsenal in securing the rural population from the subversive influence of the 
CPM and thus targets for both CPM attacks in armed attacks and propaganda. As the rural 
Northern Malaysian states became increasingly developed so too did the reach of the 
government at the expense of the CPM. These large-scale development schemes were 
however long-term plans that were slow to bear fruit and as we have seen, the CPM were 
quick to exploit their teething problems through the VMR broadcasts. Of particular concern 
was whether the government‘s general policies in the aftermath of May 13 Riots would 
alienate large sections of the Chinese population which was in itself ‗an important deterrent 
and counter to communist policies‘.572  
 
In the aftermath of the May 13 1969 riots, Razak had managed to overcome the 
challenge from the ‗Ultra‘ component of UMNO, but the overriding need for Malay support 
and the continued pressure from politicians, civil servants and certain sections of the Malay 
electorate ‗to become more chauvinistic‘ ensured the ‗moderately pro-Malay‘ policies of 
the Malaysian federal government in the decades to come.
573
 Steps had to be taken to 
ensure the confidence of the Malay majority electorate without losing the support of 
important sections of the Malaysian Chinese community. As such, the Second Malaysian 
Plan drawn up against the communal violence of the May 13 1969 riots and the revived 
CPM insurgency was designed as part of the solution to the twin problems of communism 
and communalism.
574
 The plan was explicitly aimed at bringing the mainly rural and 
agricultural Malays into commercial and industrial life as well as agricultural and rural 
development thus securing the government‘s Malay base.575 The successful implementation 
of the Second Malaysian Plan was ‗essential for stability and in particular for improving the 
economic lot of the Malays, which [was] crucial if the dormant threat of a recurrence of 
racial violence [was] to be removed‘.576 
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As a result of population resettlement measures implemented during the First 
Emergency, a distinct division had been created between the populated and unpopulated 
areas of Peninsula Malaysia.
577
 Unlike the mainly rural Malays, the majority of the Chinese 
population were concentrated in the cities rather than the jungle fringes where the CPM 
presence was the most pronounced. The Second Malaysian plan was meant to close the gap 
between the hitherto mainly rural and agricultural Malays and their predominately urban, 
commercial and industrial Chinese counterparts.
578
 The twin prongs of the Second 
Malaysian Plan was ‗the eradication of poverty among all Malaysians, irrespective of race‘ 
through the correction of the ‗racial economic imbalance through the modernisation of rural 
life, a rapid and balanced growth of urban activities and the creation of a Malay commercial 
and industrial community‘ and the other being the ‗restructuring of Malaysian society‘.579 
In short, the plan proposed to solve the twin problems of communism and communalism by 
a population-centric approach that involved the dual-pronged tools of social engineering 
and social policy that eventually secured the people that mattered. The development and 
ultimately the securing of the Malay population nonetheless involved a major 
reconfiguration of Malaysian society not unlike that of the First Emergency years. In the 
case of post-colonial Malaysia, the ‗political need to ensure that the Malays were seen to be 
given much greater opportunities for advancement‘ outweighed the risk that ‗undue 
preference [might] prejudice economic progress and seriously disturb the other races‘.580  
 
The proposed social restructuring always risked alienating the Malaysian Chinese 
community. At the state level, the Chinese were predominant in Perak (Chinese 44%, 
Malays 40%), Selangor (Chinese 48%, Malay 29%) and Penang (Chinese 57%, Malay 28%) 
while the four northern largely rural states of Kelantan (Malays 92%), Trenggannu (Malays 
92%), Kedah (Malays 68%) and Perlis (78%) were overwhelmingly Malay.
581
 At the group 
level, there was a significant divide between the English-educated Chinese businessmen 
who were part of the establishment and the poorer Chinese-educated community between 
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whom there was virtually no contact, communication and understanding. During both the 
First and the Second Emergency, the CPM posed a direct threat to the interests of the 
Chinese business elite who had more in common with the Malay government officials on 
the green of the Royal Selangor Golf Club than Chinese CPM insurgents in the jungle. 
Similarly, the MCA which represented Chinese interests in the Alliance government during 
both Emergencies was largely drawn from the Chinese elite. The impression of the MCA as 
a party of the English-educated rich rather than the Chinese-educated majority was 
reflected by its abysmal showing in the 1969 elections and the subsequent after election 
riots.
582
 With the exception of Perak, the efforts of the younger elements within the MCA to 
make grass roots contact had little effect.
583
  
 
Thus, despite fears of ‗racially biased bureaucratic abuses‘, the middle-class urban 
Chinese tended to prefer Razak‘s moderate brand of Malay leadership to the internally 
divided Chinese political leadership of the MCA - or the revolutionary upheaval of the 
CPM.
584
 The implementation of Second Five-year Plan was pragmatic in the sense that 
while employers were urged to advance Malays, the Malaysian government did not hesitate 
to use Chinese expertise to improve the efficiency of its para-statal economic authorities – 
the Council of Trust for the Indigenous Peoples (MARA) and the National Corporation 
(PERNAS).
585
 Compared to the political unity of the Malays, the Chinese were a 
fragmented community.
586
 The Malaysian Chinese community were unable to develop a 
form of political cohesion through which its interests could be assured and considered in 
the central formulation of policy in a Malay dominated government.
587
 Even though the 
CPM was blamed for much of the riot violence by the Malaysian government, the party 
could not quite capitalise on the grievances of the divided Chinese community. As such, 
CPM recruits in urban centres were largely drawn from the lower rungs of urban Chinese 
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society including criminal elements.
588
 In short, the divided nature of the Malaysian 
Chinese community meant that only the Chinese-educated working and criminal class in 
the urban centres and rural Chinese were realistic targets for CPM recruitment and 
subversion.  
 
In November 1974, student demonstrations involving all the institutions of higher 
education: the University of Malaya, the National University, the Science University of 
Penang, the National Institute of Technology and the Ungku Omar Polytechnic (Ipoh) and 
their respective student unions in Malaysia affected the main urban centres, particularly 
Kuala Lumpur.
589
 The predominantly Malay student demonstrators were protesting against 
the plight of poor Malay smallholders in Baling whose income had been severely reduced 
by inflation in the price of basic essentials and fall in the price of rubber.
590
 The VMR was 
quick to respond to the issue and condemned the Second Five-year Plan as one that was 
‗meant to serve the interests of a handful of bureaucratic capitalists and imperialists‘.591 The 
local CPM front organisations however played no active role in the organisation of the 
Baling protests.
592
 Part of the government‘s response came in the form of an emergency 
programme to increase the market price of rubber which included restricting the production 
of plantation companies and direct governmental purchase from small-holders.
593
  Overall, 
the Malaysian government was seen to have reacted with ‗a mixture of firm (but not brutal) 
repression of the demonstrators and a series of measures to alleviate the condition of the 
small holders‘.594 More importantly, the emergency programme‘s success in raising rubber 
prices to the benefit of the Malay small-holders amplified the need for Malay affirmative 
action and strengthened the authorities‘ position at the expense of the CPM‘s call to 
revolutionary violence.  
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Despite lending its moral support to the student demonstrations via the VMR, the 
CPM‘s call to revolutionary violence was unappealing to the Malay student Left. Rather, 
the Baling issue united the socialist and Malay nationalist elements as well as provided an 
occasion for the student left to confront the government –for the first and very last time.595 
Once again, akin to the May 13 riots, the CPM did not possess the capacity and resources to 
exploit a significant event that could severely damage the Malaysian government‘s 
credibility. As argued in chapter four, the CPM‘s influence over the student population was 
largely restricted to the Chinese-language schools and did not extend to the Malay or 
English-educated (mainly in Singapore). In short, the CPM could do little to harness the 
potential of a united student Left in Malaysia. By the time of the 1974 Malaysian elections, 
the failure of the predominately Malay PSRM to win a single parliamentary or state seat 
demonstrated that the majority of the Malay electorate had rejected ideology in favour of 
communalism.
596
 From 1969 to 1974 – prior to the severe plunge in the price of rubber in 
mid-1974, the federal government could rely on exports of the country‘s main primary 
products (rubber, tin, oil palm and rubber) to fund its extensive national development 
programme the revenues from which helped garner the support of the Malay electorate. In 
1973, thanks to soaring prices for its four main export commodities, an impressive annual 
economic growth rate of over eight percent was achieved.
597
  
 
In the 1974 general election, Razak‘s National Front Coalition government was 
returned to all the state assemblies of Peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak with one hundred 
percent success achieved by the two Malay parties within the coalition (UMNO and 
PAS).
598
 It had, by then, become official orthodoxy that racial unrest could be prevented 
‗only if the alleged economic and social injustices suffered by the Malays [were] 
removed‘.599 The Second Five-year Plan was designed to assuage anti-Chinese ‗have-nots 
against the haves‘ resentment of the Malay community.600 More than in any other previous 
election, Malays demonstrated in the 1974 Election their conviction that ‗only a united, 
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Malay-dominated government can look after their interests‘. 601  The July 1978 General 
Elections witnessed the National Front winning 132 of 154 seats of which UMNO took 71 
– the highest total achieved by the dominant Malay-based party. 602  Simply put, in an 
environment where the Malay majority had come to reject ideology and embrace a more 
communal brand of politics, the prospects of success for the Chinese-dominated CPM were 
more unrealistic than the First Emergency years.  
 
The CPM could, in theory, exploit the grievances of the Chinese community – 
especially those of the one million plus Chinese living in First Emergency-era New 
Villages. Unlike their counterparts among the Malay rural poor, these Chinese did not 
benefit from the government‘s economic uplift policy.603 A ‗special watch‘ was kept on the 
Chinese New Villagers who, unlike the rural Malays, preferred to keep clear of 
‗disturbances‘.604 By the end of 1971, when the Malaysian security forces were at their 
furthest point of overstretch, police action, particularly the identification and arrest of CPM 
supporters, achieved its intended effect of containing the CPM‘s underground activities.605 
Rather than take to the jungle with the CPM, the increase in non-political urban violence 
and gangsterism among the poorer Chinese, plus a higher emigration rate among the 
qualified middle class, became the preferred means to register dissatisfaction with 
government policies.
606
 Furthermore, because much of the Chinese population had been 
resettled in the main urban areas and New Villages as part of the colonial-era COIN 
strategy, the Chinese population could be more effectively monitored and policed by the 
MSB than their Malay counterparts. In January, a MSB Officer in Perak ascertained that the 
CPM had not recruited front organisation or party members from the Grik area over the last 
year. But he added that ‗if conditions did not improve it was a toss-up between whether the 
New Villagers joined the dissatisfied rural Malays or the communists‘.607  
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The Malaysian government had hoped that economic growth would generate 
opportunities so rapidly that there would be ‗enough progress to keep the majority immune 
to the attractions of revolution‘.608 In the meantime, effective MSB surveillance and direct 
police action were used to stifle pro-CPM elements, thereby preventing any possible 
outbreaks of communal violence.  Even in 1970, a period when Thai-Malaysian 
cooperation, Malaysian military-police cooperation and MSB efficiency were at one of 
their lowest points, the CPM still failed to ‗penetrate large sectors of the Chinese 
population as extensively as they did in 1948‘.609 Unlike the First Emergency in which 
winning over the rural Chinese was paramount, the key population battleground during the 
Second Emergency was the rural Malays in the northern Border States. The CPM realised 
that its credibility as a Malayan revolutionary movement depended upon its ability to gain 
support within the rural Malay communities in Kelantan, Trenggannu, Kedah and Perlis. 
Thus the Malaysian government‘s development strategy to bring the rural Malays out of the 
poverty trap at the initial expense of the Chinese community could be justified. As the 
insurgency wore on, the CPM proved unable to make inroads on the allegiance of the 
population that mattered the most- the rural Malays. Even at the peak of CPM violence in 
1975, the party failed to win over rural Malays along their infiltration routes in Kelantan.
610
 
 
While there was a degree of local recruitment in Perak and Pahang, this was largely 
due to the influx of the urban underground members forced into refuge by police action.
611
 
In 1978, well into the tenth year of the CPM‘s revived armed struggle, most of the 3,000 or 
so remaining insurgents were of Malaysian or Thai Chinese origin.
612
 In order to maintain 
its hold over the population in Southern Thailand, the CPM generally avoided spectacular 
acts of banditry that might alienate the local population and relied on tax income levied on 
the people in the CPM-controlled areas.
613
 As the insurgency dragged on, the CPM became 
even more reliant on its strongholds in Southern Thailand for the bulk of its recruits. It 
could only do so as long as the Thai government continued to ignore the development of its 
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Southern provinces. By contrast, the CPM‘s ability to recruit from the rural Malay 
communities in Malaysia proper was severely constrained. 
 
In sum, while the Malaysian state might be accused of mismanaging the grievances 
of the Malaysian Chinese community, the CPM did little to benefit from the situation. As 
observed by R.A. Hibbert, the Political Adviser (POLAD) to Commander-in-Chief (Far 
East) 
 
There is no insurgency movement in Southeast Asia which could not rapidly be 
crushed by efficient administration and an efficient police force backed by an 
efficient army...even in Malaysia, the country which has the best claim to 
having an insurgency movement which comes from outside because the CTO 
spent the 1960s in safe-havens across the Thai frontier, the real trouble is not 
the external force but the existence within Malaysia of people ready or even 
eager to help it, and the persistence of the Malaysian Government‘s inability to 
win any real loyalty from the Chinese masses.
614
 
 
Even though the CPM continued to ‗offer the Chinese a violent alternative to continued 
acquiescence in the status quo‘, a successful overthrow of the incumbent government was 
unachievable through the exploitation of Chinese grievances alone.
615
 A much stronger 
bedrock of popular support would surely have been required to precipitate such dramatic 
change. So the CPM conundrum remained: how to enlist the support of the rural Malays? 
Whereas the Malays had become increasingly united and communalised in the aftermath of 
the May 13 riots, the Malaysian Chinese community was still much divided in 1978. Just as 
in the 1969 General Elections – the precursor to the May 13 riots, the Chinese vote during 
the 1978 General Elections became ever more divided with the MCA once again losing 
much ground to the opposition DAP.
616
   
 
                                                 
614
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Files, FCO 24/1019, Thoughts on the Southeast Asian Scene on 
the Closure of Far East Command, Diplomatic Report No.491/71 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 15 
October 1971. 
615
 NA, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FCO 15/2361, The Malaysian Internal Scene: Autumn 1978, 11 
December 1978. 
616
 FCO 15/2505, Defence Advisor Malaysia –Annual Report June 1978-June 1979. 
191 
 
By 1978, however, any propensity for violence within the divided Malaysian 
Chinese community could be kept in check by decisive police action. The expanded 
recruitment of Chinese MSB officers since 1974 under a new IGP who commanded the 
loyalty and respect of the Chinese officers for his more balanced racial approach (notably 
when compared to the army) contributed to the crippling of the CPM underground in the 
mainly Chinese urban areas. In 1976, 933 CPM underground members were arrested - an 
increase of over 100 percent on the previous year‘s figure. 617  These Chinese officers 
recognised that ‗promotion on the whole [was] on merit, that only certain top jobs [were] 
reserved for Malays, and that this [was] politically desirable‘.618 Given a strong mandate in 
the 1974 and 1978 Malaysian General Elections from the Malay-Muslim electorate, it was 
vital for the Malay-dominated United Front to be seen as the upholders of Malay civil 
rights, nationalist sentiment and Islamic observance. Any direct threat to Malay power and 
privilege in post-colonial Malaysia could ‗trigger the political consciousness‘ of a 
predominantly Malay-Muslim MAF that viewed ‗their corporate interests, security, and 
future‘ as closely intertwined with those of the Malay-dominated civilian government.619 
That in itself would translate into the further marginalisation of the Chinese community as 
was the case in the aftermath of the May 13 Riots. 
 
As demonstrated in chapters three and four, in order to convince the rural Malays of 
the compatibility of Islam and communism, the CPM utilised front organisations such as 
PAPERI. Yet, this approach made little headway in light of the communalisation of local 
politics catalysed by the Second Malaysian Plan. It was further reinforced by the efforts of 
Malay rulers and ministers to present ‗Islam as a bulwark against communism‘.620  To 
summarise, the Malaysian state was able to contain the CPM‘s advance into the rural Malay 
and urban Chinese communities largely through effective MSB action in the urban areas 
where the Chinese were dominant and development of areas in which the rural Malays 
predominate. Simply put, the communalisation of politics set the preconditions for the 
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Malaysian state to implement an effective population control strategy that involved 
‗development‘ for the rural Malays and ‗securitisation‘ for the Chinese. The effective 
‗securitisation‘ or policing of the Chinese population using minimal force was made 
possible as the Malaysian Chinese community itself became more divided in the aftermath 
of the May 13 riots. 
 
In sum, just as in the First Emergency, the CPM proved unable to win over the rural 
Malays or the urban Chinese in Malaysia in their Second armed revolution. Unlike the 
communist insurgencies in Indochina, the CPM‘s slavish implementation of Maoist 
revolutionary violence and mass persuasion took no account of the local socio-economic 
changes in post-colonial Malaysia and Singapore. The VMR‘s quick responses to local 
events demonstrated a high level of local knowledge, but the responses themselves 
suggested a Peking-based CPM Central that was rapidly out of touch with local ground 
realities. That in itself was one of the reasons responsible for the three-way split within the 
party. Only in Southern Thailand did the CPM create a local parallel underground 
infrastructure. Even in 1971, at the point when the Malaysian security forces were severely 
stretched across two separate COIN efforts, the CPM did not succeed in creating a state 
within a state in any of the Northern Malaysian States (including those with a majority 
Chinese population such as Penang).  
 
Despite the deep divisions within the Malaysian Chinese community, the CPM 
failed to convince both the urban and rural Chinese that the CPM‘s revolutionary path was 
the more credible alternative. The Malay dominated National Front coalition might not be 
perfect, but in the eyes of most Chinese it was a preferable alternative to the CPM‘s vision 
of a People‘s Republic. Clearly, the Malaysian Chinese business community stood to lose 
far more a PRM than an economy under the NEP. Meanwhile, MSB and police intervention 
did enough to impress upon the Chinese urban communities that the Malaysian state rather 
than the CPM was to be the likely winner in the long term. At no point in the Second 
Emergency did the CPM succeed in ruling any major Chinese urban settlement in 
Malaysian territory by night. The failure of the CPM to penetrate deeper into Peninsula 
Malaysia could also be partially attributed to the three-way split that irretrievably upset the 
CPM plans for a concerted Southward advance. The surge in open demonstrations of each 
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factions‘ capabilities led to a severe bleeding of strength that decimated the all important 
urban underground infrastructure – a setback from which CPM Central never recovered. In 
light of the internal split and the dissipation of its strength, CPM Central more than ever 
needed external assistance and international legitimacy to succeed, but at the international 
level, China‘s need for rapprochement with non-communist Southeast Asia would 
irretrievably set back the CPM‘s cause – in material, financial and moral terms. 
 
Contest for Regional and International Legitimacy 
 
Mao‘s landmark 1971 invitation to US President Richard Nixon to conduct a state visit to 
Beijing reawakened doubts about whether the Chinese commitment to revolutionary 
movements remained ‗firm and all-embracing‘. 621  The event encouraged some China-
watchers within the British diplomatic community to conclude that ‗when state relations are 
considered of overriding importance revolutionary movements of demonstrable legitimacy 
can be written off‘.622 The theory that the Chinese might try to ‗have it both ways‘ by 
normalising diplomatic relations with the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia 
whilst supporting revolutionary movements in those very same states was a well articulated 
one within the diplomatic circles.
623
 But the long-term implications of this policy shift were 
that movements such as the CPM might be sacrificed in exchange for Malaysian and 
Singaporean support for recognition of the PRC rather than the Taiwan-exiled KMT in the 
UN. The attendance of the Chinese Ambassador at the Singapore High Commissioner‘s 
National Day reception in London was interpreted as a strong indication of the PRC‘s 
recognition of Singapore as a sovereign state rather than a part of Malaya as per the CPM‘s 
vision of a contiguous PRM.
624
  Since the communist take-over of Indochina in 1975, 
Singapore sought to develop closer relations with its non-communist ASEAN neighbours 
as well as a rapprochement with the Communist regimes of China and Indochina.
625
 Lee 
Kuan Yew‘s visit to China in May 1976 was widely viewed as ‗an important initiative in 
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the context of Singapore‘s international relations.626 Nonetheless, in order to forestall any 
lingering suspicions of Singapore as the ‗Chinese Trojan Horse‘ of Southeast Asia, the city-
state consistently maintained that it would be the last ASEAN country to establish 
diplomatic relations with China.
627
 
 
In the case of Sino-Malaysian relations, Prime Minister Razak regarded the Red 
Cross of China‘s offer of M$ 625,000 worth of blankets and canned food for victims of the 
1971 Kuala Lumpur floods as ‗an indication of a change in Peking‘s attitude towards 
Malaysia‘.628 The British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur observed that ‗a mild flurry‘ 
had been caused by the announcement of the Red Cross of China‘s aid offer.629 Since then, 
regional and international events particularly those that reflected the shifting dynamics of 
the Cold War drove both China and Malaysia towards a closer relationship. Razak realised 
that the cornerstone of Malaysia‘s foreign policy, the ‗Neutralisation‘ of Southeast Asia or 
the creation of a neutral non-aligned Southeast Asia could only be achieved with the 
support from its immediate Southeast Asian neighbours and external powers including 
China.
630
 Malaysia also needed Chinese cooperation in resolving the issue of Overseas 
Chinese living in Malaysia and reining in the CPM.  
 
By October 1970, Malaysia made it clear that in view of the imperative requirement 
for Chinese support for its policy of neutralisation in Southeast Asia, it would support the 
PRC‘s admission to the United Nations. 631   On September 1971, Razak described 
Malaysia‘s China‘s policy in the following terms: ‗one China and one seat for China at the 
United Nations. It was beyond doubt that the Government of the People‘s Republic of 
China was de jure and de facto the Government of China and that the China seat should go 
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to that Government‘. 632  Malaysia maintained that ‗there was no contradiction between 
Malaysian policy regarding relations with Communist China and her determination to 
continue the battle against internal communist terrorism‘.633 In return, the Chinese reduced 
their propaganda support for the CPM. Conspicuous references to Malaysia instead of 
―Malaysia‖ or Malaya in Chinese press and radio broadcasts amounted to a clear 
recognition of Malaysia‘s existence and sovereignty.634  
 
China‘s attitude towards the Overseas Chinese population in Southeast Asia also 
took a more conciliatory approach. The abolition of the Commission for Overseas Chinese 
Affairs (COCA) which was responsible for the dissemination of Mao Tse-Tung Thought 
and the encouragement of overseas Chinese towards the revolutionary path was explained 
by Chinese Premier Chou Enlai as an ‗indication of Peking‘s present policy‘.635 As early as 
1954, the Chinese realised that claims to the loyalty of all Overseas Chinese could be an 
impediment to the development of relations with Southeast Asia. In his September 1954 
address to the National People‘s Congress, Chou announced China‘s willingness to resolve 
nationality issues affecting Southeast Asian Overseas Chinese and expressed China‘s 
readiness to ‗urge Overseas Chinese to respect the laws of the governments and the social 
customs of all the countries in which they live‘.636  In 1955, at the Afro-Asian Conference 
in Bandung, a Treaty Concerning the Question of Dual Nationality had been signed with 
Indonesia.
637
 But, since then, no further progress had been made in settling the dual-
nationality issue with other Southeast Asian states. Hence the importance attached to 
Chou‘s August 1971 statement to General Ne Win, Prime Minister of Burma that ‗Overseas 
Chinese must obey the laws of the countries in which they reside‘. 638  Similar assurances 
were given to Thai, Filipino and Malaysian officials visiting China.  
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 1972 and 1973 also witnessed increased trade, cultural and technical links between 
China and Malaysia. By June 1973, formal talks in New York on the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries had begun.
639
 The outcome of these talks 
was an official state visit by Razak to China to formalise Sino-Chinese relations. On 21 
May 1974, the NCNA Bulletin announced the following: 
 
The Government of the [PRC] and the Government of Malaysia have mutually 
agreed in principle upon the establishment of diplomatic relations. At the 
invitation of Chou Enlai, Premier of the State Council of the [PRC], his 
Excellency Tun Abdul Razak Bin Datuk Hussein, Prime Minister of Malaysia, 
will pay an official visit to the [PRC] from 28 May to 2 June 1974 to formalise 
this agreement of the two governments to establish diplomatic relations.
640
 
 
In a joint communiqué issued in Beijing on 1 June 1974, China and Malaysia made formal 
pledges of mutual recognition that effectively established diplomatic relations between the 
two states.
641
 The communiqué also declared Malaysia‘s decision to close down its Taipei 
consulate and recognised ‗the Government of the [PRC] as the sole government of China, 
and acknowledge[d] the position of the Chinese Government that Taiwan is an inalienable 
part of the territory of the [PRC].
642
  
 
In return, Razak received the ‗most satisfying single feature of the discussions‘ – the 
assurance from Chou that ‗we regard the people of Chinese origin who are your citizens as 
Malaysians.
643
 Paragraph five of the joint communiqué declared that: 
 
Both the Government of the PRC and the Government of Malaysia...do not 
recognise dual nationality. Proceeding from this principle, the Chinese 
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Government considers anyone of Chinese origin who has taken up of his own 
will or acquired Malaysian nationality as automatically forfeiting Chinese 
nationality. As for those residents who retain Chinese nationality of their own 
will, the Chinese Government...will enjoin them to abide by the law of the 
Government of Malaysia, respect the customs and habits of the people there and 
live in amity with them.
644
 
 
What this meant in real terms was that since the PRC had now unequivocally rejected them, 
ethnic Chinese Malaysians could no longer divide their loyalties. For his part, Razak was 
given the welcome of a conquering hero. The Malaysian Press carried headlines such as 
‗The Tun‘s Hour‘; ‗Peking‘s Historic Visitor‘; ‗Tun Returns in Triumph; and ‗One Step by 
Malaysia‘s Prime Minister, One Stride Toward‘s Malaysia‘s Goal of a Zone of Peace‘.645 
This joint communiqué which was a formal recognition of Malaysia‘s sovereignty by the 
PRC was a landmark event which strategically aided the Malaysian government‘s efforts to 
contain the CPM insurgency. 
 
Razak failed to obtain any concessions from the Chinese on the VMR station in 
Hunan, China, but the Chinese did confirm that the CPM insurgency was an ‗internal 
matter‘. ‗It was up to the Malaysians to deal with it.‘646 The willingness of the Chinese to 
sacrifice the CPM for closer relations with Malaysia was reflected in paragraph two of the 
joint communiqué which stated that ‗the two Governments consider all foreign aggression, 
interference, control and subversion to the impressible. They hold that the social system of 
a country should only be chosen and decided by its own people‘.647 On his return from 
China, Razak pronounced that ‗the establishment of relations with China, and the mutual 
recognition by the Malaysian and Chinese governments, removed the basis for the 
terrorists‘ activities‘.648 Razak‘s establishment of relations with China ushered in a new era 
of Sino-ASEAN relations. In an appreciation of the magnitude of change, Sir Eric Norris, 
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British High Commissioner to Malaysia, remarked: ‗Times change; I doubt if any of my 
predecessors would have predicted that a Malaysian Prime Minister would use a film of 
himself in deep conversation with Chairman Mao in Peking to help win a general 
election.‘649 In conceding that the CPM insurgency was a Malaysian domestic problem 
while, at the same time, establishing diplomatic relations with the Malaysian Federation, 
Mao‘s regime delegitimized the CPM‘s central objective: the establishment of a People‘s 
Republic in Peninsula Malaysia.    
 
In a display of defiance, the CPM factions responded to Razak‘s developing entente 
with China and his calls for surrender by sabotaging the construction of the East-West 
Highway and assassinating the IGP.
650
 Moroever, in spite of the marked decline in the 
quotation of CPM and VMR statements in official Chinese media, China‘s moral support 
for the CPM subsisted through the VMR.
651
 The Chinese evidently saw no contradiction 
between the normalisation of relations with Malaysia‘s government and fraternal inter-party 
relations with the CPM. In fact, China claimed the right to party level ties with foreign 
revolutionary movements conducted through the CCP‘s International Liaison Department 
while at the same time, maintaining diplomatic relations with the non-communist Southeast 
Asian states.
652
 It was nonetheless a significant shift from the nadir of the Cultural 
Revolution some years earlier when the radical turn in Chinese policy that led to open 
support for pro-Beijing, anti-imperialist, and anti-hegemonist revolutionary movements had 
so antagonised governments throughout the region.
653
 The new orientation in Chinese 
policy would become clearer still under Mao‘s successors. In his efforts to combat the 
Soviet threat, Deng needed the support of the non-communist ASEAN member states more 
than that of the CPM – which was, by 1975, a divided revolutionary movement with little 
domestic and international support. 
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As noted earlier, the death of Mao and the new Deng era ushered in an age of 
pragmatism in Chinese foreign policy towards non-communist states of Southeast Asia. In 
reality, China's post-Cultural Revolution foreign policy had begun before the deaths of Mao 
and Chou. When ASEAN was formed in 1967, Beijing denounced it as ‗a new anti-China, 
anti-communist alliance‘, but on 18 January 1976, Peking Radio praised ASEAN‘s 
‗successive victories in their common struggle against hegemonism‘ – a Chinese term for 
Soviet expansionism.
654
 As early as 1971, POLAD Hibbert observed that: 
 
Large changes have occurred in Asia during the four years of Far East 
Command‘s rundown...Perhaps the most important change has been the 
hardening of Sino-Soviet rivalry into bitter and probably in the long run 
irreconcilable hostility. Gradually this hostility is affecting every situation in 
Asia...we must look forward to a new alignment of forces in Asia and the 
longer-term fate of Malaysia and Singapore...will largely depend on the way in 
which this new alignment emerges and the agility with which Malaysia and 
Singapore and their allies, including Britain, adjust themselves to it.
655
 
 
Certainly, both Malaysia and Singapore benefited at the CPM‘s expense from the shift in 
Chinese foreign policy necessitated by the Sino-Soviet split. By 1979 the moderate 
leadership under Deng Xiaoping had consolidated power.
656
 Rather than exporting 
revolution as a means of legitimising their rule, this new generation of CCP leaders‘ focus 
was on economic development and reform as well as countering the Soviet bloc on the 
international stage – a task which required the engagement of the non-communist ASEAN 
bloc.  
 
The alignment of a unified Vietnam towards the Soviet camp further pushed China 
toward disengagement from Pro-Beijing insurgent movements that included the CPM. As 
the Sino-Vietnamese confrontation deteriorated to the brink of war in November 1978, 
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Deng embarked on personal visit to non-communist Southeast Asian to rally support for 
China.
657
 When China invaded Vietnam in February 1979 as a response to Vietnam‘s 
invasion and occupation of Cambodia, the VMR declared that:  
 
The action taken by the Chinese army and people in countering the armed 
incursion of the Vietnamese is in line with the fundamental interests of the people 
of China and Vietnam as well as those of the people of Southeast Asia and the 
world. It is a just action. The Malayan people firmly support the Chinese people's 
just war to defend their frontier region and counter attack the Vietnamese 
aggressors.
658
  
 
The CPM‘s unequivocal support for China was not enough to prevent a further 
downgrading in ties between the CCP and the CPM. In February 1981, Chou‘s successor, 
Premier Zhao Ziyang announced in Bangkok that ‗CCP relations with Southeast Asian 
Communist parties were only political and moral, and that China would make efforts to 
ensure that relations with these parties would not affect our friendship and cooperation with 
ASEAN countries‘.659 By then, even the moral support was slowly eroded to the point 
whereby the VMR station was eventually closed at the ‗request‘ of Deng. The VMR station 
had always presented a very visible thorny issue in Sino-Malaysian and Sino-Singaporean 
relations. Its closure in 1981 could not be a clearer signal that in Deng‘s China, 
revolutionary movements with little promise of success (such as the CPT and CPM) were 
dispensable politically and morally. The CPM was deadweight that had to be jettisoned in 
return for ASEAN‘s support in the UN over the Cambodian issue. In short, as a 
revolutionary movement making little headway in the jungles of the Thai-Malaysian border, 
the CPM were ill-placed to bear the full impact that the Sino-Soviet split and great power 
relations had on Southeast Asia nor had they the necessary bargaining counters that would 
allow them to negotiate with Beijing from a position of strength.  
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 While the CPM was left to survive on its own devices, Malaysia could depend on its 
new found entente with China, the commitment of its ANZUK partners to guarantee its 
security and the improvement in Thai-Malaysian Trans-border cooperation. Despite the 
commitment to wind-down its military presence in Singapore by 1971, the UK could never 
have allowed the CPM to menace the existence of its show-case decolonisation project in 
Southeast Asia. As late as 1978, Malaysia was the third largest recipient of financial 
assistance under the FCO‘s military aid schemes. 660  The establishment of the Royal 
Malaysian Police Special Action Unit in 1975 ‗brought up to operational readiness with SAS 
assistance‘ was another way in which the British government could unobtrusively aid in the 
COIN effort.
661
 Cognisance of the ‗over-zealous pursuance of the NEP‘ did not prevent the 
British government from taking the position that ‗the NEP is the political expression of the 
economic dissatisfaction of the Malays and as such ‗its implementation [was] doubtlessly 
justified‘. 662  In response to occasional concerns of British members of Parliament on 
detention without trial in Malaysia under the Internal Security (Essential Regulations) Act, 
the FCO made it clear that such cases were ‗entirely a matter for the Malaysian authorities in 
which the British government had ‗no locus standi‘.663 Likewise, the Australians were of the 
view that notwithstanding the ‗tinder lying around‘ with regards to the communal situation, 
the consolidation of the moderate Malay government under Hussein Onn in the last months 
of 1977 served as a ‗restraining influence‘ on Malaysians who wished to disrupt communal 
relations.
664
 By late 1977, the marked improvement in Thai-Malaysian Trans-border 
cooperation had severely disrupted the CPM‘s chain of command and inflicted a loss of 
cohesion within the organisation.
665
 It cannot be emphasised enough that the task taking on 
the CPM core strength in Southern Thailand would have been impossible without close Thai 
support. 
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The Comprehensive Security Response to Revolutionary Violence 
 
Since independence, central Malaysian governments of various administrations operated on 
the rule that security cannot be defined without development. The various five-year Plans 
sought to promote internal political and social stability by introducing measures that 
increase and sustain economic growth thereby reducing poverty and income disparities. 
From the Malaysian perspective, development was even more important than military 
defence. To the Malaysian leadership, the most likely security threats were from within 
rather than without. Therefore in order to guarantee political stability and counter internal 
and communal instability, socio-economic development was to take precedence over all 
else including external defence. In operational terms, KESBAN was designed to remove the 
perceived root causes of insurgency and thereby isolate the insurgents. One key factor in 
KESBAN‘s ultimate success was the military‘s ability to work within a framework of 
governmental operations alongside the Police and other civilian institutions. Operational 
decisions were made at an inter-agency level based on holistic approaches rather than a 
singularly military solution to the insurgency problem. Indeed, the MAF‘s acceptance of 
KESBAN aptly illustrates the military‘s development as a national institution within 
Malaysian society. The conceptual framework of KESBAN however rests on the 
experience and lessons from a colonial COIN campaign that gave the post-colonial state 
much of its meaning and character. This conceptual framework enabled post-colonial 
Malaysia to both defeat the CPM insurgency and create a nation-state connected by 
institutions, infrastructure, national projects and communities borne out off the Second 
Emergency.   
 
Unfortunately, these vast development projects encouraged corruption, which soon 
became clear at the state level - particularly in Perak. Nonetheless, by 1977, despite the 
corruption on the part of the Perak State government and its Mentri Besar which included 
large graft payments in return of logging concessions that ‗would normally be opposed by 
the military for security reasons‘, the security forces had largely succeeded in separating the 
CPM 5
th
 AU from the masses in Perak.
666
 Moreover, this success had been achieved in an 
operational environment whereby the booby trap remained the ‗queen of the battlefield‘. 
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Indeed as late as 1979, the prevalent fear of the booby trap and the reluctance of the 
security forces to aggressively engage the CPM insurgents meant that more often than not, 
operations were still preceded by artillery and air strikes to ‗soften up‘ the insurgents and 
booby traps.
667
  Why and how then did the Malaysian COIN effort succeed in face of 
evident corruption at the state level and in an operational environment in which the security 
forces seemed to be reverting back to the Americanised big guns approach? 
 
A partial explanation for the apparent success of the security forces was the 
improvement in the PFF-MAF relationship which enabled a sharing of operational and 
training expertise and in the field assistance.
668
 As explained in chapters three and five, the 
construction of the East-West Highway and Temenggor Dam were regarded as a direct 
threat to not only the CPM‘s presence in Malaysia but also its secure base areas in Southern 
Thailand.
669
 The projects were designed bring development to the Northern Peninsula 
Malaysia as well as physically cut off the CPM‘s infiltration routes. Nonetheless, it soon 
became apparent to most expatriate experts working on the East-West Highway that ‗the 
main purpose of the road was strategic‘ rather than of economic importance.670 Indeed, by 
December 1977, the physical barriers posed by the rapidly filling Temenggor Dam and the 
East-West Highway coupled with the disruption of the party‘s chain of command had led 
the CPM to look to survival and resurrecting its severed links with the masses.
671
   
 
The combination of these new infrastructure projects and sustained security force 
pressure compelled the various groups to change locations which in turn ‗provoked 
territorial disputes as the old de-facto boundaries between the various factions [were] 
violated‘.672 By 1979, the strategic balance on the Thai-Malaysian border region was best 
explained in the following terms: 
 
The war [remained] under control but the [insurgents‘] inability to extend their 
operations further south than West Pahang and North Selangor or to convert an 
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appreciable number of Malays to their cause (a pre-requisite to ultimate success) 
[was] matched by the inability of the Security Forces to finish the job.
673
 
 
In short, the primary cause of both the CPM‘s failure and the successful Malaysian COIN 
effort lay in the CPM‘s inability to win over the rural Malays in the border area. In tandem 
with this, the federal development projects intended to improve the living standards of the 
rural Malays had communalised the rural Malay community to such an extent that it had 
become largely immune to the CPM‘s efforts at revolutionising the thoughts and actions of 
the rural Malays.  
 
By early 1979, on both sides of the Thai-Malaysian border border, the CPM 
insurgents were driven into the deep jungle where their ‗present tactics [were] to conserve 
strength and discourage the security forces, particularly by use of booby-traps to which an 
effective answer [had] yet to be found‘.674 By then, all six CPM assault units active in 
Peninsula Malaysia were reduced to the existential task of ensuring their presence and 
survival. Even in a situation whereby the hard-core CPM insurgents held the upper hand in 
tactical engagements, it was the state that held the strategic initiative. Indeed, such was the 
confidence of the security forces in securing victory through the long-term attrition of the 
CPM that the MAF‘s planned expansion programme in 1979 called for the doubling in size 
of supporting services such as artillery and engineers, the establishment of schools of 
armour and artillery and a Conventional Warfare Centre and the creation of a tank regiment 
by July 1983 – a clear shift in emphasis towards building conventional rather than COIN 
capabilities.
675
 By the twentieth year of the CPM‘s revived insurgency, the MAF had yet to 
come up with an effective tactical solution to the CPM booby-trap problem. Yet, the large 
scale federal and state development projects under the KESBAN scheme in Northern 
Peninsula Malaysia turned the strategic initiative firmly in the Malaysian government‘s 
favour.  
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In the long run, the role of the security forces in protecting the KESBAN projects 
proved to be more effective than the locate, cordon, bomb and hope to catch the survivors 
on their way out‘ operations or any sort of limited military action that did little to influence 
the strategic picture. Indeed, by the time of KESBAN‘s formal introduction in 1980, the 
role of the Malaysian security forces was largely to create a secure environment through 
which the development projects in the country could be carried out without any 
interference.
676
 Similar to the resettlement of the rural Chinese in the first Emergency, the 
extensive relocation of Malay rural communities as part of the KESBAN development was 
designed to create a hurdle for communications between the CPM and any potential 
supporters.
677
 Despite their inability to press home militarily into the CPM jungle 
strongholds, the security umbrella provided by the security forces allowed the Malaysian 
Federal government to build up sufficient socio-economic progress in the northern Border 
States to win over the rural Malays.  
 
 The security forces ensured the safe and successful implementation of the 
KESBAN development projects and protected its economic, social and political returns. 
Indeed, KESBAN development in those areas was a significant contributory factor in the 
loyalty of the rural Malays to the ruling National Front coalition.
678
 Moreover, the 
encirclement of the New Villages with various development programmes and the extensive 
relocation of the rural population under the protection of the security services effectively 
cut off the CPM from its supporters and the masses. In short, the economic revitalisation of 
the border areas made possible under the protection of the security services brought 
employment, an improved standard of living and more importantly support for the 
government‘s cause into a hitherto ‗black‘ region. In the eyes of the rural Malays, the 
KESBAN scheme demonstrated the ability of the Federal government to ensure their 
physical and socio-economic security. Under the protection of the Malaysian security 
forces, the implementation of the KESBAN projects led to a near complete eradication of 
the CPM threat by the early 1980s. In short, it mattered little that the security forces failed 
to clear the remnants of the jungle-hardened hard-core cadres that remained. It also 
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mattered little that priority was given to the socio-economic development of the Malays 
over that of the other ethnic communities. So long as the rural Malays viewed the National 
Front as the more credible alternative, there was little that the CPM could do to turn the 
strategic tide. 
 
Building a Winning State 
 
This chapter has suggested that the rural Malay population was the centre of gravity in the 
Second Emergency. With the rural Malays won over and safely secured, tactical 
engagement with the CPM in the jungle became a sideshow that the MAF had to contain 
but need not win.  We might reprise here the interconnected COIN quadrant discussed in 
Chapter two: the utility of military force, civil-military relations, population security, 
and propaganda. The state‘s performance within this interconnected quadrant 
ultimately dictates the success or failure in countering revolutionary war, simply 
because it is through them that the power of the word and deed is most keenly felt by 
the population and the revolutionary. The sine qua non to any such strategy is the 
ability of the state to secure the key population group. In the Second Chapter, it was 
established that the American preference for overwhelming force devoid of any real 
understanding of local conditions was a poor substitute for a less destructive approach 
that sought to win over or secure the rural Vietnamese population. Conversely, the 
ability of the British colonial authorities to control and convince the rural Chinese in 
colonial Malaya consigned the then MCP to an exiled existence in Southern Thailand 
and China. Similarly, the post-colonial Malaysian government understood that the 
winning the confidence of the rural Malays in the northern Border states was the 
principal strategic task before it. 
 
In the utility of military force, the Malaysian security forces (particularly the 
MAF) largely preferred the Americanised ‗locate, cordon, bomb‘ approach in response 
to the tactical problem of booby traps. That was a significant departure from the small -
unit approach adopted by the British security forces in the later part of the Emergency. 
Reliance on its military sledgehammer approach was fatal to the prospects of American 
success in Vietnam but did not strategically set back the Malaysian COIN effort in the 
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same way. The fact that most of the large-scale ‗locate, cordon, bomb‘ operations were 
conducted in Thai rather than Malaysian territory meant that little collateral damage was 
inflicted on the rural communities in Peninsula Malaysia. The need to engage large 
numbers of communist armed elements within Peninsula Malaysia was a concern for the 
British authorities during the First Emergency that did not exist in the Second Emergency. 
As such, the role of military force during the Second Emergency was best suited to contain 
CPM violence and secure the population within Malaysian territory. A military solution at 
the strategic level was only plausible with the cooperation of the Thais whose lack of 
resources in the Southern provinces made any hopes of sustain military operations an 
unrealistic option. 
 
In theory, the committee system that extended from national to district level 
pioneered in the First Emergency was the template of civil-military cooperation in the 
Second Emergency. In practice however, service rivalries between the MAF and the police 
exacerbated by the running down of MSB led to a scenario whereby each security agency 
was very much doing its own thing. The situation was somewhat remedied from 1974 
onwards with an improvement in service conditions and equipment of the police units and 
MSB. As such, police units at the forefront of the COIN effort particularly the PFF were 
accorded better recognition rather than treated as poorer cousins of the MAF. Even though 
the MAF‘s Royal Malay Regiments were still treated as the premier units of the security 
forces regardless of their COIN abilities, the expansion and improvement in the quality of 
the PFF units did result in a more efficient PFF that was able to secure the rural areas 
and communities in the rural North of Peninsula Malaysia. The Federal government 
was cognisant of the importance of police or paramilitary capabilities in COIN 
operations and concrete steps were taken to foster greater civil-military cooperation. 
Even an incremental improvement in civil-military cooperation from 1977 was 
sufficiently rendered into better protection of the KESBAN development projects that 
were key to winning the confidence of the rural Malays. 
 
 On the oft-emphasised issue of population security, the ability of both the 
British administration to secure the rural Chinese and of the Malaysian federal 
government to secure the rural Malays decisively turned the tide of the COIN 
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campaign in the authorities‘ favour. In contrast, the failure of the American -led COIN 
effort to secure the rural population in the Vietnamese countryside precipitated the 
denouement of the American presence in Indochina. In all three COIN campaigns, the 
centre of gravity was embedded in their respective key rural communities: the rural 
Chinese for the British, the rural Vietnamese for the Americans and the rural Malays 
for the Malaysians. In the case of Singapore, the astronomic economic growth achieved 
under the PAP government which translated into socio-economic mobility for the 
population at large enabled the state to secure the urban working-class. In both 
Malaysia and Singapore, there were instances whereby colonial legacies such as the 
ISA continued to be used as instruments of population control. The Malaysian 
development as security model was essentially derived from the colonial template 
albeit with a different emphasis on priorities. The precedence on uplifting the rural 
Malays was a necessity in the Second Emergency as both the state and the insurgent 
recognised that winning the hearts and minds of the rural Malays was the key battle in 
securing Peninsula Malaysia. 
 
The CPM relied on the Maoist ‗thought determines action‘ approach to 
revolutionise the actions of its target audience. Nonetheless as the insurgency wore on, 
the CPM increasingly failed to galvanise the thoughts and actions of the population 
that mattered most – the rural Malays. Strategic propaganda broadcasts on the 
compatibility of communism with Islam and alleged cases of corruption by the Malay 
elite via the VMR were insufficient on their own to win over the majority of the rural 
Malays. According to the tenets of Maoist mass persuasion, face to face 
communication and maximum possible interaction with the masses was the main tool 
of revolutionary psywar. The crippling of the CPM underground in Peninsula Malaysia 
from 1975 onwards however prevented the CPM from carrying out mass work and 
cultivating the sustained contact required to win over the rural and urban masses. In 
view of the CPM‘s inability to sufficiently interact with the masses, even the lacklustre 
counter-propaganda efforts of the Malaysian government which were inclined to blame 
just about every major communal and social problem including the May 13 1969 Riots 
and 1974 student unrest on the CPM had little adverse impact on the overall COIN 
effort.  
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Both the Malaysian and Singapore governments were concerned about the 
subversive effects of the VMR broadcasts emanating from Chinese soil. In the longer 
term, however, the VMR failed to persuade the Malaysian and Singaporean masses on 
the credibility of the CPM‘s cause. In both word and deed, the CPM did not convince 
the rural Malays in Malaysians and urban working class in Singapore that the 
revolutionary alternative was better than the models of development offered by both 
respective states. Moreover, the CPM was also unable to win over its traditional 
audience, the rural and working-class Chinese in Peninsula Malaysia. As noted earlier, 
increase in non-political urban violence and gangsterism among the poorer Chinese and a 
higher emigration rate among the qualified middle class were the preferred displays of 
dissatisfaction with the pro-Malay policies of the Malaysian government. Further 
credibility on the local and international stage was lost when the PRC officially 
recognised Malaysia and no longer referred to the Malay Peninsula as Malaya. The 
CPM doggedly maintained and preached Maoist revolution at a time when the PRC 
was already shedding its revolutionary zeal. Simply put, the CPM‘s revolutionary 
agenda dictated by a leadership exiled in Beijing was rapidly out of touch with 
political and socio-economic conditions at the local, regional and international level.  
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Conclusion  
 
The signing of the Haadyai Peace Accords in 1989 marked a tacit recognition by the 
remnants of the CPM‘s party faithful that rural insurgency no longer held any realistic 
prospects of success in Peninsula Malaysia. While this may be said with some confidence, 
these concluding remarks acknowledge that the dearth of primary source material for the 
1981 to 89 period of the Second Emergency still presents a significant knowledge gap that 
can only be filled when further archival releases take place. It is difficult to be sure when 
this will occur. The Second Emergency remains a ‗live‘ episode of contemporary history in 
Malaysia and Singapore that tends to be cherry-picked for local political lessons rather than 
comprehensively examined as a case study in post-colonial COIN practice. As was stated at 
the very start of this thesis, the asymmetry in the availability of open-access primary 
sources poses a significant barrier to an extensive study of the Second Emergency as a 
COIN campaign. So the preceding chapters have set about the task with an explicit 
acknowledgement of the asymmetric condition in sources – particular those that present the 
perspective of the CPM and its CCP sponsors. 
 
Nonetheless, as I hope has been proven, there is sufficient empirical evidence to 
establish the meta-argument that, with the political wind – regional and international - taken 
out of its sails by 1974, the CPM stood little chance of establishing a People‘s Republic. 
For all that, the Malaysian government could never have resolved the prickly cross-border 
insurgency by unilateral or military means alone. An independent post-colonial Malaysia 
won the final argument by convincing all actors concerned that it made no sense to 
continue any investment in the CPM, an insurgent movement whose local, regional and 
international support had dwindled to insignificance. It was the force of this political 
argument that explains why and how the Malaysian state was able to secure a long-term 
strategic victory despite its lack of tactical and operational success in the jungles of 
Southern Thailand. Victory rested, not on battlefield success, but on winning the 
confidence of the key local population (the rural Malays), the main regional player 
(Thailand), and the CPM‘s erstwhile pivotal external backer (Communist China). And this 
achievement was set within the interconnected COIN quadrant identified at the beginning 
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of the thesis as follows: the utility of military force, civil-military relations, population 
security, and propaganda. 
 
For much of the Second Emergency, both the CPM and the Malaysian government 
viewed military coercion as the primary tool of engagement with the other. Yet this 
emphasis on armed confrontation highlights a central irony of the Second Emergency, 
namely, the complete absence of a decisive military action or of any instance in which 
kinetic military force had a significant impact on events. Nonetheless, both sides persisted 
in the use of military force as the key option to victory. The lack of direct high-level 
contacts between the Malaysian government and the CPM until the 1980s certainly did 
little to change perceptions of both sides of the conflict. The CPM‘s lack of dialogue with 
the Malaysian political establishment meant that constitutional channels of conflict 
resolution were closed to the Party. Under the initiative of Kitti Ratanachaya, Deputy 
Commander of the Thai Fifth Infantry Division (later Commander of Fourth Army Region), 
surreptitious initial contacts and subsequent, more formal talks between the operational, 
military and political leaders were gradually pursued.
679
 Meanwhile, by the early 1980s, the 
CPM leadership tacitly acknowledged that the armed struggle had failed. Taking advantage 
of this new window of opportunity, the Thais were instrumental in facilitating the resultant 
dialogue between the CPM and the Malaysian government that culminated in the signing of 
the Haadyai Peace Accords.  With the assistance of their Thai military counterparts, a joint 
approach allowed the Malaysian security forces to maintain attritional pressure on the CPM 
and, at the same time, open a channel of negotiation for the CPM.  Locally, Thai assistance 
at the political level and the comprehensive approach were the key enablers in winning over 
the local population which in turn guaranteed strategic success for the Malaysian 
government.  
 
Throughout much of the Second Emergency, the Malaysian security forces, the 
army above all, were compelled to adopt the American-style ‗locate, cordon, bomb‘ 
strategy in recognition of the CPM‘s superiority in jungle fighting techniques and the 
other seemingly insurmountable tactical problem of booby traps. Yet this more heavy-
                                                 
679
 Interview with General Kitti Ratanachaya, Deputy Commander of the Thai Fifth Infantry Division (later 
Commander of Fourth Army Region). 
 
212 
 
handed military approach failed to decisively defeat the CPM militarily. The chill in 
Thai-Malaysian relations from 1972 to 76 further prevented the Malaysian security 
forces from effectively pursuing the CPM in its jungle safe havens in Southern 
Thailand. The warming of Thai-Malaysian relations in 1976 facilitated an improvement 
in joint cross-border cooperation both quantitatively and qualitatively. Admission by 
Bangkok Prime Minister Tanin Kraivixien‘s administration in 1976 that the CPM 
constituted a Thai, as well as a Malaysian, security problem ushered in an era of closer 
bilateral cooperation between the two neighbouring states that included the hitherto 
unheard of practice of allowing MAF rather than PFF units into Thai territory. Joint Thai-
Malaysian operations against the CPM became more sustained and exerted an 
attritional effect on the CPM forces. MAF troops made up for the lack of military 
resources from the Thai side, but the lack of staying power of the Thai-Malaysian troops 
meant that no realistic military solution was possible under such conditions. The message 
was clear, however: the Thai government had turned away decisively from its predecessors‘ 
previous ‗live and let live‘ modus operandi when it came to its relationship with the CPM 
in Southern Thailand. 
 
The resource shortfalls that prohibited the Thais from maintaining a sustained 
and dense military presence in Southern Thailand meant that the CPM could always 
return to its jungle havens in the absence of Thai security forces. What added to the 
already tenuous situation was that, despite the improvement in bilateral relations, any 
permanent or extended basing of MAF units in Thai territory remained politically 
unfeasible for the Thai government. As a result of these restrictions, what joint Thai-
Malaysian military ventures there were remained too tightly constrained to engage the 
CPM forces decisively. Hence, the strategic options left open to the Malaysian security 
forces were more limited. As we have seen, they might be summarised thus: effective 
containment of CPM violence; the prevention of further infiltration of CPM armed units; 
and the delivery of real security to outlying populations in Malaysian territory. In the long 
term, the assistance that really mattered was not Thai boots on the ground, but the channel 
of communication facilitated by the Thais that allowed for a negotiated end to the shooting 
war. If, by the early 1980s, the CPM stood little realistic chance of military victory, 
similarly, the Malaysian security forces lacked both the capacity and the political leverage 
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to cross the border and destroy the CPM‘s safe havens in Southern Thailand. In short, the 
Malaysian security forces could not defeat the CPM militarily. The point should not be 
taken too far, for, arguably, the lack of decisive battlefield success did not matter 
because securing the population was the only absolute requirement.  
 
Seen in this light, the principal achievement of the Malaysian security forces 
during the Second Emergency lay in ensuring the safe and successful implementation of 
the KESBAN development projects and safeguarding their economic, social and political 
returns thereafter. KESBAN development in the Northern Malaysian states that brought 
employment, increased incomes and improved standards of living into the rural Malay 
communities was pivotal in guaranteeing the loyalty of the rural Malays to the ruling 
National Front coalition government. Lined to this, a further security force achievement, 
largely attributable to the MSB, was to secure the allegiance of the Malaysian Chinese 
population. Resettlement of the rural Chinese squatters into New Villages during the First 
Emergency and the concentration of much of the Chinese Community in the major urban 
areas of Malaysia made the task of securing, controlling and monitoring the Malaysian 
Chinese population during the Second Emergency a much easier task. Despite the running 
down of the MSB‘s Chinese expertise in the 1960s, the CPM failed to exploit the 
intelligence gaps to penetrate deeper into the urban areas. To make matters worse, the 
internal party slit led to an upsurge of urban violence from 1974 that severely depleted the 
ranks of the CPM underground and devastated its clandestine network. It proved a costly 
strategic mistake, one that severely weakened whatever hold the CPM had on the urban 
population. 
 
At a time when CPM was weakened by internal strife, efforts to improve 
cooperation and coordination between the MAF, MSB, police and other civil federal 
agencies were bearing fruit. Even though the MAF‘s Royal Malay Regiments were still 
treated as the premier units of the security forces, the expansion and improvement in the 
quality of the PFF units did result in a more efficient PFF that was able to secure the 
rural interior of Northern Peninsula Malaysia. Even an incremental improvement in 
civil-military cooperation from 1977 yielded tangible results in better protection of the 
KESBAN development projects that, as mentioned above, were key to winning the 
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confidence of the rural Malays. The Chinese population on the other hand could be 
effectively policed based on effective MSB intelligence and internal policing action 
without the substantial involvement of military forces. 
 
At this point, it is useful to reprise Karl Hack‘s notion of ‗screwing down the 
people‘. Hack‘s argument that the British essentially won the First Emergency by a 
coercive method of population control targeting the rural Chinese is perhaps more 
appropriate to the Second Emergency. The imperative of a hearts and minds approach 
in the First Emergency was more pressing than that in the Second Emergency as the 
British colonial authorities had to convince the highly dispersed rural Chinese of the 
viability of the New Villages and of ‗managed decolonisation‘ more generally. On the 
other hand, in the aftermath of the May 13 1969 Riots, the rural Malays, and not the 
rural Chinese, were the key population to be won over in the building of a Malay-led 
Malaysia. There was no pressing need to win the hearts and minds of the Malaysian 
Chinese in the New Villages and urban areas when potential CPM supporters could be 
effectively kept in check by police action. In the slightly different socio-demographic 
conditions of the Second Emergency, it was enough to convince any potential  
Malaysian Chinese CPM supporter of the futility of the CPM cause without the need 
for an extensive hearts and minds campaign reminiscent of the First Emergency.    
 
That is not to say that the Malaysian government deliberately ignored the needs of 
the Malaysian Chinese population. In recognition of the potential threat posed by the CPM 
to the inhabitants of the New Villages, schemes were implemented to advance the socio-
economic development of particular New Villages that were prone to CPM influence.  The 
priority in socio-economic development, however, was still accorded to the rural Malays 
for reasons of national unity and national security.  As the Second Emergency wore on, 
the CPM increasingly failed to revolutionise this key section of the Malaysian 
population. CPM propaganda which stressed the compatibility of communism with 
Islam while highlighting alleged cases of corruption among the Malay elite at the 
expense of their rural brethren via were insufficient on their own to win over the 
majority of the rural Malays. In view of the CPM‘s inability to interact with the masses 
due to its crippled underground capabilities, even the lacklustre counter-propaganda 
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efforts of the Malaysian government, which were inclined to blame just about every 
major communal and social problem, including the May 13 1969 Riots and 1974 
student unrest, on the CPM, had little adverse impact on the overall COIN effort. 
Unlike the British-led COIN effort in the First Emergency, there was little need to coax 
CPM cadres out of the jungle since the overwhelming majority of them were in the 
jungle havens across the border. Moreover, the population both urban and rural were 
effectively secured by police action. Hence, the absence of an effective propaganda 
apparatus did little damage to the state‘s prospects of success.    
 
In stark contrast, the CPM had to win the confidence the rural Malays in the 
border areas if it was to succeed in its revolution. The CPM also made little headway 
in winning over the Malaysian Chinese. As noted in chapter six, rather than take to the 
jungle with the CPM, dissatisfaction with government policies registered in non-political 
urban violence and gangsterism among the poorer Chinese and a higher emigration rate 
among the qualified middle class. In the case of Singapore, the CPM‘s revolutionary 
message was largely drowned in the heady euphoria of double digit economic growth. 
To be sure, there were sympathisers, but these were largely leftist intellectuals rather 
than the hardened revolutionaries that the CPM was hoping to recruit. In sum, the CPM 
had little success in winning over any particular demographic group in the Malay 
Peninsula. Malaysian Chinese disenchanted by the pro-Malay policies of the federal 
government theoretically presented the CPM with the best hopes, but even in their eyes, 
the CPM was seen as an unlikely winner or a credible alternative.   
 
The Second Emergency tilted in favour of the Malaysian state not so much as a 
result the security forces‘ prowess but because the CPM could not win over key 
sections of the Malaysian population. Similarly in the island city state of Singapore, the 
CPM never devised an effective riposte to the PAP‘s programme of rapid economic growth 
and fast-rising living standards.  In a political climate where the majority of the 
Singaporean electorate were prepared to allow a diminution of personal freedoms for the 
greater sake of national security and cohesion, the CPM‘s revolutionary message had 
limited appeal. With the exception of its jungle havens in Southern Thailand, the CPM 
failed to sink its roots in any significant population centre or group. Any tentative footholds 
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built by the CPM underground were destroyed by its predilection for ill-conceived 
revolutionary violence which was heavily influenced by the internal party split. Despite its 
internecine struggles, the CPM often carried the day in tactical engagements with the 
Malaysian security forces, but these sideshows did little to win the big battle that mattered – 
winning over the confidence of the rural Malays. CPM inability to secure the popular 
allegiance of any significant social or ethnic group was exacerbated by its loss of 
confidence at the international level. 
 
The available empirical evidence suggests that, as early as 1972, the PRC was 
taking tentative steps towards the establishment of diplomatic ties with non-communist 
Southeast Asia. In 1974, the international legitimacy of the CPM‘s cause was dealt a severe 
blow when the Zhou Enlai conceded the point that the CPM was an internal problem for 
Malaysia. China under Deng was pragmatic in its readiness to forsake a failing 
revolutionary movement with scant local or international legitimacy in return for ASEAN 
votes at the United Nations. Despite its unwavering pro-Beijing stance, as exemplified in 
the CPM‘s VMR propaganda, Deng realised that China would benefit more from closing 
down of the VMR station at Lee Kuan Yew‘s request than standing by a protégé without 
realistic prospect of success. In the long term, the CCP‘s fraternal relationship with the 
CPM was more of an embarrassment rather than an aid to Chinese foreign policy. Deng‘s 
vision of China was far more effectively advanced by harnessing the international influence 
and potential foreign investment represented in Lee Kuan Yew. Chin Peng‘s promised 
revolution offered nothing comparable. Unlike its immediate counterpart in Vietnam, the 
CPM failed to elicit any substantial Sino-Soviet material support or lobbying assistance on 
the international stage. Moreover, unlike the Vietnamese insurgents, the CPM failed to win 
control of the villages in the countryside. Furthermore, the CPM‘s underground 
infrastructure in the cities was too weakly rooted to form the basis for a protracted urban 
insurrection. With little local and international support, the CPM‘s revolution failed to 
make any significant progress beyond its safe havens in Southern Thailand.  
 
In the final analysis, while the CPM bettered the Malaysian security forces 
militarily at the tactical level, at the strategic level, the security forces managed to string a 
defensive cordon around the northern border states. This, in turn, allowed KESBAN 
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development to succeed. The Malaysian security forces did not have to defeat the CPM in 
battle as long as the rural population in the North was sufficiently shielded from CPM 
violence. Conversely, for all its jungle-fighting prowess, the CPM never possessed the 
critical mass of popular support to bleed the security forces into capitulation. Moreover, its 
attempts to sabotage KESBAN development proved counter-productive, retarding its 
efforts to win over the rural Malays – the main local centre of gravity in the Second 
Emergency. CPM failure to penetrate and control the four northern largely rural and mainly 
Malay states of Kelantan, Trenggannu, Kedah and Perlis rendered the CPM‘s plans for a 
southward advance by 1975 unachievable. Despite allegations of widespread corruption, 
the immense socio-economic improvements brought by KESBAN development and the 
moderately pro-Malay policies of the UMNO-led coalition won the minds if not hearts of 
the rural Malays. Securing the rural Malay population and winning their confidence was the 
key battle that the CPM had to win. It failed to do so.    
 
The Second Emergency was a contemporary of the Vietnam War in its international, 
regional and operational context. Both conflicts were a reflection of the Cold War dynamics 
in Southeast Asia – particularly Sino-American foreign policies in the region. As we have 
seen in the preceding chapters, the empirical evidence suggested a cross-fertilisation of 
operational and tactical methods between the insurgents and counterinsurgents.  Why then 
has the Second Emergency remained a footnote whilst the Vietnam War became so 
entrenched in the COIN metanarrative – even in Southeast Asia? As hinted in the preceding 
paragraphs, the lack of access to indigenous primary source material including government 
archives posses an impediment to further research on the conflict. Another possible 
explanation can be found in the scale of the conflict. The scarcity of resources available to 
the Malaysian government meant that even at the peak of the CPM insurgency, only a 
single division of the Malaysian Army could be deployed in the COIN role in Peninsula 
Malaysia. Conversely, a single U.S. Army infantry battalion in Vietnam had at its disposal 
more indirect fire support and air support than the entire Malaysian Army. The ‗smallness‘ 
of the Second Emergency (when compared to the magnitude of the Vietnam War) however 
does not hide the potential lessons that can be drawn from the Second Emergency for future 
consideration – particularly the evolution of a population-centric comprehensive approach. 
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On the other hand, ‗big‘ as exemplified by the U.S. Army in Vietnam is not always 
beautiful – especially when the key objective is winning over the population. 
 
  In Vietnam, heavy collateral damage from the ‗big guns‘ approach resulted in the 
loss of American credibility as protectors of the Vietnamese villagers. With a rural 
population resentful and disgruntled at the wanton destruction of their lives, livelihoods and 
property, the Vietcong had no lack of recruits to fill its ranks while American efforts at 
pacification were critically hampered. The overwhelming display of force by the U.S. 
Armed Forces also had a negative impact on domestic opinion. According to Ivan 
Arreguin-Toft‘s ‗strategic interaction‘ theory, when actors employ opposite strategic 
approaches (direct-indirect or indirect-direct), the weaker actor is more likely to win 
‗even when everything we think we know about power says they shouldn‘t‘.680 Andrew 
Mack describes the Vietnam War as a conflict fought on two fronts, ‗one bloody and 
indecisive in the forests and mountains of Indochina, the other essentially non-violent 
but ultimately more decisive within the polity and social institutions of the United 
States‘. Mack further argues that the obvious asymmetry in American conventional 
military power often meant that the morality of the war is more easily questioned.
681
 
Highlighting the ‗distance between the position of the state and that of the liberal forces 
(that give meaning to the term society) concerning the legitimacy of the demand for 
sacrifice and for brutal conduct‘, or ‗normative difference‘, Gil Merom concluded that:  
 
Events in Vietnam … destroyed the credibility of the Vietnam 
policy … while Nixon‘s combined policies bought him time and some 
freedom of maneuver, they could not eliminate the anti -war sentiment 
and the protest potential, or change the ultimate outcome of the 
war … In the end, in spite of significant battlefield successes, all the Americans 
                                                 
680
 Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, p. 18. 
681
 Andrew Mack, ‗Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict‘, World Politics, 
27 (January 1975), 181–82, pp. 177–186. 
219 
 
achieved was to buy their South Vietnamese allies a few more years of political 
independence.
682
 
 
America‘s strictly military approach to counter a People‘s War in Vietnam saw many a tactical 
victory in numerous engagements with the NVA and Vietcong on the battlefield. However, 
the sheer brutality associated with American military action alienated much of domestic polity 
and public opinion. Drawing on the lessons of Vietnam, David Petraeus drills home the point 
that public support is the ‗Essential Domino‘, and the Vietnam War showed the military that 
there are finite limits to how long the American public will support a protracted conflict.
683
 
On the futility of the big war paradigm, Edward Luttwak mused that ‗450 American 
soldiers could have been carrying flutes instead of manning howitzers, and if they had just 
played their flutes, it would have had exactly the same effect on the outcome of the 
war‘.684 By ignoring the public opinion factor and the crucial importance of an integrated 
civil-military approach to what was essentially a political rather than a conventional military 
task, what the American military establishment obtained in the end, were pyrrhic tactical 
victories that led to no strategic solution.  
 
In contrast to the integrated civil-military infrastructure that the British 
instituted in the First Emergency and later by Malaysia in the Second Emergency, 
Westmoreland and many of the senior commanders in the U.S. Army saw no need for 
such an equivalent and conducted the Vietnam War as a ‗purely military-army-
business‘. According to Robert Komer, the over-militarisation of the war ‗led to the 
tail wagging the dog, with everything else required to conform‘.685 Nonetheless, an 
aberration from the ‗search and destroy‘ strategy of the army was to be found in the 
‗Balkanised‘ environment of the Vietnam War. Marine Generals such as Krulak and 
Greene charged that rather than addressing the fundamental needs of the Vietnamese 
people—security and political stability—MACV strategy was ‗needlessly bleeding 
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American forces by engaging the enemy in big-unit encounters while the VC infrastruc-
ture remained virtually untouched‘.686  
 
With Kruluk‘s firm backing, Major General Lewis Walt was able to conduct an 
independent campaign of pacification in the I Corps area of operations in the 
northernmost region of South Vietnam. Walt created a coordinating council of regional 
civilian agency heads and Combined Action Platoons (CAP), which integrated marine 
rifle squads with the South Vietnamese Regional Forces platoons. Living in the 
villages among the rural population, the CAP units were able to focus their efforts on 
pacification while regular USMC units conducted platoon-sized patrols and civic action 
programmes. In the planning rooms of Washington, Greene and Krulak fought in vain 
against the entrenched big war paradigm. Despite the encouraging results of CAP in I 
Corps, Westmoreland was loathed to introduce the CAP concept to the Army‘s area 
of operations. The pure military approach as advocated by Westmoreland was to continue in 
MACV administered sectors until 1968, when a belated effort was made to revitalise and 
inject some synergy into the pacification programme in South Vietnam. 
 
The last and final shake-up of the pacification programme in 1967 resulted in an 
acrimonious dispute between the military and civilian bureaucracies in Washington and 
South Vietnam. The main issue of contention was ‗whether pacification should be 
considered primarily a political or a military problem, a matter of social development or 
of national security‘.687 Over the years, based on findings that the ‗division was a purely 
military instrument and could not adequately control the integrated civilian-military 
effort that was needed at the province level‘, various study groups such as the Roles 
and Missions Study Group advocated removing the ARVN Divisions from the chain of 
command on Pacification. Westmoreland, however, did not concur with the 
recommendations and argued that if carried out, ‗the Corps span of control would be 
too large for effective direction‘, and the notion, was therefore ‗illogical‘. 688 When 
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the dust eventually settled, it was the military view that prevailed. In the final attempt at 
integrated civil-military pacification, the Civil Operations and Rural Development 
Support (CORDS) programme headed by the ebullient Ambassador Robert Komer was set 
up, albeit under the jurisdiction of MACV.  
 
Under CORDS, American military forces, as well as those of her allies engaged in an 
extensive civic action programme, intended to assist the populace in the vicinity of their 
base areas. Troops were involved in the distribution of food, clothing, building materials 
and fertilizer, in the construction and repair of bridges, the building of schools and medical 
clinics, and the provision of medical examinations and immunisations. However, these 
efforts could do little as long as the status quo at the higher level remained unchanged. Just 
as firepower and technology came to be the substitutes for an effective military strategy, 
utilising the financial resources of the world‘s largest capitalist economy was the dominant 
approach in the civil affairs arena. Indeed U.S. policy in Vietnam as a whole failed to 
realise the fundamental importance of the social and psychological factors in 
pacification, particularly the need for effective population security measures that 
would separate the insurgent from the population as well as prove to the people that 
the government was committed to their safety and well-being. In other words, the 
incoherent application of immense material resources to win over a population which 
the government little understands does not automatically lead to strategic success.  
 
On the other hand, as a smaller case study in post-colonial insurgency/COIN, the 
Second Emergency presents three main conclusions and considerations for further 
deliberation. The primacy of population control and how the development of a population-
centric comprehensive approach can deliver strategic victory has been emphasised 
throughout this thesis. We have seen how the federal Malaysian government and, to a lesser 
extent, the city state of Singapore were able to achieve this by state-building, extending the 
arms of the state and its institutions throughout hitherto impenetrable sovereign territory. 
Conversely, rather than extend its parallel underground infrastructure like the Vietcong, the 
CPM sowed the seeds of its own demise by destroying its precious underground cells in 
open competition with the CPMRF and CPMML.  
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Thus the first main conclusion is this - emergent nation-states plagued by 
insurgency benefit from attaching higher priority to contested population groups and 
extending the reach of state institutions and agencies into the regions where such 
communities are concentrated. The British colonial authorities were able to build a 
successful counterinsurgent state in the First Emergency that had its footprints firmly 
planted right down to the district and village levels – particularly in the highly contested 
black areas. Upon independence, what the British bequeathed to the post-colonial 
Malaysian government was not a failed state unsure of its survival, but a polity with an 
efficient civil service, well developed physical infrastructure and vibrant export-orientated 
economy. To be sure, there were lingering pockets of potential sympathisers which the 
insurgents could exploit. Much of the population-centric apparatus from the First 
Emergency however remained. The Malaysian government was able to adapt its 
population-centric inheritance to the needs of the Second Emergency albeit in a slightly 
different manner. The principle governing the overall strategy nonetheless remained the 
same – identifying, controlling and winning over of key population groups with a targeted 
approach that is in touch with the psyche and social characteristics of the particular group. 
 
The second consideration is related to the first - no population can be effectively 
secured in a cross-border insurgency without effective assistance from its immediate 
neighbours. It would be ahistorical to refer to this particular experience as a template of 
success for other post-colonial COIN efforts, but the breeding grounds of insurgencies have 
traditionally been in regions with a conspicuous absence of state authority – in this case the 
badlands of Southern Thailand. As we have seen, the fact that the Thais no longer tolerated 
the CPM as a state within a state and chose instead to cooperate with Malaysia in their 
COIN efforts was a key determinant that turned the strategic tide in Malaysia‘s favour. In 
the case of Vietnam, the porous nature of the Cambodian-Vietnamese border allowed the 
Vietcong to set up an intricate network of infiltration routes that the American forces failed 
to interdict from both land and air. The Thai-Malaysian security forces were never able to 
completely cut off all of the CPM‘s infiltration routes or uproot the most impenetrable 
CPM safe havens, but the joint pressure certainly attrited CPM strength. Indeed,  by the late 
1970s, the CPM was weakened to the point of fighting for survival rather than advancing 
its armed struggle southward. The CPM‘s inability to mount any concerted southward 
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advance allowed the Malaysian government to secure the population in the Northern States 
and thus the whole of Peninsular Malaysia. It is difficult to conceive how Malaysia could 
have succeeded without Thai assistance and a more secure border. Had the Thais persisted 
with a ‗live and let live‘ policy, the Second Emergency might have persisted well beyond 
1989.   
 
The final conclusion is perhaps the most consistent across this narrative, namely, 
that the large-scale application of kinetic military force is likely to prove indecisive in a 
COIN scenario. The experiences related here seem to indicate that the reverse might even 
apply. After all, the inability of the Malaysian security forces to come to grips with the 
CPM at the tactical level did not adversely set back the overall COIN effort. Conversely, 
the tactical successes of the U.S. Army on the battlefield failed to secure the Vietnamese 
countryside. Indeed, the most effective contribution of the Malaysian security forces during 
the Second Emergency was population protection and the protection of key development 
projects. The restricted operating environment of the Second Emergency and the fact that 
the Federal government got its grand strategy right meant that the tactical and operational 
shortcomings of the Malaysian security forces did not snowball into strategic defeat. The 
ghosts of failure from the Vietnam War, however, are still being exorcised into lessons. As 
T.E. Lawrence observed, such lessons are often counterintuitive to military commanders 
and the soldiers that they command. As he recalled, ‗It seemed a regular soldier might be 
helpless without a target. He would own the ground he sat on, and what he could poke his 
rifle at‘.689 Even as we acknowledge the shift in historical context and milieu, perhaps this 
peculiar trait of soldiering observed by Lawrence close to a century ago will stand the test 
of time. 
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